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Abstract  
Remembering national heroes is one of the most important aspects of the politics of national 
identity. Due to their exemplary lives and deeds, the national heroes get portrayed as the role 
models for the nation. How do states choose the heroes? What are the ‘selection criteria’? What 
is the role of commemorating the heroes in defining the relations between the national ‘self’ 
and ‘other’? Using the case of the ‘Heroes of Tajikistan’ and this nation’s problematic relations 
with neighbouring Uzbekistan, this thesis attempts to find the answers to these questions. In 
doing so, it relies on the poststructuralist theories of IR. The study reveals that the discursive 
construction of the national ‘self’ and ‘other’ through commemorating the ‘Heroes of Tajikistan’ 
is a correlative of Uzbekistan’s threatening behaviour in relations with Tajikistan. In other words, 
remembering the heroes in particular, and the identity politics in general, are not the simple 
matters of domestic affairs, but rather can be the crucial factors in studying international 
relations.  
As this research revealed, the national identity discourses in Tajikistan honour the ‘Heroes’ for 
their leadership in achieving national independence from Uzbekistan in the 1920s (Makhsum 
and Shotemur), and defending the Tajik language and literary traditions from the discriminatory 
attitude of the Uzbek nationalists in the late 1920s (Aini),as well as writing the history of Tajiks 
throughout the Soviet period in a way that represents Tajiks as the indigenous people of Central 
Asia and Uzbeks as the occupants (Ghafurov). Uzbekistan’s interference in the Tajik civil war 
(1992-1997) and its hostile position towards the construction of the Roghun hydroelectric power 
station in Tajikistan (since 2004) triggered the negative memories about the traditional Uzbek 
‘other.’ At the same due to the predominance of the narratives about the traditionally negative 
image of Uzbeks, the behaviour of Uzbekistan in the post-Soviet period appears as a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. In the light of ever-growing Tajik-Uzbek tension, literary, academic and journalistic 
discourses in Tajikistan portray the President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon, another officially 
recognised ‘Hero of Tajikistan’, as continuing the struggle of the past heroes against Uzbeks. 
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1 
Introduction  
1. Overview 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed “An Agreement on Eternal Friendship” in 2000.1 Ironically, 
relations between the two nations have rarely been friendly since. Towards the end of the 
2000s, Uzbek-Tajik bilateral relations rather reached a state that one observer called a “cold 
war”.2 This thesis examines this “cold war” in terms of self/other relations, with a particular 
focus on discourses dominant on the Tajik side of the conflict. Concentration on the discursive 
construction of the Tajik “self” and the Uzbek “other” in Tajikistan provides a historical context 
for the “cold war” and thus, “bring[s] to light an unfolding pattern that culminates in and 
clarifies the present.”3 Furthermore, analysing Tajik-Uzbek relations in terms of the self/other 
dichotomy makes it possible to identify the particular features associated with both “self” and 
“other” that animate the inter-national enmity. Considering that discursively constructed 
images of national heroes represent the exemplary features of the national “self”, this thesis is 
entirely devoted to an analysis of the Heroes of Tajikistan.4 
The argument that this thesis makes is two-fold. Firstly, studying the heroes/anti-heroes of a 
nation is helpful in understanding the dominant moral attributes attached to the “self” and the 
“other”, which provides an informative lead-in to a close examination of the nation’s foreign 
relations. This argument is built throughout the thesis by proposing answers to sets of question 
in respective sections of the thesis: How do states choose the heroes? What are the ‘selection 
criteria’? What is the role of commemorating the heroes in defining the relations between the 
national ‘self’ and ‘other’? As it will be shown in literature review, so far there is no scholarly 
work that has attempted to answer these questions, which evidences the original contribution 
of this study to academia. Furthermore, as the second part of the next chapter clarifies, this 
argument is founded on an original theoretical framework, which is a contribution to the 
discipline of International Relations in its own right. Considering that the thematic focus of the 
thesis is on Tajikistan and some problematic aspects of its relations with Uzbekistan, the thesis 
makes a second argument; precisely, practices of national identity construction in Tajikistan are 
                                                          
1 The Tajik side views this and previously signed similar document as an important milestone in the bilateral 
relations between the two nations. See Hamrokhon Zarifi, ed. Siiosati Khorizhi Tozhikiston dar Masiri Istiqloliiat 
(Dushanbe: Irfon, 2011), 27. See also Emomali Rahmon - bunyonguzori siyosati khorizhi Tozhikistan, ed. Hamrokhon 
Zarifi (Dushanbe: Irfon, 2012), 94. 
2 See Saltanat Berdikeeva, "A Cold War Over Resources in Central Asia," National Geographic Energy Blog, 30 May 
2012; Shairbek Juraev, "Central Asia's Cold War? Water and politics in Uzbek-Tajik relations," PONARS Eurasia Policy 
Memo, no. 217, September 2012. 
3 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its 
Implications for the Study of World Politics  (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 160. 
4 Throughout this thesis, the word “Hero” (with a capital letter) is used to refer to the Heroes of Tajikistan 
(Qahramoni Tojikiston), while “hero” (with a lower case initial letter) is used for the general meaning of this word. 
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remarkably immersed in demonization of the Uzbek “other”, as a result of which the current 
Tajik moral space,5 it has become impossible to have a sustainable discourse about the Tajik 
“self” without implicitly or explicitly referencing the Uzbek “other”. In other words, given that 
“othering” is an inevitable part of constructing the “self”, the negative image of 
Uzbeks/Uzbekistan is vital for the ongoing discursive construction of Tajik “self”. Linking it to 
Central Asian studies, and perhaps provoking new debates, this argument enables to assume 
that a “cold war” with Uzbekistan is vital to Tajikistan to ensure its ontological security.6 
2. Literature review 
There are plenty of IR publications with a specific focus on the links between the politics of 
national identity and international relations. Some of these publications view national identity 
as stable national feature that informs foreign policy practices.7 The approaches of these works 
are not applicable to this study for the methodological reasons explained in the next section, as 
well as for the theoretical reasons covered in the next chapter. Other publications have treated 
the interaction of identity and cross-border relations as mutually constitutive. These works focus 
on the role of the various discourses at work and, according to them, identity requires the 
existence of the “other”.8 A review of some these publications and related literature is provided 
in the sections of the thesis that deal with methodology and theoretical frameworks. This thesis, 
while relying on the methodological and theoretical assumptions offered by these works, makes 
a unique contribution to the existing literature in terms of its thematic focus and argumentation. 
While a significant number of publications are devoted to studying of the politics of identity in 
Tajikistan, no scholarly work has been conducted on the theme of the Heroes of Tajikistan with 
the aim of revealing the “moral compass” of the Tajik “self”. Furthermore, even though there is 
no shortage of academic research in covering the importance of the images of heroes/anti-
heroes in shaping the national “self”, so far no attempt has been made to use these findings in 
an analysis of inter-state relations with the aim to propose an all-encompassing IR theory. This 
                                                          
5 The definition of the term is provided in chapter 1 in a broader context of an analytical framework of the thesis. 
6 A section of Chapter 1 is devoted to the definition of the concepts of ontological security.  
7 See, for instance, Douglas Woodwell, Nationalism in International Relations: Norms, Foreign Policy, and Enmity  
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Amelia Hadfield-Amkhan, British Foreign Policy, National Identity, and 
Neoclassical Realism  (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010) 
8 Roxanne Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of US Counterinsurgency Policy in 
the Philippines," International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 3 (1993); Jennifer Milliken, "Metaphors of Prestige and 
Reputation in American Foreign Policy and American Realism," in Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International 
Relations, ed. Francis Beer and Robert Hariman (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1996); Alexander 
Bukh, Japan's National Identity and Foreign Policy: Russia as Japan's 'Other'  (London and New York: Routledge, 
2011); Alanna Krolikowski, "State Personhood in Ontological Security Theories of International Relations and 
Chinese Nationalism: A Skeptical View," Chinese Journal of International Politics 2, no. 1 (2008); Xavier Guillaume, 
"Foreign Policy and the Politics of Alterity: A Dialogical Understanding of International Relations," Millenium - 
Journal of International Studies 31, no. 1 (2002); David Campbell, "Global Inscription: How Foreign Policy Constitutes 
the United States," Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 15, no. 3 (1990) 
3 
section of the thesis is devoted to a review of literature on two relevant themes – relations 
between Tajik “self” and Uzbek “other”, and roles of hero-making for identity construction.  
2.1. Literature on Tajikistan’s national identity politics and bilateral relations with 
Uzbekistan 
A wide range of literature on Tajikistan’s political history, domestic policy, and specific identity 
construction practices is available.9 Most of these sources are used and critically analyzed in the 
relevant chapters. However, some of them need to be reviewed here to establish the position 
of this thesis in terms of a knowledge creation practice. To begin with, a growing number of 
scholarly works on identity and the “other” in Tajikistan are employing discourse analysis 
methods. One such analysis, which inspired this thesis at its earliest stage, is Blakkisrud and 
Nozimova’s analysis of Tajikistan’s historical textbooks.10 By comparatively analysing history 
textbooks published in Tajikistan during the 1990s and early 2000s, these scholars revealed a 
dominant narrative in which, not only is a glorious, past Tajik ‘’self’’ created, but also the image 
of “others” such as a threatening Uzbek “the new old enemy,” “lingering influence of the 
Russian/Soviet heritage” as well as “Islam as a potential disruptive power”.11 However, as this 
thesis shows, Blakkisrud and Nozimova were inaccurate in their findings when they concluded 
that “[n]ever before and never after has Tajik “self” been presented in opposition to the Uzbek 
“other” to such an extent.  The Uzbeks are being accused of attempting to deprive Tajiks of both 
their nationality and their statehood”.12 Furthermore, there can be no doubt that textbook 
analysis is a useful means of understanding dominant and officially promoted discourses about 
the “self” and the “other”. However, it ought to be viewed as one of many locales of identity 
                                                          
9 See, for instance, Kirill Nourzhanov and Christian Bleuer, Tajikistan: A Political and Social History, Asian Studies 
Series Monograph 5 (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2013). Paul Bergne, The Birth of Tajikistan: National Identity and the 
Origins of the Republic  (London: I.B.Tauris, 2007). John Heathershaw and Edmund Herzig, "Introduction: the 
sources of statehood in Tajikistan," Central Asian Survey 30, no. 1 (2011). Sergei Abashin, "The Transformation of 
Ethnic Identity in Central Asia: A Case Study of the Uzbeks and Tajiks," Russian Regional Perspectives 1, no. 2 (2010). 
Kirill Nourzhanov, "The Politics of History in Tajikistan: Reinventing the Samanids," Harvard Asia Quarterly 5, no. 1 
(2001). Marlene Laruelle, "The Return of the Aryan Myth: Tajikistan in Search of a Secularized National Ideology," 
Nationalities Papers 35, no. 1 (2007). Helge Blakkisrud and Shahnoza Nozimova, "History writing and nation building 
in post-independence Tajikistan," Nationalities Papers 38, no. 2 (2010). Slavomír Horák, "In Search of the History of 
Tajikistan: What Are Tajik and Uzbek Historians Arguing About?," Russian Politics and Law 48, no. 5 (2010): 73-74. 
Reuel Hanks, "Indentity Theft? Ethnosymbolism, Autochthonism, and Aryanism in Uzbek and Tajik National 
Narratives," in Nationalism and Identity Construction in Central Asia: Dimensions, Dynamics, and Directions, ed. 
Mariya Omelicheva (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2015). Mohira Suyarkulova, "Statehood as Dialogue: 
Conflicting Historical Narratives of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan," in The Transformation of Tajikistan: The Sources of 
Statehood, ed. John Heathershaw and Edmund Herzig (New York: Routledge, 2013). "Between national idea and 
international conflict: the Roghun HHP as an anti-colonial endeavor, body of the nation, and national wealth," 
Water History 6, no. 4 (2014). Filippo Menga, "Building a nation through a dam: the case of Rogun in Tajikistan," 
Nationalities Papers 43, no. 3 (2015). Eva Kleingeld, "The Rogun Dam in Tajik-Uzbek Official Discourse" (Leiden 
University, 2016). Shahram Akbarzadeh, "Why did nationalism fail in Tajikistan?," Europe‐Asia Studies 48, no. 7 
(1996): 1109. 
10 Blakkisrud and Nozimova, "History writing and nation building in post-independence Tajikistan." 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 180. 
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construction and power relations. Nevertheless, Blakkisrud and Nozimova’s article has 
introduced an innovative approach to the study of Tajik national identity and remains the most 
comprehensive publication that focuses on the analysis of Tajik history textbooks.   
An article by Horák demonstrates that there is a wider context to self/other construction in Tajik 
history textbooks. Horák clearly depicts how, in the post-Soviet period, Tajik and Uzbek 
historians got involved in a disagreement over their conflicting versions of the nations’ national 
historiography. Horák’s work is important not only in understanding the growing role of Tajik 
historiography in shaping the Tajik “self” in opposition to the Uzbek “other”, but also in 
attempting to show the direction in which the “dominant intellectual paradigm” in Tajikistan13 
was headed. In particular, Horák correctly notes that “[v]arious approaches to the perception of 
history have not only given rise to scholarly debate but also become a factor in interstate 
relations”14 because both Tajik and Uzbek historians are dependent on the state and its 
dominant ideology.15 Horák wrote that “[t]he Soviet school of historiography […] supported the 
search for the historical roots of this or that nation exclusively in a particular Soviet Socialist 
republic - not on the territory of other, neighbouring republics.”16 This statement is weak, 
however. As it will be shown elsewhere in this thesis, a Soviet approach to historiography has 
not prevented Soviet Tajik and Uzbek historians from creating conflicting and mutually exclusive 
versions of the history of Central Asia. In particular, Tajik scholars have never agreed to limit 
their focus within the state borders.  
Horak’s theme has been further developed by other scholars.17 A chapter authored by Mohira 
Suyarkulova offers an interesting social constructivist analysis of conflicting historical narratives 
in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.18 The author convincingly argues that the “historiography wars” 
between Tajik and Uzbek scholars have been instrumental in the construction of “positive self-
identity and negative other-identity” in both states.19 Suyarkulova particularly focuses on how 
the debates between Tajik and Uzbek historians on Aryan ancestry and the history of national 
statehood (i.e., the focus on the Samanid Empire in Tajikistan and the Timurid Empire in 
Uzbekistan) ensured the dialogical construction of self/other relations in both countries.20 She 
also provides a brief overview of historiographical debates that took place between Tajikistan 
                                                          
13 Horák, "In Search of the History of Tajikistan: What Are Tajik and Uzbek Historians Arguing About?," 73-74. 
14 Ibid., 65. 
15 Ibid., 66. 
16 Ibid. 
17 See Suyarkulova, "Statehood as Dialogue: Conflicting Historical Narratives of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan." Hanks, 
"Indentity Theft? Ethnosymbolism, Autochthonism, and Aryanism in Uzbek and Tajik National Narratives." 
18 Suyarkulova, "Statehood as Dialogue: Conflicting Historical Narratives of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan." 
19 Ibid., 162. 
20 See ibid., 166-73. 
5 
and Uzbekistan during the Soviet period.21 Similarly, a publication by Reuel Hanks provides an 
interesting study of “duelling identities” in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Hanks relies on an analysis 
of the concepts of the longue duree, mythometeur, and a “golden age” in order to reveal how 
“each state is “othering” its rival as it attempts to develop the symbolic capital required to 
construct a national ideology based on an ethno-symbolic framework.”22 It should be noted, 
though, that Suyarkulova and Hanks focus on what Wendt would call the “social identity” of a 
state. “Social identity” is shaped by inter-state relations or, to use Suyarkulova’s words, 
“dialogue”. However, as it will be shown in the next chapter of this thesis, neither scholar was 
interested in focusing on the discursive construction of identity. Without revealing the general 
practices of discursive construction and the moral foundations of self/other polarity, a 
“dialogical” or “duelling” approach remains inadequate. It fails to explain, for instance, how and 
why, the Russian state and the Islamic religion occasionally surface as “others” in Tajikistan’s 
discourses on national identity. Hanks’ focus on the “golden age” and myth-making 
demonstrates that his research is not only about Wendtian “social identity”, but also covers 
“corporate identity” issues. Nevertheless, a further theoretical elaboration on the links between 
these two levels of identity would be helpful.23  
Closely related to this thesis’s focus are recently published scholarly works about how official 
Tajik official discourses on the Roghun hydroelectric power station have been shaping both Tajik 
national identity and the image of the Uzbek “other”.24 In her article, Suyarkulova offers an 
analysis of “the elite discourse” on the Roghun project in Tajikistan using the predicate and 
metaphor analysis methods. She implies that the self/other dichotomy prevalent in those 
discourses and self/other polarity in historical discourses are connected.25 This important point 
in her article would benefit from elaboration. This article can be viewed as one of the first 
attempts to “problematize the metaphors, tropes, and narratives utilized by both sides of the 
controversy” in Tajik-Uzbek self/other discourses.26 However, it is overwhelmingly reliant on 
Russian language news reports as primary sources for conducting discourse analysis; to have a 
complete scope of “the elite discourse” it would be appropriate to incorporate some official 
statements and public speeches, including Tajik language primary sources.27 Another limitation, 
                                                          
21 Ibid., 163-66. 
22 Hanks, "Indentity Theft? Ethnosymbolism, Autochthonism, and Aryanism in Uzbek and Tajik National Narratives," 
122. 
23 As shown in the next chapter, Alexander Wendt theorizes “social identity” as more related to international 
relations, thus does not consider “corporate identity” as a matter of inter-state relations.  
24 Suyarkulova, "Between national idea and international conflict: the Roghun HHP as an anti-colonial endeavor, 
body of the nation, and national wealth." Menga, "Building a nation through a dam: the case of Rogun in Tajikistan." 
Kleingeld, "The Rogun Dam in Tajik-Uzbek Official Discourse." 
25 See Suyarkulova, "Between national idea and international conflict: the Roghun HHP as an anti-colonial endeavor, 
body of the nation, and national wealth," 373-74. 
26 Ibid., 381. 
27 Suyarkulova admits this limitation in the beginning of the article. See ibid., 368. 
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which is perhaps due to the limited space in an academic article, no comprehensive definitions 
of predicate analysis and metaphor analysis are provided. Nevertheless, the article is 
outstanding for the methods of analysis chosen.   
Thematically and methodologically similar to Suyarkulova’s article, Filippo Menga’s article 
provides an interesting analysis of the Tajik government’s “rhetorical legitimation strategies” 
and their impact on establishing an image of Roghun as a national project. Menga’s analysis 
focuses on “how the construction of a national identity can overlap with the construction of a 
large dam, to the extent that the dam itself becomes a national image.”28 The scope and variety 
of the primary sources used in the article is impressive. Menga convincingly argues that 
Uzbekistan’s position on Roghun “convince[ed] the Tajik government that the dam could be held 
up as a symbol of self-determination and success, one that could rally the Tajik people around a 
national idea and against a common antagonist.”29 Building on Menga’s findings, this thesis 
attempts to show that the Roghun project has been utilized by Tajik government to build 
President Rahmon’s heroic image in the face of the “traditional” Uzbek threat. 
The relevant literature on identity issues in Tajikistan and the role of Uzbek “other” in the 
construction of Tajik “self” is not limited to the publications reviewed above. However, so far no 
scholarly work has been conducted exploring how commemoration of the Heroes of Tajikistan 
shaped the self/other dichotomy. This thesis is going to explore a new area in this regard. The 
role of the Heroes in the identity politics in Tajikistan is not of lesser importance than, for 
instance, the role played by the commemoration of Ismoil Somoni, a notorious Samanid ruler of 
the medieval period and Aryan heritage.30 Kirill Nourzhanov has shown that the politics of 
commemorating the Samanid Empire as the “golden age” of Tajik national statehood touch upon 
the image of the Uzbek “other”.31 In her turn, Marlene Laruelle’s inquiry into the Tajik 
government’s attempts to validate the idea of the Tajik nation’s Aryan roots shows the 
importance of autochthonous-ness in the regional rivalry.32 This thesis demonstrates that along 
with the Samanid Empire and Aryanism, the Heroes of Tajikistan should be viewed as the third 
pillar of national identity politics in Tajikistan. 
                                                          
28 Menga, "Building a nation through a dam: the case of Rogun in Tajikistan," 480. 
29 Ibid., 487. 
30 For a comprehensive analysis of the role of remembering the Samanid Empire in the formation of the ideological 
foundations of the Tajik statehood, see Nourzhanov, "The Politics of History in Tajikistan: Reinventing the 
Samanids." For an analysis of how the idea of Aryan ancestry is being utilizaed in shaping the national identity in 
Tajikistan, see Laruelle, "The Return of the Aryan Myth: Tajikistan in Search of a Secularized National Ideology." 
31 Nourzhanov, "The Politics of History in Tajikistan: Reinventing the Samanids." 
32 Laruelle, "The Return of the Aryan Myth: Tajikistan in Search of a Secularized National Ideology." 
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2.2. Literature on national heroes and anti-heroes 
Scholarly interest in the patterns of discursive construction relating to the personalities of those 
specifically selected to be heroes of their nations is relatively new.33 As the growing number of 
studies show, discursive construction of heroes is one of the central aspects of the politics of 
identity in many countries around the world. It can be seen in the examples of France,34 Israel,35 
the Philippines,36 the US,37 Bulgaria,38 Barbados,39 Indonesia,40 Ukraine,41 Nigeria,42 China,43 
Serbia,44 Chechen Republic,45 etc. There is an “unquestioned consensus among scholars about 
the role that national heroes play in modern societies.”46 Various schools of nationalism studies 
agree on the importance of heroes. In Eriksonas’ words, “different ways of thinking about the 
nation are in unison when it comes to the concept of the national hero, a notion which lends the 
idea of nationalism a human face.”47 For instance, a leading representative of the ethno-
                                                          
33 Maria Todorova, Bones of Contention: The Living Archive of Vasil Levski and the Making of Bulgaria's National 
Hero  (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2009), 479. 
34 See Venita Datta, Heroes and Legends of Fin-de-Siecle France: Gender, Politics, and National Identity  (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011)., Susan Rubin Suleiman, "History, Heroism, and Narrative Desire: The “Aubrac 
Affair” and National Memory of the French Resistance," South Central Review 21, no. 1 (2004). 
35 See Tali Tadmor Shimony, "The Pantheon of National Hero Prototypes in Educational Texts: Understanding 
Curriculum as a Narrative of National Heroism," Jewish History 17, no. 3 (2003)., Judith Tydor Baumel, "The Heroism 
of Hannah Senesz: An Exercise in Creating Collective National Memory in the State of Israel," Journal of 
Contemporary History 31, no. 3 (1996). 
36 See Ruth Roland, "The “Rizalista Cult” in Philippine Nationalism: A Case History of the “Uses” of a National Hero" 
(PhD Dissertation, New York University, 1969). 
37 See Barry Schwartz, George Washington: The Making of an American Symbol  (London: Collier Macmillan, 1987)., 
"Social Change and Collective Memory: The Democratization of George Washington," American Sociological Review 
56, no. 2 (1991)., Elizabeth Goren, "Society’s Use of the Hero Following a National Trauma," The American Journal of 
Psychoanalysis, no. 67 (2002). 
38 See Todorova, Bones of Contention: The Living Archive of Vasil Levski and the Making of Bulgaria's National Hero. 
39 See David Lambert, "Part of the Blood and Dream’: Surrogation, Memory and the National Hero in the 
Postcolonial Caribbean," Patterns of Prejudice 41, no. 3-4 (2007). 
40 See Janet Hoskins, "The Headhunter as Hero: Local Traditions and Their Reinterpretation in National History," 
American Ethnologist 14, no. 4 (1987). 
41 See David Marples, Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine  (Budapest and New 
York: Central European University Press, 2007). 
42 See Wale Adebanwi, "Death, national memory and the social construction of heroism," The Journal of African 
History 49, no. 3 (2008). 
43 See Wang Yiyan, "The Emperor and the Assassin: China’s National Hero and Myth of State Origin," Media Asia 34, 
no. 1 (2007)., Yingjie Guo, "National Unification Overrides All: The Heroism of Hero," Media Asia 34, no. 1 (2007)., 
Yusheng Yao, "The Making of a National Hero: Tao Xingzhi's Legacies in the People s Republic of China," Review of 
Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies 24, no. 3 (2002)., Marc Andre Matten, "The Worship of General Yue Fei 
and His Problematic Creation as a National Hero in Twentieth Century China," Frontiers History of China 6, no. 1 
(2011). 
44 See Tea Sindbæk, "The Fall and Rise of a National Hero: Interpretations of Draža Mihailović and the Chetniks in 
Yugoslavia and Serbia since 1945," Journal of Contemporary European Studies 17, no. 1 (2009). 
45 See Zübeyde Güne-Yadcy, "A Chechen national hero of the Caucasus in the 18th century: Sheikh Mansur," Central 
Asian Survey 22, no. 1 (2003). 
46 Linas Eriksonas, National Heroes and National Identities: Scotland, Norway and Lithuania  (Brussels: P.I.E-Peter 
Lang, 2004), 15. 
47 "The National Hero: A Scottish Contribution," Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 30, no. 1-2 (2003): 83., 
National Heroes and National Identities: Scotland, Norway and Lithuania, 15. 
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symbolism school, Anthony Smith, notes that “every nationalism requires a touchstone of virtue 
and heroism, to guide and give meaning to the tasks of regeneration.”48 He further argues that: 
Heroes provide models of virtuous conduct, their deeds of valour inspire faith and 
courage in their oppressed and decadent descendants. The epoch in which they 
flourished is the great age of liberation from the foreign yoke, which released the 
energies of the people for cultural innovation and original political experiment.49 
Nevertheless, most studies in this regard are authored by modernist historians. For instance, 
Maria Todorova argues that “[national heroes] are first and foremost social symbols whose main 
function is the example they set within the group.”50 Hutchins, in her turn, states that “the 
existence of heroes (particularly those who have dedicated themselves to or sacrificed their lives 
for the nation) stands as a monument to the national idea."51 She further notes that "[t]he 
ultimate commitment to the national(ist) cause of individuals of admirable ability and character 
validates and legitimates that cause.”52 Likewise, Datta notes that “the cult of heroes was a way 
to cement national solidarity as well as to establish its legitimacy and roots in the past.”53 
Similarly, Cubitt states that “heroic reputations are products of the imaginative labor through 
which societies and groups define and articulate their values and assumptions […]”54 These and 
similar arguments are summarized in the following passage from Lambert: 
This cultural function of heroes may take on particular importance in the context 
of nations-in-the-making, like those in which rising elites are seeking to establish 
their legitimate authority during or after periods of transition, such as 
decolonization. In these cases, important or exemplary figures from the nation’s 
past or present, often associated with moments of political achievement or social 
transformation, may be invested with heroic status. They are intended by elites 
and their supporters to embody the ideals that best represent ‘the nation’ and 
around which a sense of nationhood might cohere. In this sense, the creation of 
national heroes is part of the ongoing project of what a nation ‘means’.55 
Heroic figures are selected and celebrated through formalized procedures and practices, 
including honors systems, funerals and canonization rituals, which provide a clear example of 
the ‘invention of tradition’”.56 In Todorova’s view, states follow the “vicissitudes” of hero-making 
such as “heroicization, glorification, consecutive appropriations by different, often opposing 
                                                          
48 Anthony Smith, Myth and Memories of the Nation  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 65. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Todorova, Bones of Contention: The Living Archive of Vasil Levski and the Making of Bulgaria's National Hero, 478. 
51 Rachel Hutchins, "Heroes and the renegotiation of national identity in American history textbooks: 
representations of George Washington and Abraham Lincoln, 1982-2003," Nations and Nationalism 17, no. 3 
(2011): 650. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Datta, Heroes and Legends of Fin-de-Siecle France: Gender, Politics, and National Identity, 11. 
54 Geoffrey Cubitt, "Introduction," in Heroic Reputations and Exemplary Lives, ed. Geoffrey Cubitt and Allen Warren 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 3. 
55 Lambert, "Part of the Blood and Dream’: Surrogation, Memory and the National Hero in the Postcolonial 
Caribbean," 353. 
56 Ibid. 
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political forces, reinterpretation, commemoration and, finally, canonization.”57 The politics of 
identity relies on education policy, cultural policy, mass media, and even monetary policy, to 
create images of heroes and anti-heroes. State-sponsored films might be used to cultivate the 
heroism.58 Theatre and press also can play a significant role in cultivating national heroism59and 
ideas of heroism can also be “pedagogically instilled.”60 Images of heroes can serve as “role 
models” in teaching various subjects in schools ranging from history to literature, to music61 
because the curriculum has a significant role in “translating” the “ideological value-system” of a 
state into educational messages for the young generation.62 Due to guaranteed penetration into 
the everyday lives of the people, usually, Central Banks of states also print images of heroes on 
money, banknotes and coins. Moreover, particular heroes can change over time63 due to shifts 
in the moral and knowledge space of the state. Lastly, the hero-making processes, methods, and 
their intensity might vary from one case to another.64 
Methods of commemorating anti-heroes might be different from methods of commemorating 
heroes.65 Theoretical speculations on anti-heroes are not, however, as abundant. The reason for 
such misbalance is that anti-heroes are associated with negative values. Therefore, unlike 
heroes, antiheroes are destined to be forgotten rather than remembered. However, the images 
of anti-heroes are as important as those of heroes. As Ducharme and Fine find out, 
“[c]ommunities solidify the reputations of their villains in collective memory through dramatic 
public reactions to activities that offend shared values.”66 Because “[b]y warning against deviant 
acts, creating folk devils, and drawing boundaries, society reaffirms normative behaviour and 
communal integration.”67 So, it is no wonder that “during the years immediately preceding the 
First World War, the French people, both weary of internal conflict and anxious about an ever-
present threat from Germany, increasingly sought consensus around heroes as well as anti-
heroes.”68 It can be argued that both national heroes and anti-heroes play an equally important 
role in the formation of the national “self” and “other.” While images of heroes are associated 
with the best possible values, and are rendered to serve as an example to the masses, images of 
                                                          
57 Todorova, Bones of Contention: The Living Archive of Vasil Levski and the Making of Bulgaria's National Hero, xiv. 
58 See Yiyan, "The Emperor and the Assassin: China’s National Hero and Myth of State Origin.", Guo, "National 
Unification Overrides All: The Heroism of Hero." 
59 See Datta, Heroes and Legends of Fin-de-Siecle France: Gender, Politics, and National Identity. 
60 Shimony, "The Pantheon of National Hero Prototypes in Educational Texts: Understanding Curriculum as a 
Narrative of National Heroism," 311. 
61 Ibid., 316. 
62 See ibid. 
63 See Kathryn Crameri, "'We need another hero': The construction of Josep Moragues as a symbol of independence 
for Catalonia," National Identities 13, no. 1 (2011). 
64 Hoskins, "The Headhunter as Hero: Local Traditions and Their Reinterpretation in National History," 606. 
65 L.J. Ducharme and G.A.  Fine, "The Construction of Nonpersonhood and Demonization: Commemorating the 
Traitorous Reputation of Benedict Arnold," Social Force 73, no. 4 (1995): 1311. 
66 Ibid., 1310. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Datta, Heroes and Legends of Fin-de-Siecle France: Gender, Politics, and National Identity, 178. 
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anti-heroes encompass “morally unacceptable” value. Anti-heroes are remembered so that they 
may be hated or forgotten as a public punishment. 
Studying the practices of remembering national heroes and/or forgetting the anti-heroes is 
limited to the disciplines such as history, nationalism and memory studies. This thesis shows that 
the implications of these practices go beyond domestic politics and have direct relations to the 
cross-border relations. Linking this aspect of identity politics to international relations requires a 
careful “trespassing” to the territory of International Relations theory. Chapter 1 starts dealing 
with this task of finding out which IR theory can be best to incorporate identity politics, which is 
then finalized in Chapter 2, by showing how an aspect of identity politics, i.e., hero-making, is 
relevant to cross-border relations. In this regard, this study belongs to the discipline of IR. So, it 
is practical to begin with clarifying the IR research methodology and the methods of analysis this 
thesis uses. 
3. Research methodology and methods of analysis 
Methodology is concerned “with the logical structure and procedure of scientific inquiry.”69 
Every “scientific inquiry” in IR relies on a particular research methodology, regardless of whether 
or not the methodology in question is clearly elaborated on by researchers. As Karin Fierke puts 
it, “[m]ethodology refers to those basic assumptions about the world we study, which are prior 
to the specific techniques adopted by the scholar undertaking research.”70 This thesis analyses 
the links between state’s practices of hero-making and the discursive construction of self/other 
differences in international relations. This indicates that certain concepts (e.g., identity 
construction, self/other dichotomy) and methods (e.g., discourse analysis) are key for this study. 
However, providing a mere definition of these “basic assumptions”, or a review of the methods 
of analysis (or, data gathering) is not enough to explain the methodology of a research.71 A 
research methodology reveals essential information about the ontological72 and 
epistemological73 stances that a study takes; for “the question whether [ontology and 
                                                          
69 Giovanni Sartori, "Concept misformation in comparative politics," American political science review 64, no. 04 
(1970): 1033. 
70 Karin Fierke, "World or Worlds? The analysis of content and discourse," Qualitative Methods: Newsletter of the 
APSA 2, no. 1 (2004): 36. 
71 Some IR scholars tend to use “methodology” as a synonymous to “methods”, which is a serious confusion. For 
instance, Maoz states that “[c]ase study is arguably the most common methodology in international studies.” See 
Zeev Maoz, "Case Study Methodology in International Relations," in Evaluating Methodologies in International 
Relations, ed. Frank Harvey and Michael Brecher (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2005), 161. 
72 Ontology “refer[s] to a catalog of objects, processes, and factors that a given line of scientific research expects to 
exist or has evidence for the existence of.” See Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy 
of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics, 28. 
73 Epistemology “deals with how it is that we might know something about the world.” See Steve Smith, "Positivism 
and Beyond," in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 31. 
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epistemology] can be separated is at the heart of the methodological difference.”74 This thesis 
uses reflexivity as its research methodology – a choice that is prone to criticism from a positivist 
point of view. As a pre-emptive reply to a possible criticism, positivism and its distortion of IR as 
a science should be reviewed first.  
3.1. The tyranny of positivist methodology in IR 
The methodological differences caused by conflicting ontological and epistemological 
assumptions have resulted in the waves of “Great Debates” in IR.75 For the most part, due to the 
mutually exclusive positions regarding these issues, the inter-theory debates in IR have devolved 
into “derisive caricatures of one another’s work as ‘storytelling,’ ‘mindless number-crunching,’ 
or ‘philosophical mumbo-jumbo,’ and the accompanying characterization of those approaches 
as ‘unscientific’ and hence not worthy of intellectual engagement.”76 Referring to the debate 
between (neo)positivist and poststructuralist scholars, also known as the Third Debate, Jackson 
rightly notes that it has been “largely a dialogue of the deaf, with most of the social and 
philosophical theory on the side of the dissidents while most of the empirical propositions were 
on the side of the fairly unreflective neopositivists.”77  
In the 1950s-60s “positivism became synonymous with the term science in the [IR] discipline.”78 
Even though “[t]he post-positivist turn began in the mid-1980s,”79 in  the mid-1990s, Smith 
lamented that “the vast majority of international relations research over the last 30 years has 
rested implicitly on positivist assumptions.”80 Positivism is still perceived as a “gold standard” 
against which all approaches are evaluated.”81 Even nowadays, doing research using post-
positivist methodologies risks being labeled an unscientific endeavour. As Jackson rightly notes: 
a decision to conduct research using a non-neopositivist methodology places a 
particular burden on a researcher: to be clear not only about her or his research 
                                                          
74 Fierke, "World or Worlds? The analysis of content and discourse," 36. 
75 For the overview of "four great debates" in IR, see Milja Kurki and Colin Wight, "International Relations and Social 
Science," in International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, ed. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 16-24. See also David A Lake, "Theory is dead, long live theory: The end of 
the Great Debates and the rise of eclecticism in International Relations," European Journal of International Relations 
19, no. 3 (2013): 569-71, 77-80. For a critical review of the "Great Debates" in IR, see Brian Schmidt, "On the history 
and historiography of International Relations," in Handbook of International Relations, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, 
Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons (London: Sage, 2013), 15-21. 
76 Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study 
of World Politics, 18. 
77 Ibid., 72. 
78 Colin Wight, "Philosophy of Social Science and International Relations," in Handbook of International Relations, 
ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons (London: Sage, 2013), 34. “Positivism is a methodological 
position reliant on an empiricist epistemology which grounds our knowledge of the world in justification by 
(ultimately brute) experience and thereby licensing methodology and ontology in so far as they are empirically 
warranted.” See Smith, "Positivism and Beyond," 17. 
79 Wight, "Philosophy of Social Science and International Relations," 39. 
80 Smith, "Positivism and Beyond," 32. 
81 Ibid., 13. 
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methodology, but about where that methodology differs from the still-dominant 
neopositivist way of doing research. It is not enough to reject hypothesis-testing or 
cross-case generalizations; the researcher engaging in alternative modes of scientific 
research has to spell out the warrants for her or his claims in such a way that they 
cannot be mistaken for neopositivist procedures, and to locate her or his work among 
the existing bodies of work that utilize a methodology more suitable to the 
knowledge-production practices that she or he is actually using. 82 
Therefore, the non-positivist methodology that the post-structuralist theory of this thesis relies 
on is prone to criticism from the positivist standpoint. However, there is no way that this thesis 
can “easily” explain its non-positivist methodology in positivist terms, so that “everyone can 
understand it”. The reason is that “there is no methodologically neutral metalanguage into 
which we could reliably translate our warranted knowledge-claims and have them be globally 
understood.”83 As Ann Tickner notes, in the IR discipline in the US, “reflectivists or post-
positivists, a category that encompasses a rich array of theoretical approaches, all of which offer 
a series of alternatives to rationalism, are presented by the mainstream as operating outside the 
acceptable realm of academic study and not part of the social-scientific enterprise.”84 The 
epistemology of positivism in IR “has determined what could be studied because it has 
determined what kind of things existed in international relations.”85 Non-positivist studies of IR, 
accordingly, have been deemed to make no sense. Brook Blair’s recent criticism of post-
structuralist theories is an example of this: “the post-structuralist and postmodernist projects 
have thus far failed to establish any authentic theoretical innovations capable of providing us 
with a viable framework for furthering our understanding of International Relations.”86 As a 
response to similar criticism, Steve Smith wrote in the mid-1990s that post-modernism “is a 
genre of work that has been attacked and dismissed, usually by people who have not bothered 
to engage with the complex issues involved (and maybe without reading the texts either!)”87 
Post-positivist scholars of IR, in their turn, “view the traditional epistemological foundations of 
the field […] as no longer a philosophically defensible basis for making authoritative judgments 
about validity in political inquiry.”88 However, without engaging in this “dialogue of the deaf”, it 
is sufficient to note Blair’s criticism as evidence of positivism’s ongoing tyranny in IR. This tyranny 
                                                          
82 Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study 
of World Politics, 206. 
83 Ibid., 210. 
84 J Ann Tickner, "Dealing with difference: Problems and possibilities for dialogue in International Relations," 
Millennium-Journal of International Studies 39, no. 3 (2011): 610. 
85 Smith, "Positivism and Beyond," 11. 
86 Brook M Blair, "Revisiting the ‘third debate’(part I)," Review of International Studies 37, no. 02 (2011): 828. Note 
the use of post-structuralism and post-modernism as synomyms. Wight rightly states that “The discipline seems 
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tends to treat the two terms as synonymous.” Wight, "Philosophy of Social Science and International Relations," 40. 
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88 Schmidt, "On the history and historiography of International Relations," 20. See also Jim George and David 
Campbell, "Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Difference: Critical Social Theory," International Studies 
Quarterly 34, no. 3 (1990): 281-88. 
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imposes strict limitations on scientific epistemology and ontology. Steve Smith offers a closer 
look at the roots of such “scientific-ness” claims:  
in international relations positivism has tended to involve a commitment to a natural 
science methodology, fashioned on an early twentieth-century view of physics; that is 
to say a physics before the epistemologically revolutionary development of quantum 
mechanics in the 1920s, which fundamentally altered the prevailing view of the 
physical world as one which could be accurately observed. Accordingly, positivism in 
international relations, as in all the social sciences, has essentially been a 
methodological commitment, tied to an empiricist epistemology: together these result 
in a very restricted range of permissible ontological claims.89  
3.2. Redefining the “science” of IR 
This thesis opposes what Wight unfavorably calls, a “positivism or perish”90 approach to IR. It 
instead concurs with Jackson’s position regarding the need to re-define the “science” of IR. 91 To 
begin with, Jackson uses the Weberian definition of “science” to settle the five-decade long 
debate in IR about which theories are scientific and which theories are not.92 First, the “scientific-
ness” of a particular inquiry should be assessed not based on the chosen method, but rather its 
purpose, which can be “explaining” and/or “understanding” a particular matter of interest.93 
Second, and most importantly, “even someone who rejects our values should be able to 
acknowledge the validity of our empirical results within the context of our perspective.”94 Thus, 
“it is on this basis – and not on the specific content or character of the value-orientations thus 
applied – that the ‘scientific’ character of an investigation can and should be evaluated.”95 Such 
a Weberian approach to “social science” and “objectivity” proposed by Jackson brings “radical a 
shift” to the discipline.96 In particular, this approach has significant implications for inter-theory 
debates in IR.97  
From the Weberian standpoint, the Great Debates in IR can be boiled down to debates about 
which methodology is the best way to create valid scientific knowledge. Jackson rightly suggests 
that “[r]ather than judging an argument by the standards of another methodology, it only makes 
sense to judge an argument by its own methodology, and according to the ways in which that 
                                                          
89 Smith, "Positivism and Beyond," 17. 
90 Wight, "Philosophy of Social Science and International Relations," 47. 
91 For the arguments about the need to re-define the "science" of IR, see Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in 
International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics, 1-19. 
92 See ibid., 20-23. 
93 Ibid., 20-21. 
94 Ibid., 22. 
95 "Foregrounding ontology: dualism, monism, and IR theory," Review of International Studies 34, no. 01 (2008): 
148. Jackson suggests that “a study conducted from the perspective of, say, a Marxist conception of class relations 
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demonstration of what it would be like to construct the world in that way.” See ibid., 148-49. 
96 Ibid., 148. 
97 See ibid., 149-53.  
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methodology fills out the broad definition of science.”98 A criticism “that engages with post-
structuralism on its own conceptual and methodological terms […] will allow for a fairer 
judgment of post-structuralism’s contribution to the study of international relations.”99 It is only 
by following this approach that IR scholars can avoid engaging in a “dialogue of the deaf”. Thus, 
rather than being concerned with evaluations of “(un)scientific-ness”, scholarly debate in IR 
should be limited concerns of “internal validity”, that is “whether, given our assumptions, our 
conclusions follow rigorously from the evidence and logical argumentation that we provide.”100  
3.3. Methodology 
The research methodology that this thesis uses is reflexivity.101 Before defining what reflexivity 
stands for, it needs to be made clear what is meant by “methodology”. Following Jackson’s 
definition, methodology, “broadly understood”, is a philosophical ontology that “set[s] the 
context within which particular practices of knowledge-production might make sense.”102 
Research using reflexivist methodology makes two commitments. The first commitment 
concerns the relationship between the knower and the known, or to use Jackson’s words, the 
“connection between the researcher and the researched world“.103 This commitment pre-
supposes that “knowledge-production is in no sense a simple description or recording of 
already-existing stable worldly objects.”104 Jackson labels this commitment as “world-mind 
monism”. Existing in opposition to “world-mind monism” is “mind-world dualism.”105 The 
second commitment concerns the scope of knowledge. In this regard, reflexivity “maintains the 
possibility of knowing things about in-principle unobservables.”106 This pre-supposition, which 
Jackson labels as “transfactualism” – as opposed to “phenomenalism”107 – assumes that “valid 
knowledge-claims reach beyond experiences to grasp the deeper generative causal properties 
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that give rise to those experiences.”108 As far as the focus of reflexivist inquiries is concerned, 
Jacksons say that:  
For reflexivists […] what is required is a detailed self-examination of the social and 
historical conditions under which knowledge is produced. The result of this kind of 
examination—an examination that poses a set of dialectical relationships between a 
knowledge-producer and her or his own conditions—is not a disclosing of real-but-
undetectable causal powers, but a way of helping the members of a given society come 
to a clearer understanding of their situations.109 
In a re-defined “science” of IR, reflexivity is a methodology that can co-exist with other 
methodologies even though “the four methodologies differ widely with respect to what they 
hold a valid knowledge-claim to consist of.”110 Among the IR theories that rely on reflexivist 
methodology are the critical, feminist and post-colonial theories of IR.111 
Figure 1. Jackson's typology of methodologies. Sources: Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, The Conduct 
of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of 
World Politics  (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 197.   
 Relationship between knowledge and observation 
Phenomenalism transfactualism 
Relationship between 
the knower and the 
known 
mind-world dualism neopositivism critical realism 
mind-world monism analyticism reflexivity 
Suganami suggests adding one more commitment to Jackson’s typology of methodologies – the 
purpose of the knowledge production. According to him, for instance, “analyticists’ aim in 
producing knowledge claims is to offer an interpretive understanding of the segment of the 
world found interesting”, whereas reflexivists aim “not only to interpret the world, but also 
transform it.”112 Furthermore, he argues that the “methodologies differ in the types of questions 
they ask [and] which kind of question one should give priority to is not a matter of philosophical 
ontological choice, faith or taste, but one of political judgment.”113 In this regard, he offers to 
add two categories to the Jacksonian typology – interpreting the world and transforming the 
world. Following a convincing criticism, Suganami suggests that “Jackson’s 2x2 classification 
table does not work well”114 even though he does not propose an alternative one.115 
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Nevertheless, based on Suganami’s article, the following adapted version of Jackson’s table can 
be drawn: 
Figure 2. Adapted version of Jackson’s typology based on Suginami's criticism. 
 Phenomenalism Interpreting the 
world 
Transfactualism Transforming 
the world 
Representational view of 
knowledge claim116 
Neopositivism  Critical realism 
Constructionist view of 
knowledge claim117 
Analyticism  
 Reflexivity 
This study does not claim to be an objective analysis of Tajik-Uzbek bilateral relations, or the 
mutual construction of the Tajik “self” and the Uzbek “other” because “[a]ll claims to scientific 
objectivity are actually social practices imposing order through practices of power.”118 As 
Jackson states, “objectivity is an ontological stance that is perhaps best named as dualism [which 
assumes that] we have both ‘things’, which are objects of investigation by researchers and […] 
and ‘thoughts’, which contain representations of the things.”119 Furthermore, objectivity (or, 
dualism) raises “a specific set of epistemological problems, largely revolving around techniques 
to guarantee that knowledge of the world corresponds to the world itself.”120 Thus, in 
ontologically objective studies “valid knowledge means mirroring the world, representing it 
accurately, and not ignoring any of its important and essential features.” 121 This thesis does not 
claim to cover all important and essential features of Tajik-Uzbek relations. It rather attempts to 
“avoid […] the thing/thought dichotomy altogether, concentrating instead on those practical 
(worldly) activities that give rise to both ‘things’ and ‘thoughts’.”122 
3.4. Methods of analysis 
Methods are “techniques for gathering and analyzing bits of data.”123 It is claimed that methods 
are directly linked to the theory in use.124 However, more important for this thesis is the 
appropriateness of chosen methods in the context of the overarching methodology. As Jackson 
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puts it, “methods without methodology can be quite myopic in lacking a big picture within which 
specific techniques might make sense.”125 Considering that  
Considering the aims of the thesis as discussed earlier, it uses various methods of discourse 
analysis. Discourse analysis makes “a set of assumptions concerning the constructive effect of 
language.”126 As far as the practical importance of discourse analysis methods is concerned, Iver 
Neumann convincingly states that:  
Discourse analysis is eminently useful […] because it says something about why state Y 
was considered an enemy in state X, how war emerged as a political option, and how 
other options were shunted aside. Because a discourse maintains a degree of regularity 
in social relations, it produces preconditions for action. It constrains how the stuff that 
the world consists of is ordered, and so how people categorize and think about the 
world. It constrains what is thought of at all, what is thought of as possible, and what 
is thought of as the ‘natural thing’ to do in a given situation.127 
According to Milliken, “a normal science of discourse analysis”128 makes three assumptions 
about discourse.129 First, discourses construct “social reality”.130 This is what Doty calls “the 
linguistic construction of reality.”131 Second, in any given society, discourses shape commonly 
accepted understandings of truth and common sense, “limiting possible resistance among a 
broader public to a given course of action, legitimating the state as a political unit, and creating 
reasonable and warranted relations of domination.”132 Third, discourses are unstable and 
require significant and constant efforts of “articulation” and “rearticulation”.133  
Based on these assumptions, discourse analysis methods follow three goals, i.e., 1) to reveal the 
process of constructing this “reality”;134 2) to show how the discursive construction of what is 
good (and bad) disciplines society as well as limiting the options ‘’that policy-makers find 
reasonable”;135 3) to trace the measures taken “to stabilize and fix dominant meaning” amid the 
                                                          
125 Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study 
of World Politics, 26. 
126 Cynthia Hardy, Bill Harley, and Nelson Phillips, "Discourse analysis and content analysis: two solitudes?," 
Qualitative Methods: Newsletter of the APSA 2, no. 1 (2004): 19. 
127 Iver Neumann, "Discourse analysis," in Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A pluralist guide, ed. 
Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 62. 
128 Jennifer Milliken uses the term “normal science” as opposed to the “bad science” or “dangerous science” – the 
labels that the “mainstream” theorists use in describing IR theories that rely on discourse analysis. See Jennifer 
Milliken, "The study of discourse in international relations: A critique of research and methods," European journal of 
international relations 5, no. 2 (1999): 227. 
129 Milliken calls them “analytically distinguishable bundles of theoretical claims”. See ibid., 228. 
130 Ibid., 229.  
131 Roxanne Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of US Counterinsurgency Policy in 
the Philippines," International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 3 (1993): 302. Emphasis in original. 
132 Milliken, "The study of discourse in international relations: A critique of research and methods," 237. 
133 Ibid., 230. 
134 Hardy, Harley, and Phillips, "Discourse analysis and content analysis: two solitudes?," 19. 
135 Milliken, "The study of discourse in international relations: A critique of research and methods," 240. 
18 
constant struggle between “hegemonic discourses” and possible alternatives.136 Gee suggests 
that a discourse analyst should seek answers to a set of questions: 
- How is this piece of language being used to make certain things significant or not 
and in what ways? 
- What […] practices (activities) is this piece of language being used to enact (i.e., 
get others to recognize as going on)? 
- What identity or identities is this piece of language being used to enact (i.e., get 
others to recognize as operative)? What identity or identities is this piece of 
language attributing to others, and how does this help the speaker or writer enact 
his or own identity? 
- What sort of relationship or relationships is this piece of language seeking to enact 
with others (present or not)? 
- What perspective on social goods is this piece of language communicating (i.e., 
what is being communicated as to what is taken to be “normal,” “right,” “good,” 
“correct,” “proper,” “appropriate,” “valuable,” “the ways things are,” “the way 
things ought to be,” “high status or low status,” “like me or not like me,” and so 
forth)? 
- How does this piece of language connect or disconnect things; how does it make 
one thing relevant or irrelevant to another? 
- How does this piece of language privilege or disprivilege […] different ways of 
knowing and believing or claims to knowledge and belief […]?137 
These questions overlap and complement each other. Most importantly, together they support 
the above-mentioned three assumptions about discourse that Milliken makes. In revealing the 
power relations and practices behind the construction of the Tajik “self” and the Uzbek “other” 
in Tajikistan, chapters 2-6 of this thesis rely on Milliken’s assumptions and offer answers to the 
relevant question(s) posed by Gee. In doing so, this thesis uses a set of discourse analysis 
methods – predicate analysis method, metaphor analysis method, and context (intertextual) 
analysis method. It adheres to one of the main principles of semantics, according to which “the 
meaning of sentence must be calculated on the basis of the meanings of its component 
words.”138 
Predicate analysis method. A predicate “is a quality or an attribute.”139 Through attributing 
particular qualities and attributes to the subject, “[i]t is characterized as being something, having 
something, or doing something, all of which constitute types of predication.”140 At the level of 
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linguistics, “[p]redication involves the linking of certain qualities to particular subjects through 
the use of predicates and the adverbs and adjectives that modify them […].”141 Therefore, 
predicate analysis requires the extraction of “descriptive characteristics, adjectives, adverbs, 
and capabilities attributed to the various subject” from the texts being analyzed.142 For instance, 
to use Doty’s example, “to state that the United States "has stood for fair play, for aid to the 
weak, for liberty, and freedom" establishes the United States as a particular kind of subject with 
particular qualities.” 143 So, predicate analysis method is “most suited to examining the discursive 
formation of a particular subjectivity […].”144 However, it is not limited to the overview of 
attributes and qualities attached to the subject. It also explains, “how […] these constructions 
can become widely circulated and constitutive of an attitude of "self" toward "other," thus 
making particular practices possible.”145 Predicate analysis is also useful in “analyzing the social 
construction of space and of geopolitical reasoning.”146 
Metaphor analysis method. Using a metaphor in discourses is one of the ways of creating a 
reality.147 According to Chilton and Ilyin: 
metaphor is an off-record strategy, the goal of which is to manage the most 
threatening speech act, and to minimize the accountability of the speaker. It is left to 
the responsibility of hearers to infer metaphorical entailments and relevance to the 
communication situation. With a metaphor it is possible to avoid a direct reference to 
a face-threatening phenomenon. The hearer is left to make inferences from knowledge 
the speaker can assume shared.148 
The Tajik President, for instance, by using metaphors can talk extensively about the atrocities 
that Tajiks experienced due to waves of violent attacks from conquerors, loss of territories and 
the nation’s struggle to survive as a result. This allows him to discursively construct self/other 
relations in the minds of Tajik listeners, considering the familiarity of the population of Tajikistan 
with the context of the discourse. For a lay listener/reader, it takes an intertextual (contextual) 
analysis to understand the identities and issues at play in such speech acts. However, a 
metaphor “leaves room for the negotiation of specific meanings and references,” which makes 
it “an important diplomatic device.”149 Therefore, in this case, using metaphors allows the Tajik 
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president to go ahead and meet with the Uzbek president even after his speech for a domestic 
audience where he hints at “historical atrocities” of Uzbeks against Tajiks. 
In using metaphorical analysis, a “researcher establishes metaphors used regularly in the 
language practices of a group or society to make sense of the world.”150 As Doty rightly puts it, 
“[e]very discourse has a particular stock of metaphors that is commonly used when referring to 
the discourse topic.”151 As far as the practical importance of metaphor analysis is concerned, it 
should be noted that “metaphors not only profoundly influence the ways in which we perceive 
the world, but also the actions we decide to take to maintain those perceptions.”152 Similarly, 
Lakoff and Johnson argue that “what is at issue is not the truth or falsity of a metaphor, but the 
inferences that follow from it and the actions that are sanctioned by it.”153  
Intertextual analysis method. Metaphor analysis might look like a guess-work if it is not backed 
up with context/intertextual analysis. In other words, an informed reader can only guess that it 
is being referred to Uzbeks when the Tajik officials or historians talk about “newcomers”, 
“barbarians”, “blood-thirsty conquerors”. It requires an intertextual analysis of what is implied 
and what possible actions might be sanctioned by the metaphoric use of “genocide” to explain 
Uzbekistan’s cultural and education policy in relation to Tajiks. There is always a question 
regarding the notion that “since more than one meaning can be created, how do we decide 
which meaning is intended, is justifiable, and/or makes the most sense?”154 Nevertheless, 
“[s]peakers and writers rely on listeners and readers to use the context in which things are said 
or written to fill in meanings that are left unsaid, but assumed to be inferable from context.”155 
In this regard, Gee is right to note that “[a] vast amount [sic] lies under the surface, not said, but 
assumed to be known or inferable from the context in which the communication is occurring.”156 
Similarly, Hansen notes that “texts build their arguments and authority through references to 
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other texts: by making direct quotes or by adopting key concepts and catchphrases”.157 In doing 
so, as Hansen further explains, “new texts rely upon the status of the older, but this process of 
reading and linking also produces new meaning.”158  
Therefore, the other half of the task is to reveal the context, or, what Dijk would describe as the 
global semantic properties of the discourse. In this regard, a researcher should bear in mind that 
“besides the local semantic structure, a discourse also has a global semantic structure or 
macrostructure.”159 As Doty states, “[t]exts always refer back to other texts which themselves 
refer to still other texts.”160 So, texts are intertextual in a sense that they are “’plugged in’ to 
each other as well as to other texts; other foreign policy texts, social science texts, and non-
academic text.”161 Overall, in order to understand what and who is meant by a particular 
metaphor and what actions are legitimised by its use, it is essential to view the utterance of 
metaphors as a part of a larger web of discourses. The lengthy analyses in the third, fourth and 
fifth chapters are designed to reveal the context in which ongoing self/other relations in Tajik 
national identity discourses are based. The focus of analysis and the “objects” of analysis of 
these chapters are informed by Hansen’s intertextual research model, which is modified for the 
purpose of this thesis:162 
Figure 3. Adapted version of Hansen’s model of intertextual analysis. 
 Model 1 Model 3A Model 3B 
Analytical focus Official discourse:  
Heads of states  
Senior civil servants  
Cultural 
representations: 
Popular culture  
High culture 
Marginal political 
discourses:  
Social movements 
Academics  
Object of analysis Official texts 
Direct and secondary 
intertextual links 
Supportive texts 
Critical texts 
Fiction, poetry Marginal newspapers, 
websites, books, 
pamphlets 
Academic analysis 
As non-positivist research, this thesis does not use “formal methods of IR” and “qualitative 
methods” (including case study and content analysis methods), which work only within a 
positivist methodology.163 First, the thematic focus on Tajikistan’s case might give an impression 
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of a case study being conducted, however it should not mean a hypothesis-testing positivist case 
study. Because“[s]tudying single, or multiple, cases does not place a scholar in any particular 
methodological box.”164 This work is not a case study, for “studying right cases”165 is not the 
primary goal here. It is assumed that “[w]ell-crafted case selection takes into account the 
universe of possible cases and the logic of comparison implied by the research question.”166 
However, the case of Tajikistan in this thesis has not been chosen out of a “universe of possible 
cases”. Obviously, no selection process to find out “least likely cases,”167 “most likely cases”,168 
and “deviant cases”169 is undertaken before choosing the case of Tajikistan. Similarly, the thesis 
does not bear in mind any “logic of comparison”.  Second, considering the overwhelming 
reliance of this research on analysis of the publicly available texts, there might be an expectation 
of the use of content analysis methods. It is a bit tricky to differentiate content analysis from 
discourse analysis, for both discourse analysis and content analysis “are concerned with drawing 
conclusions about some aspects of human communication from a carefully selected set of 
messages.”170 However, content analysis “adopts a positivist approach” and thus the two 
methods of analysis have a deeply “conflicting ontology and epistemology.”171 Furthermore, 
“[c]ontent analysis is the study of the text itself not of its relations to its context, the intentions 
of the producer of the text, or the reaction of the intended audience.”172 
As far as the data that this thesis relies on in its analysis, they are the texts of national identity 
that are generated in Tajikistan. Relying on Xavier Guillaume’s definition of the term “text”, 
which is reviewed in detail in the section 1.4 of Chapter 1, this thesis uses this term to mean 
narratives of all forms as well as activities and measures that are “readable” by the audience or 
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observer. As Hansen rightly notes, “the body of texts should include key texts that are frequently 
quoted and function as nodes within the intertextual web of debate”.173  Government policies, 
official documents, and academic and journalistic publications (which do not often risk 
challenging the government’s stance) about are the key texts that this thesis relies on. These 
texts, as will be shown in the relevant chapters, are frequently quoted or referred to and serve 
as nodes. Last, the thesis often uses the term “discourse” as synonym to Guillaume’s “text”, 
without any aim at engaging any academic debate on what discourse is and is not. 
4. Structure 
To better understand the flow of the argumentation of the thesis, the following pattern of 
connection between the chapters should be noted. The “empirical” chapters – Chapters 3, 4, 5, 
directly stem from Chapter 2. In other words, Chapter 2 reveals the issue, which is then further 
elaborated on in details in Chapters 3-5. A reader might not be able to find any links between, 
for instance, between Chapters 1 and Chapter 4, as the former is about the IR theories and the 
latter is about Sadriddin Aini’s role in forming the Tajik identity. Chapter 2 aims at playing a 
linking role between the empirical chapters and the theoretical chapter. 
Chapter 1 presents the analytical framework of this thesis based on theories of IR. Almost every 
piece of IR research starts with a review of realist, liberalist, and constructivist theories.174 
However, this chapter skips outlining the merits and limitations of (neo)realism and 
(neo)liberalism to avoid repeating the criticism these theories have received from constructivist 
and post-structuralist standpoints. Considering that identity politics is a matter of the Third 
Debate in IR,175 the chapter rather starts with a review of Wendt’s constructivist theory, which 
challenged then-dominant “mainstream” theories of IR in several respects, including with regard 
to the issue of a nation state’s identity in international politics. Then, it outlines other 
constructivist inquiries into the identity-IR nexus, which unlike Wendt, utilized the post-
structuralist approach, influenced by post-structuralist/post-modernist schools of humanities, 
social and political sciences. Namely, the chapter reviews David Campbell’s post-structuralist 
writing followed by a short criticism of Iver Neumann’s “Copenhagen” school of IR. Furthermore, 
tracing the advancements of the post-structuralist IR school, the chapter reviews Xavier 
Guillaume’s theoretical works, which largely build on Campbelian post-structuralism. Along with 
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demonstrating the merits of post-structuralist theories developed by Campbell and Guillaume, 
the chapter also reveals their limitations. 
Most scholarly works on IR theories contribute to the filed in one of three ways: they either 
reveal the compatibility of two competing theories; find that one theory is powerful and another 
flawed; or challenge all existing theories and propose a new one.176 This chapter tries to make a 
contribution in all three areas. First, acknowledging that all three scholars (Wendt, Campbell, 
Neumann) have made ground-breaking contributions to the identity-focused IR theories in the 
1990s with their ripple-effects observable in the 2000s and 2010s, the chapter argues that 
Campbell’s post-structuralist theory of IR is more capable of explaining the dynamic and multi-
faceted nature of national identity, as well as the diverse and elusive means of constructing the 
identity both in domestic and international realms. Second, even though Campbell’s theory is 
incompatible with Wendt and Neumann’s theories, followers of Wendt and Neumann have 
come up with useful concepts that not only perfectly fit into, but also enrich, Campbell’s theory. 
In this regard, the chapter analyses the scholarly works of Huysmans, McSweeney, Steele, and 
Mitzen, who contributed the term of “ontological security” to IR studies. Last, this chapter 
propses an analytical framework, which is both based on Campbell’s poststructuralist IR theory 
and critically engaged with it by incorporating the concept of ontological security. Overall, based 
on this analytical framework, the chapter attempts to provide a new explanation for the role of 
the politics of national identity in international relations. The expectation is that the new 
approach does not suffer from, what Reus-Smit calls, “a relevance deficit,” and does not use 
“ornate language” merely as a “badge of membership”177 – as some post-structuralist theories 
of IR are believed to do.  
Chapter 2 attempts to reveal why the most “domestic” aspects of the politics of national identity 
are not purely domestic, per se. The chapter focuses on the practice of remembering the 
national heroes as parts of an attempt to boost national identity. It explores why celebrating the 
lives and deeds of the heroes – which, upon first glance, might appear to be irrelevant to 
international relations –  canbecome a factor in understanding/explaining the complexities of 
Tajikistan’s foreign relations. Precisely, the chapter focuses on the case of Heroes of Tajikistan, 
the title given to historical personas that the government chooses as the most important ones 
in the history of the nation. It is followed by a review of the proposals in Tajikistan about 
expanding the ranks of the Heroes, as well as the government’s attempts to create another 
league of national heroes for those who do not qualify for being a Hero. This leads to the next 
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section of the chapter, which is about the meaning and value that the Heroes of Tajikistan are 
officially depicted as bearing and representing. The chapter sets the tone regarding the 
analytical importance of focusing on the Heroes to achieve a better understanding of the 
foundations of national identity and the image of “other” that the state attempts to construct. 
It paves the way for chapters 3-5 of the thesis that analyze, in detail, the connections between 
discourses about the Heroes, the construction of  national self-identification/representation and 
the “other” in the realms of national territoriality, language and literature, and historiography. 
Chapter 3 reveals how, through remembering Nusratullo Makhsum (1881-1937) and Shirinsho 
Shotemur (1899-1937), the two Heroes of Tajikistan, the Tajik state attempts to create the image 
of a Tajik “self” and an Uzbek “other”. Considering that the “heroism” of Makhsum and 
Shotemur took place during the process of the creation of Tajikistan, the first section of the 
chapter provides a historical analysis of NTD in Central Asia in the 1920s. In particular, it shows 
how the elites, who represented the Uzbek, Kazakhs, and Turkmen ethnic groups, dominated 
the delimitation process and why the interests of Tajik nation were represented poorly. The 
second part of the chapter focuses on the leadership showed by Makhsum and Shotemur after 
the Tajik ASSR was created within the Uzbek SSR in 1924/5. It also deals with the leadership 
displayed by these two national heroes when Tajikistan eventually ceded to being an 
autonomous region within Uzbekistan in 1929. Finally, the chapter analyses the dominant 
discourses in post-Soviet Tajikistan about the events of the 1920s, in general, and the positive 
roles that Makhsum and Shotemur played in relation to the territoriality. It reveals that the texts 
concerning national identity in Tajikistan both celebrate the establishment of Tajikistan and 
mourn its creation on territories that do not match the historical homeland of the Tajiks. In other 
words, these texts educate Tajiks to be thankful to the founding fathers of Tajikistan for securing 
a safe-haven for the “survival” and “revival” of the Tajik nation, which otherwise would have 
completely disappeared as a result of a “genocide” and “loss of territories” caused by the Uzbeks 
and some pro-Uzbek Tajiks. So, Tajikistan is the homeland of Tajiks, however, territorially it is 
incomplete. “[S]tates are never finished as entities” but rather “are (and always have to be) in 
the process of becoming.”178 Occasional outcries about returning the “lost territories” are not 
necessarily the manifestation of a covert plan, but rather a reminder of the incompleteness of 
the process of constructing Tajik statehood. Discourses about “genocide” and “lost territories” 
situate ongoing tense relations between Tajikistan with Uzbekistan in an “understandable” 
context. As is shown in chapter 6, these discourses make Uzbekistan’s hostile position look like 
as a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
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Chapter 4 reveals the role of Sadriddin Aini (1878-1954), a Hero of Tajikistan, in the construction 
of the Tajik “self” and the Uzbek “other” through the instrumentalization of language and 
literature. The chapter traces Aini’s personal journey towards becoming a defender of the Tajik 
language and identity in the 1920s and onwards. As this chapter shows, as an educational 
reformist, Aini was marginalized from politics by the Young Bukharans, who eventually came to 
dominate the political scene in Bukhara and later in Uzbekistan. As a result, he became close to 
newly-emerging Tajik political leaders and cooperated with them in their struggle against Uzbek 
leadership. This chapter particularly focuses on two of Aini’s achievements; first, Aini’s role in 
the standardization of the Tajik language. Second, Aini’s compilation of samples of literary works 
in the Tajik language to prove to his Uzbek counterparts that the Tajiks have a rich literary 
language and history. Along with these contributions, the chapter also reviews how texts of 
national identity view Aini’s literary works as replicating the historical truth about the 
oppression of the Tajik nation. It also analyses his literary works to show how he narrated the 
victimized image of the Tajiks who had suffered in the hands of the Uzbek rulers. The chapter 
ends with an analysis of the dominant narratives about Aini’s role in the creation of Tajik national 
identity and an examination of his debates with his Uzbek contemporaries. 
Chapter 5 examines the services of Bobojon Ghafurov (1908-1977), which earned him the title 
Hero of Tajikistan. The chapter reveals that Ghafurov succeeded in writing the history of the 
Tajik nation in a way that positioned the Tajiks as the most ancient and advanced people of 
Central Asia, causing debates with his colleagues from Uzbekistan. The chapter begins with an 
explanation of how Ghafurov emerged as a Tajik national historian and introduces the 
prominent scholarly works that make up the core of his legacy. Next, the chapter provides a 
detailed review of the evolution of Ghafurov’s views via a review of his major publications. In 
particular, his position regarding the origins of Tajik nation, its relations to the Iranian/Persian 
people, as well as the origins of the Turkic tribes and the Uzbek people is analyzed. The chapter 
also covers the criticism that Ghafurov’s scholarly position received from Uzbek historians and 
officials.  Finally, it analyses official and scholarly discourses surrounding Ghafurov and his works, 
which reveal that, in Tajikistan, Ghafurov’s historiography is viewed as a severe blow to the pan-
Turkist Uzbek ideology. The chapter concludes that his arguments continue to play a major role 
in the discursive construction of Tajikistan’s historical superiority. 
Chapter 6 consists of three parts. The first part is about the demonization of Uzbekistan in 
Tajikistan’s texts of national identity as a result of Uzbekistan’s involvement in the Tajik civil 
war in 1992-1997. It briefly reviews the role of Uzbek players in the Tajik civil war, including 
Uzbekistan itself. Then it reviews the dominant discourses in official Tajik sources and media, 
which portray Uzbekistan not only as an external force, hindering national unity in Tajikistan, 
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but also as a party that caused the civil war. This part ends with an analysis of the attempts, in 
Tajikistan, to discursively connect Uzbekistan’s negative role in the Tajik civil war (1992-1997) 
to its “historical atrocities” dating back to the 1920s. The second part of the chapter reveals 
the exacerbation of Uzbekistan’s negative image in Tajikistan due to Uzbekistan’s position on 
the Roghun HPS. Reviewing the uncompromising position of both the Uzbek and Tajik 
governments, this thesis shows how the disagreement has culminated in diplomatic and 
economic “warfare”. Finally, the chapter establishes links between narratives about how 
Uzbekistan has been preventing Tajikistan’s economic independence and prosperity and 
historically dominant discourses about the “genocide of Tajiks” and “lost territories” in the 
1920s. The chapter ends with an analysis of the texts of national identity in Tajikistan that 
portrays President Rahmon as a Hero of Tajikistan, who united the Tajiks after the civil war and 
has been pursuing the path of energy and economic independence by mobilizing Tajikistan to 
build the Roghun HPS. This chapter implies that discourses about the historically abusive and 
unjust attitude of Uzbek leadership to the Tajik nation significantly exacerbate and amplify the 
perception of Uzbekistan as Tajikistan’s enemy in political and economic terms in the post-
Soviet period. 
5. Limitations 
Several limitations of this thesis should be noted. First, I have not been able to gather most of 
the primary data – interviews and archive materials – for analysis due to hurdles created by the 
Tajik and Uzbek government officials. My supervisory panel is aware of the fact that the 
Embassies of Tajikistan in Tashkent and Bishkek have refused to accept my visa application on 
several occasions, referring to the absence of documents that confirm my association with a 
hosting Tajik academic institution. The Tajik universities in Dushanbe and Khujand that I 
approached with a request for affiliation abruptly ended the correspondence with me, or with 
the networks I engaged, every time when I presented the abstract of the thesis and the tentative 
interview questions. Similarly, my efforts to get access to the state archives in Uzbekistan were 
unsuccessful. The General Director of UzArchive Agency, under the Cabinet of Ministers of 
Uzbekistan, A. Kh. Abdullaev provided a written explanation of denial. Second, partly due to the 
failed field trip to Tajikistan, this thesis does not include the narratives and discourses on Mirzo 
Tursunzoda, one of the Heroes of Tajikistan. The available resources on his personality are not 
as abundant as they are in the case of all of the other Heroes. Third, this research is not an all-
encompassing analysis of identity politics in Tajikistan. As was stated above, the main concern 
of this thesis is to present an analysis of the self/other dichotomy in narratives concerning the 
Heroes of Tajikistan and an examination of the interconnectedness of these narratives with 
tensions created by the Roghun project. Fourth, how the population of Tajikistan perceives the 
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politics of identity in Tajikistan is beyond the interests of this research, which is rather concerned 
with the state’s efforts to create a dominant narrative of self/other relations. Fifth, the focus on 
the Uzbek “other” should not mean that it is the only, consistent “other” in identity narratives 
in Tajikistan. As was shown in the literature review at various stages, Russia, Islam and Iran 
appeared as “others” in the identity discourses. This point will be returned to briefly in Chapter 
6. Last, the chapters of this thesis are not designed to provide a complete biography of each of 
the Heroes of Tajikistan.  
  
29 
Chapter 1. Identity Politics and Ontological Security: Fitting National 
Identity into IR Theory 
1. National identity in the main theories of IR 
1.1. The social identity of state: the structural constructivist explanation of 
international relations 
The social constructivist theory of IR developed by Alexander Wendt should be regarded as 
groundbreaking due to the challenge it posed to traditionally dominant theories. However, 
Wendt’s contribution to the study of identity in IR has been underestimated. As Zehfuss puts it, 
“[t]he conception of identity is crucial to both the constructivist move and the systemic 
character of Wendt’s argument, even if it is not its declared focus.”179 Wendt himself was well 
aware that “[i]dentity formation has not been a significant concern of mainstream systemic 
theorists, neorealist or neoliberal.”180 So he attempted to address this issue. Wendt believes 
that identity is socially constructed and sustained as a result of interstate relations.181 Identity is 
not “exogenously given” contrary to the assumptions of the rationalist theories of IR.182 In 
Wendt’s constructivist theory, how states “identify” themselves in relation to other states 
defines the very nature of international relations:  
If states identify only with themselves, so to speak, the system will be 
anarchic. If they identify with a world state it will be hierarchical […]. And if 
they identify with each other, such that they have a collective identity in 
which each is bound to cooperate with the other, they would constitute a 
decentralized authority system, an “international state” that is neither 
anarchy nor hierarchy.183 
For Wendt, assumptions about self-help and the anarchic nature of international relations, as 
well as the notions such as the “normality” of war and mutual suspicion and the “exceptionality” 
of peace, cooperation, and trust were wrong. He rather argues that everything depends on the 
interplay of the identities of states. In his own words, “[w]hether or not the structure of a state’s 
system is anarchic is intimately tied to the distribution of state identities.”184 So, “if today we 
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find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to process, not structure.”185 Overall, for Wendt 
identity is too important a factor to ignore in observing international relations. 
Wendt distinguished two layers of identity in states: corporate and social. Corporate identity 
means “intrinsic qualities that constitute actor individuality.”186 This includes ethnicity, race, and 
gender. According to Wendt, for ordinary people, corporate identity is “the body and personal 
experience of consciousness,”187 whereas, for states, it is what motivates the need for security, 
recognition, and development.188 The social identity of a state, in its turn, is comprised of “the 
sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others.”189 So, 
in Wendt’s theory, it is the social identity of the state, not its corporate identity, which is 
constructed in relation to “other”: 
[Social identities] are “ontologically dependent on relations to others; for 
example, one cannot be an “anticommunist” if there are no communists 
around, nor a “balancer” if there is no one to balance. In this respect, social 
identities are a key link in the mutual constitution of agent and structure, 
embodying the terms of individuality through which corporate agents relate 
to each other.190  
Though Wendtian constructivism has challenged rationalist interpretations of international 
relations, it has some serious limitations. First, the “corporate identity” of a state is deemed as 
given and appears immune from international relations. For the theory to work, the corporate 
identity needs to be deemed as existing prior to state191 and international politics.192 Its 
sustainability is rather a matter of domestic politics. Most importantly, due to its “self-
organizing” nature,193 it is of minimum interest to Wendt’s constructivist theory. Thus, social 
constructivism does not apply to this layer of identity. Second, even though the “social identity” 
of a state is socially constructed, its “constructedness” is limited to either being power-seeking, 
self-minded or altruistic. To put it in Zehfuss’ words, “Wendt asks us to assume two actors, ego 
and alter, who then come to interact only after we have imagined them on their own.”194 The 
only explanation for this limitation is that Wendt’s main concern was to demonstrate that 
egoism is not the only feature that identifies states. He was keen to prove that they can also be 
cooperative and altruist. In other words, he was overwhelmingly focused on demystifying the 
anarchy-driven greedy state identity. In any case, Wendt’s theory, no matter how 
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groundbreaking it was at its time, fails to fully grasp the origins and importance of the multi-
layered identities of nation-states. As the next section of the chapter shows, post-structuralist 
theories of IR are better equipped in this regard. As Wendt himself acknowledges, his theory is 
rather “essentialist” and, in comparison to post-structuralist theories, is a “somewhat weak 
claim.”195  
1.2. The foreign as a threat to identity: a discursive understanding of international 
relations 
One of the most comprehensive attempts to show the importance of identity in the analysis of 
international relations belongs to David Campbell. For him, nation (“people” and “imagined 
political communities”), national identity (“the identity of a ‘people’”), and nationalism are 
constructed by the state to legitimize itself and its practices.196 By aligning itself to these 
constructs, the state becomes a national state, though it ideally seeks to be a nation-state, which 
is impossible to achieve.197 Thus, in Campbell’s view, “states are never finished as entities”, they 
are “in permanent need of reproduction” and “always in process of becoming.”198 In other 
words, “the drive to fix the state’s identity and contain challenges to the state’s representation 
cannot finally or absolutely succeed.”199 Paradoxical as it may sound, the continuity of this 
process of “reproduction” or “becoming” is essential to the existence of the state, because “[f]or 
a state to end its practices of representation would be to expose its lack of prediscursive 
foundations; stasis would be death.”200   
As far as the method of construction of identity is concerned, it is done “through the inscription 
of boundaries that serve to demarcate an ‘inside’ from an ‘outside,' a ‘self’ from an ‘other,' a 
‘domestic’ from a ‘foreign.'”201 In Campbell’s theory, there is nothing prior to or outside of the 
interaction between identity and difference, and both identity and difference are constituted 
performatively.202 The performative act that defines the boundaries of identity/difference 
dichotomy is foreign policy. So on the one hand, foreign policy is a “boundary-producing political 
performance.”203 On the other hand, it “helps produce and reproduce the political identity of 
the doer supposedly behind the deed.”204 As can be seen, foreign policy has an unconventional 
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meaning in Campbell’s theory. In his view, the conventional explanation of foreign policy as a 
“bridge between sovereign states existing in an anarchic world, a bridge that is constructed 
between two prior, securely grounded, and nominally independent realms”205 is misleading. 
Campbell rather proposes to view foreign policy as a performative act that is concerned “with 
the establishment of the boundaries that constitute, at one and the same time, the ‘state’ and 
‘the international system.'”206 In this unconventional sense, foreign policy encompasses two 
layers: “foreign policy” (in inverted commas) and Foreign Policy (with capital letters).207 
According to Campbell, “Foreign Policy serves to reproduce the constitution of identity made 
possible by “foreign policy” and to contain challenges to the identity that results.”208  
Campbell argues that the differentiation of inside from outside, self from other, and domestic 
from foreign is based on the principles of differentiation of superior from inferior. According to 
him, “the social space of inside/outside is both made possible by and helps to constitute a moral 
space of superior/inferior, which can be animated in terms of any number of figurations of 
higher/lower.”209 He views “biomedical discourses” as the roots of such differentiation where 
the physiological body is represented as healthy and clean in contrast to all possible diseases 
(“bipolarity of normal/pathological”). He believes that people tend to view the “social” as a 
healthy body while any difference is regarded as a dangerous illness.210 States have a vested 
interest in exaggerating the difference as this allows them to fulfill the role of defender of the 
“healthy body” from the threat of “disease.” Emphasizing this point, Campbell argues that “the 
very domains of inside/outside, self/other, and domestic/foreign […] are constituted through 
the writing of a threat.”211 The state’s function to “write a threat” is inherent and resembles 
what Campbell calls an “evangelism of fear”: 
[T]he state project of security replicates the church project of salvation. State 
grounds its legitimacy by offering the promise of security to its citizens who, 
it says, would otherwise face manifold dangers. The church justifies its role 
by guaranteeing salvation to its followers who, it says, would otherwise be 
destined to an unredeemed death. Both the state and church require 
considerable effort to maintain order within and around themselves, and 
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thereby engage in an evangelism of fear to ward off internal and external 
threats, succumbing in the process to the temptation to treat difference as 
otherness.212 
In other words, it is an inherent function of the state to use foreign policy to create a threatening 
“other” and defendable “self.” Thus, “[t]he constant articulation of danger through foreign 
policy is [...] not a threat to a state’s identity or existence: it is its condition of possibility.”213 As 
an example, Campbell refers to the discursive construction of “true” “Americanness” in the US, 
in opposition to “barbarian” “otherness.” At various times the discourse in the US has inscribed: 
women, the working class, Eastern Europeans, Jews, blacks, criminals, 
coloreds, mulattos, Africans, drug addicts, Arabs, the insane, Asians, the 
Orient, the Third World, terrorists, and other others through tropes that have 
written their identity as inferior, often in terms of their being a mob and horde 
(sometimes passive and sometimes threatening) that is without culture, 
devoid of morals, infected with disease, lacking in industry, incapable of 
achievement, prone to be unruly, inspired by emotions, given to passion, 
indebted to tradition, or… whatever “we” are not.214 
As will be discussed later in this chapter, this dissertation builds upon Campbell’s interpretation 
of international relations and identity formation. Using the case of Tajikistan’s “foreign policy” 
and Foreign Policy, it attempts to draw qualitatively new conclusions about Tajikistan’s relations 
with Uzbekistan. However, this dissertation stretches Campbell’s theory further to draw 
conclusions about the detailed functioning of the “foreign policy”-making process. To avoid any 
confusion, this dissertation will avoid using Campbell’s terminological apparatus. This will 
primarily be achieved by replacing “foreign policy” by “politics of identity” (or, “identity politics”) 
and Foreign Policy by foreign policy. As far as the Campbelian foreign policy (which combines 
“foreign policy” and Foreign Policy), that term will be avoided. Furthermore, this dissertation 
attempts to show that Campbell’s theory will benefit from integrating relatively new concepts 
and assumptions that can be found in emerging studies.  
1.3. International relations as Self/Other relations215 
Social-constructivist and post-structuralist theories were not the only ones that attempted to 
shed light on identity formation in IR. Iver Neumann tried to come up with a theory that would 
occupy a middle ground. Contrary to the assertions of rationalist/structuralist theorists, he 
argues that “[i]dentity does not reside in essential and readily identifiable cultural traits but in 
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relations."216 According to him, "[i]t is the cultural logic of 'us and them,' of collective identity, 
of group consciousness" that shapes the international society of states.217 He viewed 
international relations as an international society of states (rather than an anarchic system of 
states), borrowing the opinion of Hedley Bull. Drawing on this opinion, Neumann not only 
speculated about the construction of an "international societal" collective identity, but also 
about a regional collective identity,218 a sub-regional identity,219 and a national identity.220 He 
made no differentiation between the ways that regional identity and national identity are 
constructed: 
It is often maintained that Central Europe is a project radically different from 
national projects in the region since it unites where national projects divide. 
This, however, is not necessarily so. Since nation-building and region-building 
projects are both instances of identity politics, they will necessarily have a 
unifying as well as divisive aspects. The all-important question is rather how 
differentiation is produced.221 
At all levels, he believes, self-definition requires a “constituting” “other.” His scholarly works 
focus on the analysis of the European “self” vis-à-vis the Ottoman “other,” Central European 
“self” vis-à-vis the Russian “other,” and Russian “self” vis-à-vis the European “other.” According 
to him, “a thing is perceived as much in terms of what it is not as in terms of what it is.”222 In his 
view, the self and the other mutually constitute each other: 
Identity is inconceivable without difference. In order for some human 
collectives to acknowledge that they are in some respect identical, that they 
have a common identity in those respects, they have to contrast that identity 
to something different. This is unavoidable, and therefore in itself not worthy 
of great attention. However, the ways in which a collective may forge a 
common identity by differentiating itself externally from other collectives, are 
many and various. Since the production of identity and of difference – of self 
and other – proceed together, they will also color each other.223 
What differentiates Neumann from post-structuralist theorists is that he posits that hostile 
relations with the “other” can become friendly; “one should not rule out the possibility of 
turning a traditionally apposite Other into a positive Other, with which one could have mutually 
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fruitful interaction.”224 Nevertheless, most of Neumann’s assumptions sound similar to those of 
post-structuralist or even postmodernist theories of IR. For instance, Neumann argues that "[i]n 
discussing Europe, the Russians have […] clearly been discussing themselves, and so the debate 
is an example of how Russians have talked themselves into existence."225 This is what Xavier 
Guillaume, a post-structuralist theorist of IR, would call an “utterance.” Although it is evident 
that, in Neumann’s theory, identity is constructed discursively, Neumann tries to avoid linking 
himself with the post-modernists or post-structuralists. He rather associates himself with, what 
he calls, “the Copenhagen coterie of international relations,” (along with Waever, Hansen, Holm, 
Welsh) a school of theorists whom Neumann posits at the middle ground between 
rationalist/structuralist theorists (e.g., Hedley Bull and Kenneth Waltz) and post-
structuralists/post-modernists (e.g., Ashley, Der Derian, Shapiro, Walker, Campbell).  
The biggest contribution of Neumann to IR theory is his comprehensive analysis of how the 
self/other dichotomy, as a form of collective identity formation, has traveled to IR from 
disciplines like ethnography, psychology, and philosophy.226 Furthermore, he argues that 
“othering” can unite several competing national “selves” under a regional identity in the face of 
a non-regional “other.”227 Finally, ‘the Copenhagen coterie”, in his opinion, has proved that 
international cooperation is possible.228 Nevertheless, these assumptions in Neumann’s works 
do not necessarily distance him from those whom he calls post-structuralist scholars. His 
analytical methods are not always free from elements of both post-structuralism and post-
modernism. Moreover, the dialogical understanding of collective identity formation that he 
advocates for is at the core of post-structuralism.229 After all, as Neumann acknowledges, 
Hansen and Waever of “the Copenhagen coterie” owe a “debt to the theorizing of Ashley and 
Walker.”230 Lastly, Neumann himself occasionally refers to Ashley, Der Derian and Foucault.231 
To conclude, Neumann influenced a range of scholars, including Rumelili, Diez, and Bukh,232 who 
continued his efforts to maintain distance from Campbelian post-structuralist theories when 
studying the self/other dichotomy. While acknowledging Neumann’s great contribution, this 
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dissertation argues that non-antagonistic relations of the “self” with “other” are impossible as 
the “other” stops fulfilling its constructive function as soon as the “self” seeks friendly relations 
with it.  
1.4. Identity/alterity nexus: a dialogical understanding of international relations 
The dialogical understanding of IR that Neumann advocated for has been advanced to a new 
level by Xavier Guillaume, a post-structuralist IR scholar.233 Guillaume’s view on the processual 
formation of an identity within and beyond a state is revolutionary in the sense that it leads to 
a qualitatively new understanding of the term “international,” and thus, of international 
relations. For Guillaume, identity is as important an attribute as the “power” and “interest” that 
a state brings into international relations.234 His definition of identity is as follows: 
An identity, a specific self-understanding/representation, [is] a social 
continuant, as a series of on-going events and/or occurrences plotted through 
a multitude of commitments and identifications that basically give the 
structures and the horizons determining what the good is, what should and 
should not be, what should be done and how, or what or whom one should 
be associated with, distinguished from or opposed to.235 
For Guillaume, “identity is both a discursive and performative act,”236 and therefore it looks like 
an “utterance.” Based on Bakhtin’s definition of “utterance,” Guillaume argues that like 
utterance, identity has three dimensions: expressivity, contextuality, and relationality.237 
Expressivity implies that identity is expressed in texts. “Texts,” in his interpretation, are not 
merely “written words in specific media, or to the sole effects of representation.”238 They are 
rather “all activities, including material practices, by and through which human beings are 
‘readable.'”239 This “readability” or expressivity of identity does not mean anything without “its 
contextualization within a historical, socio-cultural, economic and political assemblage.”240 
Lastly, relationality of identity means that identity as a social continuant is “not self-contained,” 
but rather defined by its “extrinsicness.”241 In other words, national identity should be 
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understood as “participating in a continuous dialogical process of what itself is in relation to 
alternative understandings and representations.”242 Guillaume labels this alternative 
understanding and representation as “alterity.” Relations between “identity” and “alterity” are 
“dialogical.” According to him, “[t]his dialogical approach […] is dialogical in the sense that it 
considers identity to represent a multitude of “answers” to alterity, to multiple self-
understandings/representations.”243  
So far as identity is utterance, it presumes the presence of a narrator. According to Guillaume, 
“it is obvious—but not necessary—that the state be considered the main chief narrator, as the 
sovereign expression of national identity in the international realm.”244 The chief narrators are 
the “holders of political power and cultural authority.”245 Therefore, they are the “central and 
authoritative agents setting up linguistic and performative models [that] define a polity’s 
environment and its dominating self-understanding/representation”.246 The set of 
methodological tools that states rely on to fulfill these activities is called the politics of alterity. 
The politics of alterity is a “boundary-producing political performance,” which makes it similar 
to Campbell’s “foreign policy.”247 The politics of alterity has two components – alterity rhetoric 
and practices of alterity. Alterity rhetoric can be seen in “the different textual or discursive 
expressions that constitute the texts of foreign policy” as well as “in any type of ‘textual’ 
expression […] related to the delimitation and production of national identity.”248 While alterity 
rhetoric is more about the expressive aspects of the politics of alterity,249 the practices of alterity 
are the practical steps that a state/government undertake (i.e., what they do and how they 
behave) to enable the “actual application of the rhetoric”250 in order to render alterity and 
identity opaque. States use these practices to “concretely establish […] the boundaries defining 
the norms within and beyond the state and, consequently, either eject […] the ones that are 
considered as exterior to the boundaries enacted, or integrat[e] the ones that are considered as 
analogous to them.”251 What lies within the state’s borders is known as “domestic” or “internal” 
and what lies beyond the state’s boundaries is considered “international.” 
While Guillaume’s incorporation of Bakhtin’s views into his analysis of IR proves to be insightful, 
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there are some limitations in his post-Campbelian theory. His concept of the politics of alterity 
does not operate unless it is paired with “narrative matrices”252 that shape “knowledge space 
and moral space.” He uses La Republique as a central narrative matrix in France253 as well as 
shinkoku shiso and kokutai as the narrative matrices in Japan.254 He fails to explain where these 
matrices come from or how and why they shape knowledge and moral space. The matrices 
sound like an ideology or a national idea which defines what is right and wrong, what is 
acceptable and unacceptable. This dissertation, on the other hand, argues that, first, ideologies 
and national ideas are results of a state’s politics of identity/alterity, and not of readily available, 
operating matrices for a politics of alterity.  
Furthermore, Guillaume argues that “othering” is merely one figuration of alterity, which means 
that alterity can be good as well as bad.255 Criticizing the Campbelian way of “othering”,256 he 
states that “focusing solely on the mechanism of othering limits our ability to grasp the complex 
configurations of power relations at play in the formation, performance, and transformation of 
a […] collective identity.”257 In other words, he refuses to accept the importance of the “threat” 
of the “other” to the “self” and assumes that non-threatening figurations of "other" are possible. 
However, the empirical parts of his scholarly works are full of the examples where the “other” 
is perceived as a “threat” to identity; e.g., Japanese identity as an answer to the ‘Western’ 
threat,258 kokutai as a tool against perceived threats from modernism and Americanism,259 
Christianity as a threat,260 the portrayal of “Western ideologies, such as liberalism and 
communism […] as threatening Japanese self-understanding/representation”,261 liberalism and 
socialism as a threat to kokutai and tennosei,262 “the heterodox behavior and way of thinking of 
some Japanese people” as a threat to “the harmony of the political community as a whole”,263 
“imported and unnatural Western doctrines and perspectives” as a threat to “harmony”,264 a 
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“Japanese person following Western ideologies or religions (whether Christianity, Communism 
or Western Liberalism)” as “a westernized alien and, therefore, a threat to the peace and 
harmony of the Japanese realm”265, and so on.266  
Lastly, despite his claims that non-threatening alterity is possible, Guillaume abundantly uses 
the term “danger”267 whenever he refers to the “other.” As already shown in the previous 
section of this chapter, the practice of attributing threat and danger to the “other” is a 
characteristic feature of Campbell’s theory, which Guillaume attempts to criticize. Thus, to some 
degree, Guillaume’s attempt to develop a post-structuralist theory that goes beyond “othering” 
is not successful. Rather, there are significant similarities between his and Campbell’s theories. 
This is not to say, however, that Guillaume’s theory is a complete failure. The three concepts 
that he introduces to the study of identity in IR are important contributions to IR theory; politics 
of alterity as  being comprised of alterity rhetoric and the practices of alterity, identity as 
utterance (including its expressivity, contextuality and relationality), as well as state as a “chief 
narrator” (or, histor). This dissertation incorporates these notions in its theoretical framework. 
1.5. Ontological security and international relations 
The introduction of the concept of “ontological security” to studies of the role of identity in 
international relations was a breakthrough in IR theory. This concept had been a long-missing 
piece in the IR jigsaw, capable of revealing the extent to which the national identity politics, 
national security policy, and foreign policy of a state are intertwined. Inspired by Anthony 
Giddens’268 use of this concept in his sociological inquiries, Jef Huysmans, and Bill McSweeney 
brought it into the IR discipline in the late 1990s. While Huysmans and McSweeney attempted 
to incorporate the notion of ontological security into Campbelian and Wendtian constructivist 
theories, respectively, it was Brent Steele and Jennifer Mitzen, who speculated about a possibly 
new IR theory resting on the notion of ontological security. Although they have not been 
successful in their attempts, the introduction of the concept of ontological security to IR theory 
has been enriching. It should be noted that over the last decade a significant number of 
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publications made further contributions to the study of ontological security.269 
Huysmans acknowledges the importance of a threatening “other” to the construction of the 
“self.”270 However, a fear of the “other” can also be replaced by a “fear of uncertainty and 
ambiguity.”271 For example, the demise of the USSR removed the threat that communism posed 
to the Unites States’ identity and brought in “a chaotic condition [in the post-Cold War era] in 
which there were no certainties.”272 This caused ontological insecurity for the United States. For 
Huysmans, ontological security is a “mediation of order and chaos” whereas “daily security” is a 
“mediation of threat” from enemies and strangers.273 While dividing security into separate 
“daily” and “ontological” categories has been a breakthrough in IR, the weakness of Huysmans’ 
theoretical assumption lies in his overwhelming focus on the “fear of death.” While death 
sounds threatening to humans,274 Huysmans’ transfer of this fear to states is problematic. He 
believes that an individual’s fear of a criminal and a state’s fear of a rival state are the same and 
that both are driven by fear of death. In his own words “[t]he general category of death is 
displaced by concretized dangers, inimical forces ranging from the devil to criminals and rival 
states.”275 Huysmans does not elaborate on why/how this “displacement” occurs or on why/how 
a “rival state” obtains resemblance to a “devil/criminal.” It is probable that a further elaboration 
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would take him towards Campbelian post-structuralism, given that Huysmans argues that 
“[s]ecurity policy is a practice of postponing death by countering enemies,”276 and this seems to 
replicate Campbell’s assumptions. Huysmans’ theory does not answer such questions as 
whether or not ontological security is achievable or whether “death” is a matter of physical or 
ontological security. 
As far as McSweeney’s theoretical assumptions are concerned, they appear inherently flawed 
considering that his study is based on Wendtian constructivism, which has not withstood the 
criticism of post-structuralist theories. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that McSweeny’s usage 
of the term is a bit different from that of other IR scholars. In his interpretation, ontological 
security is not merely a “question of confidence that we are the same, and they are different,” 
but rather “a prior confidence that we and they share a common, fundamental identity” upon 
which the self/other and us/them differences can be constructed.277 In practical terms, ethnic 
differences are possible among human beings, rather than among “us Americans and them 
baseball hats.” In attempts to translate his application of identity from the human/society level 
to the societal/state level, McSweeney relies on the Wendtian concepts of “societal identity” 
and “state identity.”278 Thus, his claims carry all the drawbacks of Wendtian theory, as discussed 
earlier in this chapter. Without a proper review/criticism, McSweeney swipes away Campbell’s 
theory by criticizing it for sharing Morgenthau’s and Waltz’s assumptions that states have a fixed 
egoistic identity.279  
The Mitzen-Steele debate raised the use of “ontological security” in the IR-identity nexus to a 
qualitatively new level, mostly due to a more comprehensive re-engagement with Gidden’s 
works. The biggest contribution of Mitzen is to explain the processes that states undertake to 
maintain ontological security and avoid ontological insecurity. She calls these processes 
“routines.” According to her,  
In any given social environment, actors solidify identity and learn to be 
‘agentic’ through routinized relations with significant others. From a platform 
of stable routines, aspiring agents come to know who they are and therefore 
can act. Then, because routines anchor identity, actors become attached to, 
or invested in, their routines.280  
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Mitzen rightly notes that “[l]eaving old routines behind generates ontological insecurity”281 
because “[l]etting go of routines would amount to sacrificing our sense of agency, which would 
be hard to do.”282 Considering that “routines depend on others responding predictably,”283 
unpredictability in the changed routines pose identity insecurity. This is why, Mitzen believes, a 
conflictual relationship, no matter how costly in terms of economic and physical security it might 
be, appears rational to states and stays routinized, especially when conflicting relations are the 
source from which national identity is drawn. Thus, it is no wonder that “ontological security can 
conflict with physical security.” 284 To be more precise, “[e]ven harmful or self-defeating 
relationship can provide ontological security, which means states can become attached to 
conflict.”285 Based on this, Mitzen argues that ensuring security of identity might be more 
important for states than conflict prevention, because “[w]here conflict persists and comes to 
fulfill identity needs, breaking free can generate ontological insecurity, which states seek to 
avoid.”286 Finally, Mitzen acknowledges the importance of othering and myth-making for 
maintaining self-identity. To put it in her words, securing one’s “self-conception” is maintained 
“by projecting negative aspects of the Self onto an Other or otherwise essentializing Self and 
Other, such as through stereotyping, relying on enemy images, resurrecting national myths, 
etc.”287 However, she never explains how othering and myth-making practices are related to 
routines. Similarly, she does not attempt to theorize the links between othering, mythmaking 
and foreign policy routines. Nevertheless, based on the review above, her contribution to the 
field is enormous.  
Brent Steele attempts to fill these gaps. He argues that discursive construction of self-identity 
through narrative is not only necessary to maintain the ontological security of nation-states, but 
also “gives life to routinized foreign policy actions.”288 Both foreign policy and defence policy are 
planned in accordance with identity politics, in Steele’s opinion. As he puts it, “[o]ntological 
security illuminates not only why states pursue “non-material” incentives in their foreign policy 
actions, but also how nation-states structure their militaries to serve identity needs rather than 
simply “physical” security needs.”289 As a result, preference is given to ontological security rather 
than to physical security. To ensure the security of their self-identity (ontological security) states 
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pursue materially costly and physically dangerous policies.290 Because “[w]hile physical security 
is (obviously) important to states, ontological security is more important because its fulfillment 
affirms a state’s self-identity (i.e., it affirms not only its physical existence but primarily how a 
state sees itself and secondarily how it wants to be seen by others).”291  
In Steele’s approach, “othering” is not the only source of ontological insecurity, nor is it the main. 
He believes, rather, that “[t]he anxiety which engulfs the Self does not necessarily have to 
originate from the Other.” 292 According to him, the self is “more intrinsically dynamic” and 
possible “within the internal dialectic.” 293 Construction of the “self”, if any, can take place mainly 
within the nation-state, but not as a result of social interaction with an external “other”. Such 
an approach places Steele’s theory within the realist school, which he openly admires and 
attempts to reform. Using the language of realist theory, Steele argues that “states are self-
interested,” that they “form their security interests on the basis of their own self-interest,” and 
that their “self-interest supersedes international morality and international law.”294 In his 
version of realism, states are not driven by the urge for national survival but rather by 
“ontological security-seeking” behavior.295 In Steele’s opinion, states do everything it takes to 
ensure the security of their identity. For this purpose, states have “a menu of choices for action, 
from the deployment of military forces to the articulation of a narrative of the self in the face of 
identity threats.”296 These assumptions look unobjectionable until one starts questioning what 
Steele calls the “intrinsically dynamic” processes within a state. 
Steele describes “shaming” (synonymous with “insecuritizing”) states, through reminders of 
“past failure”, as the main source of their anxiety.297 In other words, for a state, handling 
shameful memories of the past in an appropriate manner becomes a matter of ontological 
security. Thus, “the struggle for ontological security is intertwined with the ability of agents to 
fixate on collective memories.”298 Remembering the past creates grounds for foreign policy. “In 
recalling past events, and in organizing those self-relevant events into a narrative, social agents 
not only provide particular interpretations of history but enliven history by using it to create the 
basis for action.”299 Also, states attach meaning to biographical narratives, and thus define 
national “interest” for themselves and subsequently decide upon mechanisms to secure their 
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interests.300 So, domestically intrinsic matter fuels external behavior. However, there is a serious 
discrepancy in this mechanism; Steele fails to acknowledge that the acts of “shaming” at the 
international level which trigger domestic “collective memories” and “biographical narratives” 
are a socially constructed “feeling.” The “shame” that Steele discusses cannot be internally 
triggered; it is rather a result of a state’s social interaction with “others.”  
There are other limitations in Steele’s theoretical assumptions. For instance, Steele views the 
state as an “anxious agent.”301 This labeling looks like an exaggeration considering that, other 
than being “shamed” at an international level, Steele fails to acknowledge any sources of state 
anxiety. After all, shame is not an issue in most nations. Moreover, similar to Mitzen, Steele does 
not provide an empirically rich definition of the “routines” which, according to him, are driven 
by the state’s never-ending “anxiety” about being. 302 Furthermore, all three case studies that 
Steele uses for his analysis are concerned with why states choose to remain neutral or take part 
in from military conflicts, as if waging or not waging war is the standard agenda for all states. 
Finally, even though Steele does not have anything to say against Campbell,303 and rather sees 
room for ontological security in poststructuralist theories of IR,304 he refuses to view the “other” 
as the main source of ontological insecurity. His criticism of Campbell is unconvincing and 
insubstantial. Moreover, establishing that states have a self-help nature does not necessarily 
imply the sole validity of realist theories of IR. It goes without saying that there are several minor 
issues about Steele’s speculations regarding notions as “healthy” and “unhealthy” ontological 
security; “artificial” identity 305 ;“external enemies” and “internal strangers”;306 and  the 
transition of “anxiety” into “fear”.307 None of these terms are well-defined or convincingly 
integrated into Steele’s theoretical assumption.  
2. Analytical framework and theoretical assumptions of the thesis 
All of the theories mentioned above have influenced the analytical framework employed in this 
dissertation, but the theories developed by Campbell, and Guillaume, as well as Mitzen, and 
Steele, will be engaged with more closely. As shown above, each of these scholars has made 
breakthroughs in their own right and the basic theoretical assumptions of this dissertation build 
upon their work. However, as briefly reviewed above, each of them also have their limitations, 
and some more than others. This dissertation attempts to address those issues and make a 
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contribution to IR theory. It dwells deeply on the details of “domestic” aspects of identity 
formation and “othering” to show how the self/other dichotomy is linked to foreign policy and 
international relations. In particular, as will be discussed below, it introduces notions of national 
heroism/anti-heroism as the two poles of “knowledge space,” to borrow Guillaume’s words, or 
“moral space” in Campbell’s terms. This will be helpful in showing why and how “purely” 
domestic debates about heroes/anti-heroes have direct links to international relations. 
Furthermore, this dissertation integrates the locales of “identity construction” such as 
linguistics, literature, historiography and statehood into IR theory to show that they are not only 
matters of domestic concern but also have strong links to nation-states’ external relations.  
2.1. Identity politics as a boundary-making performance 
 “The boundary-making political performance” of a state is one of its core functions. Almost all 
policies (social, economic, trade, military, foreign, security, education, etc.) conducted by a state 
contribute to this performance. Boundary-making political performance always seeks answers 
to the following questions: “Who we are” as a nation? Where do the challenges to “our” self-
identification and perception come from? Where are the boundaries between “us” and those 
challenging “us”? How do we maintain the differences between “us” and “them”? States rely on 
all possible means to forge national identity, identify active and passive challenges to that 
identity, and then act as a protector of national identity. This function cannot be fulfilled solely 
through identification of a nation’s enemy via foreign policy; through teaching national history 
in schools; or through building museums and statues, etc. All of a state’s policies contribute to 
the construction of national “self” and an “other”, as well as to the boundaries between them. 
This dissertation uses the notion of the “politics of identity” to summarize the boundary-making 
aspects of a state’s policies. It avoids using Campbell’s “foreign policy” and Guillaume’s “politics 
of alterity” as these terms can be misleading. 
2.2. Epistemic function of identity politics 
Identity is always associated with positivity. Anything that does not fit in with this positivity, or 
that passively ignores or openly challenges it, is unacceptable and dangerous, thus going beyond 
the boundaries of identity. This explains the polarity of qualities associated with the self” and 
the “other”. In maintaining ontological security, the politics of identity aims at defining and 
defending “the truth” about the national “self.” According to this “truth,” the “self” bears 
positive qualities whereas the “other” carries negative features. Similarly, the “self” is superior, 
whereas the “other” is inferior. At any given time, the boundaries of these positive and negative 
qualities defines the boundaries of what is acceptable and unacceptable. The politics of identity 
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generates knowledge about these acceptable and unacceptable qualities. Ultimately, this 
knowledge informs what is moral and what is immoral for both the individual and the collective, 
representing and identifying with the nation. It is an expectation that people act within the 
“knowledge space” or “moral space” of identity. Otherwise, an individual or collective of people 
who “disobey” become associated with the “other.” The knowledge and moral space of identity 
are created performatively and discursively. Therefore, the politics of identity include methods 
ranging from an action toward a foreign nation, to a textbook writing, to a national celebration, 
to a major infrastructure construction. 
2.3. Maintaining ontological security through identity politics 
The ultimate goal of the politics of identity is to ensure ontological security. Some nation-states 
feel more ontologically secure than others. Nevertheless, to some degree, every nation has its 
concerns and anxieties related to the “other.” Threats emanating from the “other” might range 
from passive to active. The “other” ceases to fulfill its function when it does not pose any 
challenge to the “self.” This might happen when the moral and knowledge bases of either the 
“self” or the “other” shift. In this case, the “self,” based on certain moral and knowledge bases, 
comes across an “other” which ignores or challenges that morality or knowledge. The “Self” and 
the “other(s)” are fluid, multilayered, and in a constant state of “emergence.” The more active 
a threat is, the more chances there are that it ceases to be an issue of ontological security and 
becomes one of physical security. The level of perceived threat to identity dictates the policy 
instruments that the state uses to address it (this can range from erecting a monument to 
deploying troops). Ontological security is as important as economic stability and military security 
and it is therefore no wonder that states make economically and militarily costly decisions to 
keep the dominant narratives of national identity intact. No identity is immune from ontological 
insecurity. Therefore, the politics of identity is perpetual, like the state system itself. 
Language is an important aspect of national identity. Various terms are used to explore the links 
between language and national identity. Eric Hobsbawm believes that “[a]t all events problems 
of power, status, politics and ideology and not of communication or even culture, lie at the heart 
of the nationalism of language.”308 John Joseph prefers to use “national linguistic identity” to 
define the linguistic aspect of the “us and them” dichotomy. According to him, “[t]he more steps 
‘they’ undertake to suppress our identity, the more motivated we are to maintain and even 
strengthen it.”309 Leigh Oakes defines a similar phenomenon as “linguistic nationalism.” He 
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explains it using the example of Germany, where anti-French feelings resulted in leading German 
intellectuals such as Herder, Fichte, and Humboldt advocating national pride based on an 
appreciation of the German language.310 Therefore, it can be said that “language is an important 
variable in power relations between dominant and subordinate groups.”311 In other words, 
“[c]ompetition between languages represents competition between groups.”312 The following 
paragraph best summarizes the dividing and uniting functions of language: 
[L]anguage, and in particular the existence of broadly shared 
language, is very often a primary and critical component in the 
successful moulding of a population as a nation. As a symbolic marker 
and index of individual and group identity, language has the potential 
to function as an important boundary device, separating distinct sub-
populations off from neighbouring others with different, possibly 
unintelligible language habits, and binding the former together with 
shared feelings of identity and group self-interest. Spread amongst a 
significantly wide population of speakers via the use of various mass 
media, a common language can assist in the construction of a 
geographically widespread, imagined community of speakers and the 
building of nation-like polities, providing linguistic links are also 
reinforced with other shared cultural properties. The promotion of a 
standardized, common language throughout a territory and its 
inhabitants also has the ability to even out socio-economic inequities 
present in a society and encourage the unification of a population 
through the provision of equal (or at least improved) opportunities 
for advancement and future prosperity.313 
Furthermore, “‘[h]istory’ makes up a substantial part of a biographical narrative [of the 
nation]”314 and states select certain periods in the past to appear in their biographical 
narrative.315 Creation of a national biographical narrative substantiates ontological security. The 
purpose of the biographical narrative is “to provide the Self with knowledge about its place in 
‘the world’, specifically to meaningfully situate the Self and delineate its existence in time and 
space, to provide us with a necessary sense of orientation about where we come from and 
where we are, or could be, going.”316 Ultimately, “[t]he political potency of a national biography 
lies in its function to provide a community with a basic discourse, or master narrative, which 
guides and legitimizes courses of action and provides ontological security.”317 
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3. Conclusion 
Even though the state’s “border-making” function is the main reason for the creation of the 
knowledge/moral space and the self/other dichotomy, the power of a discursive construction of 
the dangerous “other” should not be overestimated.  Uruguay, for instance, no matter how hard 
it tries, can never succeed in creating a bad image of Uzbekistan, or Uzbek leadership, or the 
Uzbek nation with the purpose of using it as dangerous “other” vis-à-vis sustainable “self”. There 
should be a point of contact, at least, or friction at best, between the “self” and potential 
“other(s).” Furthermore, a threat to ontological security and a threat to existential security 
should not be mistaken for one another. Famine, war, sanctions, and blockades, coups, and the 
military drills of neighboring nations are, rather, matters of existential security. True, their 
effects can be politicized and used for identity/difference construction. However, those physical 
and natural threats themselves cannot be discursively constructed out of nowhere.  
The thematic focus on this thesis is the politics of national identity in Tajikistan. Within the 
framework of the above-mentioned theoretical assumptions, it explains 1) how the politics of 
national identity in Tajikistan creates the boundaries of the Tajik “self” and Uzbek “other”; 2) 
how Tajikistan attempts to ensure ontological security from a threatening “other”; and 3) how 
Tajikistan defines the moral/knowledge space of identity. To do that, this dissertation focuses 
on three areas of self/other friction – statehood/territoriality, language/literature, and 
historiography. In all three areas, the Tajik government relies on images of famous Tajik scholars 
and political figures, all of whom are recognized as Heroes of Tajikistan, with texts that 
contribute to the politics of national identity hailing their lives and deeds as an example for the 
Tajik people.  
This dissertation shows that the practice of hero-making is an act that defines the moral and 
knowledge space of identity. The qualities of the Heroes and their causes, which they upheld as 
the best possible ones for the whole nation to follow, define the most acceptable national 
features and also hints at what is unacceptable. The latter quality is principally associated with 
either anti-heroes or “others.” Therefore, it is enriching to understand why Tajikistan chose 
certain heroes. Being one of the overlooked aspects of identity politics, an analysis of practices 
surrounding hero-making might illuminate aspects of how the moral/knowledge space of 
identity is defined and how the boundaries of the self and the other are drawn. Overall, 
addressing the common criticism – i.e., post-structuralist theories of IR are “an exercise in 
complication for complication’s sake”318 – this dissertation uses the case of Tajikistan’s identity 
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politics to show that such theorizations can hold strong explanatory power.   
50 
Chapter 2. The Role of Remembering National Heroes in the Politics of 
Identity: Defining the Moral Space of Identity in Tajikistan 
1. Remembering the Heroes of Tajikistan and their role in the politics of identity 
Maintaining national unity has been a priority task for the Tajik government since the end of the 
civil war in 1997. Along with declaring 27 June, the day when the peace accord was signed, the 
Day of National Unity,319 the Tajik government announced Sadriddin Aini and Bobojon Ghafurov 
were awarded with the title of “Heroes of Tajikistan” on 8 September, 1997. 320 This is the highest 
state award in Tajikistan.321 By that time, these two figures were already uncontestably and 
unconditionally famous people within Tajik society. There was no shortage of knowledge and 
discourse about the services they had rendered to the Tajik nation. Even though those 
discourses were created during Soviet rule, narratives about their exemplary lives and deeds 
were equally acceptable in post-Soviet Tajikistan. President Emomali Rahmon was chosen by the 
parliament as the next “Hero of Tajikistan” on 11 December 1999.322  Since then three more 
people were awarded the title of “Hero of Tajikistan”. On 7 May 2001, Mirzo Tursunzoda, a 
famous Soviet Tajik poet and writer, received the title of Hero of Tajikistan.323 On 27 June 2006, 
the president bestowed the same honour on Nusratullo Makhsum and Shirinsho Shotemur. 
Members of the Tajik intelligentsia represented by the Academy of Science of Tajikistan, the 
Union of Writers, Union of Artists, Union of Musicians and Union of Theatre Actors wrote a letter 
to President Rahmon thanking him for perpetuating images of these Tajiks.324  
The Tajik government exerts significant effort to promote the lives and deeds of these people 
by organizing a series of public events, meetings, conferences and publications, etc. For instance, 
in 1998, Tajikistan celebrated the 90th anniversary of Bobojon Ghafurov. A year before that, 
during the 29th session of the General Assembly of UNESCO in Paris in October-November, the 
government successfully lobbied for the inclusion of Ghafurov’s 90th anniversary to the list of 
anniversaries, historic events and eminent personalities to be celebrated by Member States and 
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Associate Members.325 This series of public events and celebrations culminated on 21 December 
2008, with a grand ceremonial meeting.326 With similar jubilance the 120th anniversary of 
Sadriddin Aini was celebrated, the main event taking place on 15 April 1998, the writer’s 
birthday.327 A decade later, the government sponsored a similar series of public events, 
conferences and publications to celebrate the 100th anniversary of Ghafurov and the 130th 
anniversary of Aini.328 
Mirzo Tursunzoda’s 100th anniversary in 2011 was also celebrated on a similar scale and in a 
similar style. Upon the request of the Tajik government in 2009, the anniversary was included in 
the list of UNESCO’s 2010-2011 celebrations and anniversaries.329 The government financed the 
construction of the Museum of Tursunzoda in the city of Tursunzoda.330 On this occasion, the 
Tajik State Institute of Arts, named after Mirzo Tursunzoda, held a year-long series of events, 
including a poem reading contest, theatrical staging, seminars, meetings with the writers and 
poets, a book fair, as well as a conference, “Mirzo Tursunzoda: About Peace and Friendship.”331 
Additionally, two public publishing houses took over the task of releasing Tursunzoda’s selected 
poems in Tajik and Russian, with English translations, as well as an edited volume of memories 
of Tajik and foreign writers and poets featuring Tursunzoda and two volumes of poems authored 
by Tursunzoda specifically for school children.332 Moreover, several national and local public 
gatherings took place. For instance, on 26 April 2011, there was a public event in Khujand city 
devoted to the 100th anniversary of Tursunzoda.333 On 12 May 2011, the Centre for Educational 
Development and the Academy of Education of Tajikistan hosted a conference dedicated to the 
100th anniversary of Tursunzoda.334 On 11 October 2011, the Writers’ Union of Tajikistan 
organized a poetry evening devoted to Tursunzoda’s poems.335 To conclude the series of events, 
on 14 October 2011, a public ceremony, participated in by President Rahmon, was held.336 
Similar events of remembrance were devoted to Nusratullo Makhsum and Shirinsho Shotemur. 
The government sponsored the celebration of Makhsum’s 125th anniversary in 2006 and 130th 
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anniversary in 2011. In particular, in 2006 President Rahmon unveiled Makhsum’s statue in the 
latter’s hometown.337 During the opening ceremony, President Rahmon stated that 
“remembering this selfless representative of Tajik nation is the duty of every proud citizen of 
Tajikistan.”338 In 2011, the Academy of Science of Tajikistan held a conference devoted to the 
130th anniversary of Makhsum, during which a dozen Tajik historians remembered the role of 
Makhsum in the establishment of Tajikistan.339 Additionally, a book was published with the title 
“In the Onset of the History,” that included primary documents about Makhsum’s political 
activity and scholarly articles about him.340 
The case of Shotemur’s remembrance perhaps bears the best evidence about Tajikistan’s efforts 
to promote the Heroes. On 25 February 2009, the government of Tajikistan adopted a special 
decree “About the Plan of Events on Preparation and Organization of the 110th Anniversary of 
Hero of Tajikistan Shirinsho Shotemur”.341 The organization committee established by this 
decree was assigned with “preparation and spreading of materials about Shirinsho Shotemur in 
mass-media, preparation, and publication of a collection of works about Shotemur written by 
local and foreign scholars and writers.”342 Moreover, within July-October 2009, the organisation 
planned to erect a monument of Shotemur in Khorog city park, restore his house and turn it into 
a museum, create a documentary, hold a conference called, “Shirinsho Shotemur and the Issues 
of Creation of a State of Tajiks”, as well as publish a book titled, “Wherever I am, I Want to be 
with Tajiks”.343 Along with the central government's decree, the head of the Gorno-Badakhshon 
Autonomous Region, Qodiri Qosim issued an order on the measures that would be taken to 
celebrate the 110th anniversary of Shirinsho Shotemur at the regional level. Among other events, 
Qosim planned to organize a conference with grandiose title “Shirinsho Shotemur and the 
Geopolitical Issues of Tajikistan from His Days to the Present.”344 
Throughout 2009, the following notable events devoted to the commemoration of Shotemur 
took place. First, “Irfon”, the publishing house of Tajikistan’s Ministry of Culture, published a 
book titled “Shirinshoh Shotemur” edited by Qurbon Alamshoev and Haidarsho Pirumshoev.345 
Second, the statue was installed in October in Khorog.346 Interestingly, President Rahmon issued 
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orders to replace the statue of Lenin with the statue of Shotemur.347 Third, the National Library 
of Tajikistan hosted a conference called “Shirinsho Shotemur – Hero of Tajikistan” on 16 
October.348 Moreover, a month-long book fair, during which hundreds of books were displayed, 
was organized around the theme of “Sources on Shirinsho Shotemur’s Life and Deeds”. Finally, 
on 20 October, there was a public celebration, in which President Rahmon was a participant, 
devoted to the 110th anniversary of Shirinsho Shotemur.349 President Rahmon used the occasion 
to instruct the Ministry of Culture to open a corner of Shotemur in the National Museum of 
Tajikistan, and to erect a memorial tomb above his grave in the outskirts of Moscow. He also 
ordered the Agrarian University of Tajikistan to be named after Shirinsho Shotemur.350 
It should be noted that Tajik scholars have expended much effort on discovering new primary 
sources on Shotemur’s life and political activity. This has contributed to the emergence of solid 
textual knowledge and discourse on Shotemur’s role in the establishment of Tajikistan. For 
instance, a book titled, “Shirinsho Shotemur in the History of Revival of Tajik Statehood” 
authored by Qurbon Alamshoev was published in 2013, and was reportedly dedicated to the 
115th anniversary of Shotemur that was celebrated in 2014.351 It is also noteworthy that in 
August 2008 Qurbon Alamshoev discovered the so-called “second letter” authored by Shirinsho 
Shotemur and addressed to Joseph Stalin, leader of the USSR. The letter clearly demonstrates 
how hard Shotemur struggled against Uzbek pressure and defended the rights of the Tajiks to 
establish a state.352 A year later, two rare videos of Shotemur were discovered.353 There have 
also been efforts to depict Shotemur’s figure through literary works. Thus, a book compiling the 
literary works devoted to Shirinsho Shotemur was published in 2012.354 
Other than the jubilees and celebrations, the government of Tajikistan has also undertaken 
other measures to promote images of the Heroes of Tajikistan. The most widespread additional 
measure is the proliferation of portraits of the Heroes in public schools, higher education 
institutions, public cultural venues and other public areas. Moreover, throughout Tajikistan 
there are cities, suburbs, streets, and institutions named after these Heroes. The Central Bank 
has also put the images of the Heroes on banknotes. Even planes are named after the Heroes. 
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Somon Air, the only air company in Tajikistan, has a fleet of Boeing airplanes that bear the names 
of the Heroes. As a representative of the company reported: 
The board of directors and management of “Somon Air” have collaboratively 
decided that our newly acquired airplanes be named after the national heroes 
of Tajikistan. Thus, in March 2009, the second Boeing that landed in Dushanbe 
was named after Sadriddin Aini, the founder of modern Tajik literature. In May 
2011, we bought another Boeing 737-700 and named it Shirinsho Shotemur; 
today another Boeing 737-900 arrived, and we have named it after Bobojon 
Ghafurov. By the end of the year we are expecting the arrival of Boeing 737-
300 – Nusratullo Makhsum.355 
Without judging the success and quality of such measures, it is evident that promoting the 
Heroes is an important aspect of Tajikistan’s national identity politics. The state exerts a 
monopoly of power in this regard and chooses whom to promote as a Hero and how this will be 
done. Before analyzing why the state chooses to hail these particular people, it is worth 
mentioning how state keeps this rank of Heroes closed for other potential “candidates.” 
2. The potential candidates for the title of Hero of Tajikistan 
According to Article 8 of the Law of Tajikistan on State Awards of the Republic of Tajikistan 2001, 
“[t]he title of “Hero of Tajikistan”, a high award, is bestowed upon those who have rendered 
services to the state and the people. These services are often in regard to the fulfilment of a 
heroic, military and professional deed for the sake of the freedom, independence and prosperity 
of the Republic of Tajikistan.”356 The appropriateness of these six people to be the Heroes of 
Tajikistan is above question in Tajikistan. However, some politicians and activists would like to 
see more Tajiks receiving this highest award. In September 2006 the IRPT requested that 
President Rahmon posthumously grant Said Abdullo Nuri, the founder of the IRPT, the title of 
Hero of Tajikistan.357 Said Abdullo Nuri, who died in 2006, was the leader of the opposition 
during the civil war in Tajikistan in 1992-7. Together with President Rahmon, he signed the peace 
treaty in Moscow in 1997 that put an end to the Tajik civil war. IRPT deemed that Said Abdullo 
Nuri deserved credit for the establishment of peace and national unity in Tajikistan. The request 
went unheeded. 
Similarly, the head of the DPT Masud Sobirov requested President Rahmon to acknowledge 
Qadriddin Aslonov as a Hero of Tajikistan. According to him, “it is gratifying to note that during 
the [20 years of independence] such outstanding compatriots as Sadriddin Aini, Mirzo 
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Tursunzoda, Bobojon Ghafurov, Shirinsho Shotemur, Nusratullo Makhsum and Emomali 
Rahmon have been conferred with the title of hero of Tajikistan.” However, “it would be fair to 
give the same title to Q. Aslonov” because there is his signature on the Declaration of the 
Independence of Tajikistan.358 Aslonov was known as a person who issued orders to demount 
the Statue of Lenin in Dushanbe and had outlawed the CP in Tajikistan for some time.359 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the harshest criticism of this initiative came from the CP of 
Tajikistan. Ismoil Talbakov, the First Deputy Chairman of the CP of Tajikistan called DPT’s 
initiative “another intrigue”. According to him, Qadriddin Aslonov has left more “black stains” 
on the history of the nation than positive deeds.360 Again, there was no any official reaction from 
the government, though a high-ranking official from President Rahmon’s political party called 
for the title of “Hero of Tajikistan” not to be devalued by such proposals.361 
There were also calls for title of “Hero of Tajikistan” to be awarded to Abdurahim Khojibaev, a 
political figure from the Soviet past of Tajikistan. During the public event devoted to his 110th 
anniversary that took place in Khujand city, Khojibaev was remembered as being one of the Tajik 
statesmen during the early Soviet period, who contributed to the formation of Tajik statehood. 
There were calls to put him on the same rank as Makhsum and Shotemur.362 One of the 
participants in the event, Usmonjon Gafforov, argued that Abdurahim Khojibaev’s book entitled 
Tajikistan was one of two books – the other being Sadriddin Aini’s Anthology of Tajik Literature 
– that “played a major role in the formation of a separate Tajik Republic at the beginning of the 
20th century”.363 These calls largely went unnoticed by the Tajik public and the government. 
In 2013, a Tajik journalist Ahmadshohi Komil wrote an open letter to the government of 
Tajikistan calling for them to recognize Tohiri Abdujabbor – a founding leader of a perestroika-
era political movement called “Rastokhez” – as a Hero of Tajikistan.364 According to him, Tohiri 
Abdujabbor had made an immense contribution to the conceptualisation of national 
independence. Komil also argued that Tohiri Abdujabbor played an important role in giving Tajik 
language the status of a state language.365 Previously, Ahmadshohi Komil had issued a brochure, 
The Architect of Tajikistan’s Independence, which featured a compilation of positive opinions 
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about the life and deeds of Tohiri Abdujabbor.366 Ahmadshohi Komil’s proposal met with 
criticism in the Tajik mass-media367 but did not elicit attention from the government. 
So far, the government of Tajikistan has shown little interest in awarding the title of “Hero of 
Tajikistan” to any new candidate. This implies that the government considers the six Heroes as 
having in common something special that makes them incomparably high-ranking and 
exemplary. The government acknowledges that there are plenty of prominent personalities 
from the distant and recent history of the nation, yet they have not “qualified” to be ranked 
alongside the Heroes. To them, the government offers other types of acknowledgments. Thus, 
in 2010 the Directorate of Construction of Governmental Properties under the Executive 
Apparatus of the President of Tajikistan requested the Ministry of Culture of Tajikistan to 
compile a list of 44 prominent Tajik personas whose likenesses could be used to fill the public 
space. The Directorate had a plan to use statues of 22 of them in the foyer of the new building 
of the National Library of Tajikistan and the other 22 were expected to appear in an alley before 
the entrance to the National Museum of Tajikistan.  
This selection process caused debates within the working group as well as in the media. As the 
representative of the Ministry of Culture of Tajikistan put it, a group of “famous scholars, cultural 
practitioners and researchers” worked on the project and “there were a lot of discussions and 
disagreements while identifying the great sons of Tajik nation, who contributed to its formation 
and development”368. Khudonazar Kholiqnazarov, Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies 
under the President of Tajikistan, issued a call to avoid using the word “heroes” for these 44 
figures and to instead denote them as “outstanding personalities”.369 Abdunabi Sattorzoda, a 
former politician370, acknowledged that “heroes are necessary, absolutely,” but questioned the 
selection method and criteria. In his words, “if these criteria are not determined, and everything 
depends on the opinion of particular people, on their sympathy and antipathy, then, of course, 
this is not for the benefit of the cause.”371 Using unknown selection criteria, the Ministry omitted 
the Heroes of the Soviet Union from the list “due to limited space” and promised to create a 
room in the National Museum of Tajikistan for them and “those famous personalities, who could 
not make it onto the list.”372  
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As soon as the Ministry’s list of 44 heroes was released,373 it attracted criticism. Some thought 
that list was incomplete, while the others believed that the list included persons that did not 
deserve to be there. The two big questions addressed the creators of the list were: what criteria 
was the list compiled on and why these issues were not brought up for public discussion before 
being reviewed in the ministry.374 Sayfullo Safarov, Deputy Director of the Centre for Strategic 
Studies under the President of Tajikistan, expressed his disagreement with the work of the 
Ministry saying that “any issue of societal importance should be discussed with the people.”375 
A year earlier, though, Safarov was optimistic about the initiative and stated that “We need 
heroes. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have whole alleys of their national heroes, why we do not 
have them?”376 Kamoludin Abdullaev, a historian, noted that the list would look absolutely 
different should there have been any polls in this regard. According to him, it was an 
unsuccessful imitation of the Soviet practice: 
When does a state experience a demand for the cult of heroes? We had this 
during the Great Patriotic War [i.e., Second World War] when the whole Soviet 
historiography was busy with it upon the direction from the top. In particular, 
[Sadriddin] Aini wrote the novels about Muqanna and Temur Malik. At that 
time this was necessary to raise the patriotism at the state level. A debugged 
machine of agitation-propaganda worked for this purpose, [and] there was a 
strong political governance, a million strong editions, and qualified cadres. We 
do not have anything of that. […] We have neither a daily newspaper, nor film 
production, nor a normal TV, nor money, nor, most importantly, motivation 
to “heroize” the mentioned list.377 
Opinions were also expressed that none of the personalities, including the “Heroes of 
Tajikistan,” deserved to be perpetuated. An early example of such position belongs to Olga 
Tutubalina, a journalist, and blogger at Asia-Plus, an independent news agency in Tajikistan. She 
argued that “the real national heroes in Tajikistan are neither the classics of literature, poets, 
and writers nor the Soviet leaders of the state and most importantly not the current leaders.”378 
According to her, the real heroes that deserve to be hailed in contemporary Tajikistan are the 
Tajik labor migrants in Russia, whose money remittance back to the home country makes more 
than a third of the GDP of the nation. Therefore, she calls to promote their images; “let, for 
instance, Somon Air [a Tajik air company] depict in its new aircraft the [image of] new hero of 
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Tajikistan – some Jamshed from Asht or Suhrob from Kulob”.379 Indirectly, she also implies that 
President Rahmon does not deserve the title of “Hero of Tajikistan”: 
There is a bit of heroism in bringing in peace to one’s own country, but it is 
impossible to achieve this single-handedly, as it takes at least two heroes for 
this. The second hero has got “lost” in the annals of contemporary history. 
Perhaps this is why the first one also does not look that convincing.380 
Overall, the government of Tajikistan has ignored criticism of its hero-hailing politics and has not 
reacted to any proposals to create more Heroes. While the recommendations regarding the 
“candidates” are spontaneous, there seems to be a well-thought out and consistent rationale 
behind the government’s choice of the six people selected to be Heroes. This gives the 
impression that the group of six Heroes of Tajikistan remains closed, a club of divinity-like 
personalities. It does not mean, however, that the government has stopped thinking about the 
hero-hailing aspect of identity politics. The case of 44 “heroes” demonstrated that the 
government was keen to acknowledge as many “outstanding people” as possible. However, 
none of the 44 have qualified to join the six Heroes so far. This raises a question. Based on what 
criteria does the government decide whether a personality deserves to be a Hero or not? As the 
next section attempts to show, there is a very specific selection criteria.  
3. The selection criteria for Heroes and the moral/knowledge space of identity 
As one Tajik journalist argues, the scholars, journalists, and writers of Tajikistan are obliged “to 
expend more effort in showing the real face and history of” the Heroes. 381 “Because, the analysis 
of their historical paths, the rich experience of these people in solving the difficult political, social 
and economic issues of Tajikistan can serve as good schooling and a good example for the youth 
of the Republic.”382 The efforts to commemorate and hail the heroes can be understood as an 
act that sets the moral space of national identity and its boundaries. By promoting this, the state 
intends to inform the masses about what the best and worst way of collective being is. It defines, 
precisely, the desired specificities as they lie within the space and boundaries of identity. What 
is undesired, unacceptable, dangerous, and threatening is represented as residing beyond the 
space and boundaries of identity. In short, hero-hailing is a boundary-making process. The 
preliminary analysis below and the detailed ones in the following chapters show that the official 
discourses about what good the Heroes have done, what they have spent their lives for, what 
they fought for, and importantly, what they fought against, contribute to a constitution of the 
“self,” the “other” and the boundaries between them. As this dissertation attempts to show, in 
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the case of Tajikistan, the “heroic” means a revival and promotion of the national “self,” as well 
as a simultaneous defence of that self from the ‘’other’’. The official discourse represents all of 
the six Heroes as contributors to the revival of the Tajik state and nation.  
Official discourses and historiography represent the Heroes as having executed a grand nation-
building effort since the collapse of the Samanid Empire, which is recognized as the most civilized 
period in Tajik statehood and was preceded by the “barbarian” Turkic tribes. All Heroes are 
remembered as contributing at least to one of the following aspects of Tajik national revival, a) 
the rise of national consciousness and the establishment of Tajik statehood; b) the 
establishment of linguistic and literary foundations of national identity; and, c) the founding of 
national historiography. In all of these three locales of construction, there is either a hidden or 
overt message about the struggle against the Uzbek “other.” In Tajik national identity discourse 
the Uzbeks are, as Nourzhanov puts it, the “readily recognizable “other.”383 This can be explained 
by the fact that Tajikistan’s “revival” as an “independent” state is related to its secession from 
Uzbekistan in the late 1920s. Official discourses represent all six of the Heroes as the driving 
forces behind this revival and independence. On top of that, President Rahmon’s policies in 
relation to Uzbekistan are officially explained as leading towards independence from Uzbekistan 
in terms of energy and transportation. 
To begin with, Shotemur and Makhsum are commemorated as the Tajik leaders, who struggled 
for the independence of Tajikistan from Uzbekistan. As the President’s decree states “the 
glorious sons of the Tajik nation” Makhsum and Shotemur received awards for “constructive 
state activities and outstanding services for the establishment of state independence from the 
Republic of Tajikistan.”384 The official discourses acknowledge them as the founding fathers of 
the Tajik state in its current form, its revival occurring long after the collapse of the Samanid 
Empire. As the next chapter shows in detail, there is historical evidence that proves Shotemur’s 
and Makhsum’s intentions to gain a wider autonomy and later an independence from the Uzbek 
Soviet Socialist Republic. As President Rahmon puts it, Shotemur’s success in “establishing the 
main fundamentals for a new life and defending the historical rights of the Tajiks to form a 
national state” made him a “selfless fighter and founder of the national state of Tajiks.”385 These 
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two Heroes are commemorated as struggling for and securing the national state where the Tajik 
nationhood had a chance to survive and revive. 
Second, Sadriddin Aini is remembered as having done a historical service to the Tajik nation by 
proving that Tajik language and literature does exist, contrary to the affirmations of Uzbeks 
nationalists. This, as the official discourses argue, has been helpful in proving the existence of 
the Tajik nation; “Sadriddin Aini, proving the existence of the Tajik people as an ancient nation 
of Central Asia, raised the question of the legitimacy of this nations’ establishment of a state of 
its of own.”386 As it will be shown in Chapter 4, Sadriddin Aini’s writings had already become a 
matter of national pride and an object of numerous studies in the fields of Tajik linguistics and 
historiography during the Soviet period. Aini is also credited for raising the national 
consciousness of Tajiks. As official narratives puts it, “it is Master Aini, who, with his patriotic, 
enlightening articles […] gave a serious impulse to the awakening of the Tajik nation”.387 While 
Aini is remembered as creating the best examples of Tajik literature and laying the foundations 
of modern Tajik literary language, the Tajik poet Mirzo Tursunzoda is hailed for successfully 
continuing his job and passing it Aini’s legacy on to the next generation. Tursunzoda’s “services 
and aspirations still shine brighter than before and were alike the deeds of Sadriddin Aini and 
Bobojon Ghafurov in forming and strengthening the national mentality, pride for the fatherland, 
and state independence, high patriotism, the stability of peace, security, and unity of the nations 
of the world.”388 There is also an argument that the national unity politics in Tajikistan has 
borrowed relevant lessons from the poet’s works.389 Moreover, “works by [Tursunzoda] 
admonish the growing generation to be sensitive and prescient in defense of the Fatherland and 
national mentality.”390 As Chapter 4 reveals in detail, official narratives about Aini and 
Tursunzoda represent their lifestyle and writings as “heroic” due to their contributions to 
reviving the Tajik national identity through preserving and developing Tajik language and 
literature. 
Third, Bobojon Ghafurov is commemorated in Tajikistan as comprehensively debunking the 
position of Uzbek chauvinists and nationalists by proving, scientifically, that, historically, Tajiks 
are the native people of the Central Asian region, whereas all other Turkic tribes are newcomers. 
He is remembered for “saving the face of the Tajik nation, safeguarding its rich history and 
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culture from the ill-intentioned distortions.”391 His works are believed to have “laid the 
centuries-worth foundation of self-consciousness and independence of Tajiks.”392 Aini also 
proved that the “Tajiks withstood against the conquerors, who were stronger than them, but 
whom they defeated by preserving the enchanting native language, literary and cultural 
traditions and […] national identity.”393 The narratives authored by Ghafurov are also key within 
the official discourse representing the struggles of Shotemur, Makhsum, and Aini as heroic and 
historically significant figures for the Tajik nation. Along with national pride about the great past, 
Ghafurov’s arguments create a scholarly foundation for a national trauma regarding unfair 
territorial delimitation in the 1920s and represent the Uzbeks and Uzbekistan as currently 
residing in originally Tajik lands. So, Ghafurov’s “heroism” consists of his success in creating 
knowledge about the historical primogeniture of the Tajiks vis-à-vis other nations of Central Asia, 
mainly, Uzbeks. Chapter 5 of this thesis presents a detailed analysis in this regard. Especially, 
this aspect of Ghafurov’s works inspiring a generation of Tajik historians, who were more explicit 
in pinpointing the “otherness” of Uzbeks. As Nourzhanov puts it, the new theorists of ethnic 
revival emerged in post-civil war Tajikistan and“asserted that the greatest sin committed by the 
Uzbeks, vis-à-vis the Tajiks, was to rob the latter of the heartland of their civilization - Samarkand 
and Bukhara, and to assimilate the Tajik population remaining in Uzbekistan by force.”394 That 
all this is in line with the official position of the government can be seen in the viewpoints of 
President Rahmon, when he says that “historians, social scientists and all [members of] 
intelligentsia within the country must make a contribution to the study and propaganda of life 
and immortal writings of this great son of a nation”.395  
Finally, President Rahmon, the only living Hero of Tajikistan and current head of state is 
positioned as a national leader who is working hard to unite his nation and develop it further. 
He is also simultaneously portrayed as a strongman, who is successfully standing against the 
aggressive behavior of Uzbekistan towards Tajikistan. As the authors of a state-sponsored book 
about President Rahmon put it, “the most significant successes and achievements of the country 
are the results of selfless work and the heroic efforts of Emomali Rahmonov.”396 As chapter 6 of 
this thesis analyses in detail, either coincidentally or intentionally, President Rahmon’s policies 
in relation to Uzbekistan seem to parallel the oft-hailed “heroism” of the five Heroes of 
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Tajikistan. President Rahmon appears to be doing his best for the development and prosperity 
of Tajikistan as well as asserting Tajikistan’s independence from Uzbekistan in areas such as 
energy and transportation. Within the last decade, Rahmon’s two roles, i.e., national leadership 
and handling tense relations with Uzbekistan, have been getting intertwined. One example of 
this intertwining is Rahmon’s plans to build Roghun hydroelectric power station (HPS) at any 
cost despite a fierce opposition of Uzbekistan. He has promoted the project as a matter of 
national pride and prosperity:  
I would like to refer to each proud citizen, to all the generous and patriotic 
people of the nation, and particularly, to qualified constructors and specialists 
in the energy and construction field, calling for their active participation in the 
prompt construction and finalization of Roghun HPS and for them to make a 
contribution to the achievement of the nation’s energy independence.397  
Despite numerous hurdles that Uzbekistan has erected to hinder this project, as well as the 
Uzbeks’ readiness to so go as far as to launch a war, Tajikistan has no plans to abandon its quest 
for energy independence. In his Annual Address to the Parliament of Tajikistan in 2014, Rahmon 
continued to mention Roghun HPS as a “crucial object” for Tajikistan.398  
4. Conclusion 
There is a meaning behind the “scarcity” of national Heroes in Tajikistan. As this chapter 
attempted to show, the official narratives represent these Heroes as defenders of the Tajik 
nation and state from the dangerous Uzbek “other.” Thus, Shirinsho Shotemur and Nusratullo 
Makhsum are hailed for securing autonomy for the Tajik nation within the Uzbek Soviet Socialist 
Republic, and later seceding from the Uzbek SSR as an independent Tajik SSR. Sadriddin Aini, in 
his turn, is credited for proving that there is centuries-old Tajik language and literature. His 
findings were helpful for the Tajik intellectuals and national leaders in their arguments against 
the Uzbek leaders with regards to Tajik autonomy and independence. Mirzo Tursunzoda is 
officially commemorated for continuing Sadriddin Aini’s mission. As far as Bobojon Ghafurov’s 
heroism is concerned, he wrote the history of the Tajik nation, where the Tajiks appeared as 
superior to all other Central Asian nations. Along with national pride about the ancient and rich 
history of the nation, his texts created grounds for mourning about the “lost” territories of the 
nation.  
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The politics of hero-making is about promoting the “best” attributes, ones which the state 
deems to be important for the whole nation. The analysis of these politics is helpful in better 
understanding the politics of identity and foreign policy of the state. In Tajikistan, discursive 
representation of Heroes overtly or covertly implies that the Uzbek nation, its leaders, and 
Uzbekistan as a state, have been and, still are, the most dangerous “other” and a threat to Tajik 
national self-identification. In a continuation of the duties of previous Heroes, President Rahmon 
appears to be not only saving the nation from collapse after the civil war but also to be 
successfully standing against the economic and political aggression of Uzbekistan. In this regard, 
the dominant “heroic” discourse in the national identity politics in Tajikistan, as well as the 
state’s steadily deteriorating relations with Uzbekistan, appear to be interconnected and 
informative of each other. Neither of these two tendencies can exist separately; both of them 
have their roots in the processes through which Tajikistan was formed as a state in the 1920s 
and, still, have not lost their actuality for the state.  
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Chapter 3. National State and National Identity: Remembering Shirinsho 
Shotemur and Nusratullo Makhsum as the Founding Fathers of Tajikistan 
1. The dominance of the Tashkent clan, the Bukhara clan and the Turkmen tribal 
leaders in NTD in Central Asia  
The history of Tajikistan has been well-studied in the Western academia.399 One commonly made 
argument is that the establishment of Tajikistan as the Tajik nation-state came about as a result 
of socio-political processes in Central Asia. These processes are supposed to have culminated in 
the 1920s in the form of a NTD. As discussed below, the most important players before and 
during NTD were the regional clans from Bukhara and Tashkent and the Turkmen tribes. As far 
as the elites representing the Tajiks in the NTD processes are concerned, they joined the struggle 
for the territories relatively late. Most importantly, during the final stage of the NTD process, 
the Tajik leaders clashed with the powerful Uzbek leaders, a group consisting of experienced 
and influential members of the Bukhara and Tashkent clans. As the first leaders of the Tajik 
political entity, Makhsum and Shotemur dealt with the consequences of delimitation and 
struggled to have its outcomes revised. They were not part of the delimitation process. 
1.1. The utilization of Turkmen, Uzbek, and Kirgiz (Kazakh) identities by the elites of 
Tashkent, Bukhara and the Transcaspian province and the lack of interest in the 
Tajik issue 
In 1920, there were four political-administrative entities in Central Asia – Bukhara, Khorazm, 
Turkestan, and Kirgiz400 Republics. The first two were People’s Socialist Republics,401 while the 
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latter two were Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics within Russia. The governments of each 
of these republics included some powerful and ambitious local political elites, who were in close 
alliance with the Bolsheviks of Russia, but who also had their own vision about the future of their 
republics. This vision was very different from,402 if not in outright conflict with, the plans of the 
Russian Bolsheviks and403 even though the Russian Bolsheviks were a dominant force, they still 
had to consider the opinions of local elites when it came to regional politics. 
While administrative reforms by the Bolsheviks, known as ethnic-based regionalization 
(raionirovaniie)404, were quite promptly designed for  Russia, the Ukraine, and Belarus, it took 
longer for Soviet leadership to come up with reforms suitable for implementation in Central 
Asia. Raionirovaniie and the formation of National Councils (sovety), which began in Ukraine, 
“served as a model for the rest of the Soviet Union.”405 The earliest signs of raionirovaniie are 
probably the establishment of ethnic departments in the Nationalities Commissariat [i.e. 
Ministry] of Turkestan ASSR by mid-1919. These groups covered ethnicities such as the Uzbeks, 
Kirgizs, Tajiks, Russians and Jews among others.406 In April 1921, the Kara-Kirgiz province was 
established in Turkestan.407 However, local leaders did not welcome these reforms. For instance, 
in January 1920 Turar Ryskulov, Chair of the CEC of the Turkestan CP, proposed to unite the 
Turkic-speaking nations of the Soviet Union and create the Turkic Republic.408 In June 1920, in 
order to entirely reform the territorial-administrative structure of Turkestan ASSR, Vladimir 
Lenin, head of the Russian CP, made a proposal to “compile the map (ethnographic and other) 
of Turkestan and demarcate [on it the borders of] Uzbekia, Kirgizia and Turkmenia” and “inquire 
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into the conditions of merging or dividing these three parts.”409 The Russian communist 
leadership in Turkestan ASSR opposed this proposal: 
Considering that thoughts on the establishment of national Turkmen, Uzbek, 
and Kirgiz republics might lead to concrete action being taken shortly, it is 
necessary to avoid these thoughts and proceed with caution […] The decision 
about these republics should be considered as a last resort, to  be used when 
all other means have been exhausted. It absolutely should not be the current 
agenda. […] Any immediate implementation of such a decision will bring in […] 
the greatest chaos. Certainly, the most unfavorable nationalist elites of all 
republics will benefit from this. Our power to control this is limited, as we even 
have no enough power to handle Turkestan.410 
Local leaders in the region admired the idea of territorial delimitation. As Karasar puts it: 
The realisation of national-territorial delimitation was the aim of various 
political projects including those of Turar Ryskulov for the creation of a single 
Turkic Republic with a single Turkic people; and of M. Sultan Galiev for the 
creation of a single Turkic Space with one Turkic nation; as well as the 
nationalist project of Mustafa Chokaev for the establishment of an 
independent and united Turkestan. […] the delimitation was a victory for yet 
another project, that of the National Communists led by Faizulla Khojaev.411 
So, in contrast to the opposition from “non-native communists” the NTD was met with “the 
ambitious and enthusiastic support of some native communists of Central Asia.”412 However, 
the local leaders were not unanimous in their vision about the national territorial delimitation, 
which led to competition among local them. Long before the territorial delimitation process 
defined the borders of new national states in Central Asia, tribal and ethnic animosities were 
fuelled by disagreements over territories and resources. Additionally, conflict was created by 
the clashing interests of the powerful clans and, as a result, groups started to outline possible 
cracks on the political map of the region. By the time the NTD started in the second half of 1924, 
the inter-ethnic and inter-clan tension in the region was so great that there proposals were 
made to the Russian government that NTD “should definitely be postponed”: 
The internal situation in the Middle Asian republics is a picture of war where 
everyone is against everyone, and this is the case with different nationalities. 
Everyone is carrying a stone that could be thrown at another in his breast, and 
everyone has divided the skin of a not yet hunted bear. It is being discussed 
now whether Teke Turkmen are superior to Bukharan or Khivan Turkmens, or 
whether Bukhara is superior to Samarkand or Samarkand superior to Bukhara; 
all regions are getting involved in the controversy, and the destiny of Tashkent 
is being discussed. This place is like a beehive, a Pandora ’s Box. […] The rapid 
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and careless implementation of national delimitation may lead to a general 
and real conflict.413 
The traditional animosity between Uzbeks and Turkmens of Khorazm, which had been going on 
since 1912,414 became an important factor in regional politics. When serious ethnic clashes 
occurred in 1922, Bukhara supported the Uzbeks while the Turkmens of the Transcaspian 
province of Turkestan supported the Turkmens. The Turkmens of Turkestan ASSR “advocat[ed] 
for the establishment of a separate Turkmenia in Transcaspia, with the inclusion of some areas 
from Khorazm.”415 They complained that the Uzbeks were assimilating with the Turkmens in 
Khorazm.416 Khodjaev, according to the records of the Soviet security services, traveled to 
Khorazm in 1922 to unite the local Uzbeks against the Turkmens.417  
The leadership of Khorazm had been attempting to play down Uzbek-Turkmen ethnic animosity, 
because they were afraid of losing Turkmen-dominated areas of Khorazm to Transcaspia, which 
was de-facto known as a Turkmen territory by the Bolsheviks.418 There was no doubt that 
Transcaspia would be attractive to the Turkmens of Khorazm, because 40% of Central Asian 
Turkmens lived in Transcaspia.419 With the 30% of Central Asian Turkmens living in Khorazm and 
27% in Bukhara,420 delimitation was most likely to result in the loss of Turkmen-dominated 
territories for Bukhara and Khorazm. This prospects of delimitation was so encouraging to  
Turkmen leaders that they even sought Stalin’s permission to seize the Turkmen provinces of 
Persia.421 Chicherin’s top secret message to Stalin sums up the role of the Uzbeks and the 
Turkmens in the then-forthcoming NTD: 
It is becoming clear that the main initiators of the national delimitation – the 
Uzbek commercial bourgeoisie – hope to get rid of poor areas and create a 
large cotton-producing region, which would provide them with commercial 
opportunities. […] Turkmen political figures are supporting the project 
because it would give them a chance to become the heads of a new state.422 
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As far as national leaders in Turkestan ASSR are concerned, there was a serious disagreement 
between two groups of local elites, both of which were represented in the government of 
Turkestan ASSR. The dispute was over relations with Kirgiz ASSR. For instance, Turar Ryskulov 
was a fierce supporter of joining the territories of Turkestan ASSR and Kirgiz ASSR. He reportedly 
had talks with the Kirgiz RevCom, an interim government, in March 1920 about uniting Turkestan 
ASSR with Kirgiz ASSR and making Tashkent the capital city of the new, unified nation.423 
However, the “Uzbek comrades” who were being led by “Comrade” Islamov were “worried 
about the loss of Tashkent424 to “Kirgizia”.425 Islamov was against any economic or political 
association with the Kirgiz Republic. 426 Moreover, Alikhan Bukeikhanov, leader of the Kirgiz 
national movement known as Alash (which established an autonomous Alash-Orda state in 
Semipalatinsk in 1917), was still politically active.427 Furthermore, Turkestan ASSR was still home 
to several, clandestine Jadid liberal-democratic movements such as Milli Ittihod, Milli Istiqlol, 
Ittihod va Taraqqiiot, and Shuroi Islomiia. These movements containedconservative groups of 
Islamic clergy, such as Shuroi Ulamo, who have been linked to Bashmachestvo. All of these 
groups were equally anti-Soviet, but they differed in their methods of struggle and ideological 
foundations.428 Last, but not least, the process of establishing Kirgiz ASSR during 1919-1920 
demonstrated that local elites could be assertive when making territorial claims.429  
Even though local leaders were politically active and ambitious, the history of Central Asia in the 
early 1920s should not be viewed separately from events in Moscow. The most important events 
were the adoption of the New Economic Plan by the Russian CP in 1921, the establishment of 
the Soviet Union in 1922, ongoing ideological struggles within the Russian CP, and Stalin’s rise 
to power after Lenin’s death in January 1924. It is not a coincidence that territorial delimitation 
in Central Asia, which had been hanging in the air since early 1920, was realized in the year after 
Lenin’s death. During the four years when the politics of razmezhevanie were idle in Central Asia, 
the local elites, as described above, came to dominate conversations about national identity and 
territorial delimitation. Therefore, the local political elites hit the ground running when Stalin, 
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the former People’s Commissar for the Issues of Nationalities of Soviet Union, initiated the 
process of NTD in the region during 1924.430  
In January 1924, the Organizational Bureau of the CC of the CP of Russia requested Jannis 
Rudzutak, Head of the Central Asian Bureau of the CC, to compile all of the proposals regarding 
NTD in the region.431 In February-March 1924, the Communist Parties of Bukhara, Khorazm, and 
Turkestan convened separately to prepare their proposals for Moscow. Particularly, on 25 
February 1924, the CC of the CP had a meeting “about the territorial delimitation of Soviet 
Central Asia into several separate republics.”432 The meeting decided to divide the Bukhara 
region into Uzbek and Turkmen republics. The CC approved Khojaev’s “Main theses on the 
establishment of Uzbekistan.”433 Following the meeting, on 10 March, the Organizational Bureau 
of the CC created the final version of the proposal, which allocated “Mastchoh, Qarotegin, and 
Gharm for Tajiks to form a Tajik Autonomous Oblast’ within the Uzbek Republic.”434 In Turkestan, 
the discussions were rather fierce, and proposals about the future of the states in the region 
ranged from calls for a unitary state to calls for several, ethnic-based states.435 As documents 
from the meeting show, representatives of both the Kara-Kirgizs and the Turkmens were vocal. 
436  
Considering the support for delimitation from the communists of Central Asia, the Political 
Bureau of the CC of the CP of Russia gave the green light to these reforms.437 On 28 April 1924, 
the Central Asian Bureau of the Russian CP and the Communist Parties of the Central Asian 
Republics convened to discuss how to administrate NTD in the region.438 During the meeting, 
the representatives of Khorazm K. Adinaev and M. Abdusalamov announced their opposition to 
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NTD and decided to keep the Khorazm Republic intact.439 The convention devolved into a 
struggle for territories and resources, the outcome of which was not suitable for the elites of 
Khorazm. As a result of the April meetings, the Central Asian Bureau established the Special 
Commission on National Territorial Delimitation. This Commission was composed of the 
Uzbek,440 Kirgiz and Turkmen committees.441 The Special Commission, after two week-long 
debates, decided to create Uzbek and Turkmen republics, as well as autonomous Kirgiz and Tajik 
provinces.442 It was decided that the autonomous Tajik territory would consist of “the 
mountainous parts of Bukhara, Ghuzor, Kulob, Mastchoh and other regions.”443 Based on 
proposals made by the Special Commission, the Political Bureau of the Russian CP issued a 
decree entitled: “On the National Delimitation of Republics in Central Asia”. The decree was 
dated 12 June 1924:444 
Following proposals made by the Central Committees and the Soviets of the 
People’s Commissars of Bukhara and Turkestan: a) an independent Turkmen 
republic from the Turkmen parts of Turkestan, Bukhara and Khorazm will be 
established; b) an independent Uzbek republic from the Uzbeks parts of 
Bukhara and Turkestan will be established; c) with the Turkmen parts 
excluded, Khorazm  will be left within its previous borders.445 
Despite its decision to refrain from NTD, Khorazm demonstrated its compliance with the 
raionirovanie policy, when, in May 1924, it established two autonomous ethnic entities – the 
Turkmen and Karakalpak-Kazakh provinces.446 Simultaneously, the government of Bukhara 
divided the republic into five provinces – Zarafshon, Qashqadaryo, Surkhon, Chorjui, and Eastern 
Bukhara.447 Even though there is no evidence that raionirovanie in Bukhara took place based on 
ethnic divides, it is worth noting that these ethnic provinces became the “building blocks” during 
the NTD (the first three provinces were given to Uzbek republic, leaving Chorjui for the Turkmen 
Republic and Eastern Bukhara for the Tajik province). It seems that the government of Bukhara 
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had its own expectations regarding what to keep for the Uzbek republic and what to give away 
to others.  
The Tajik leaders did not play any important role during NTD.448 The Special Commission on 
National Territorial Delimitation established a Tajik sub-committee within the Uzbek Committee 
on 28 May 1924.449 It had one member – Chinor Imomov. As was shown above, the various sides 
of the debate each already had their plans in relation to the autonomous, Tajik territory. 
Therefore, the Tajik sub-committee was created post-factum. When the Russian CP approved 
the decision of the Special Commission in June 1924, the delimitation process started and local 
elites became engaged in fierce debates about the borders of the Uzbek, Kazakh, and Turkmen 
republics.450  
The Central Commission on NTD, which was composed of the representatives of the Uzbeks, 
Kazakhs, and Turkmens, was established on 15 July 1924.451 The aim of the Commission was to 
solve any disputes between these groups. As Nourzhanov and Bleuer suggest, “[w]hile Uzbek, 
Kazakh, Turkmen and Kyrgyz officials bargained ferociously for every inch of land, the Uzbek 
national sub-commission quietly determined borders for the Tajiks.”452 According to Masov, the 
Tajik representatives Ch. Imamov, A. Khojibaev, and M. Saidjanov joined the debates too late 
and participated in an indecisive manner, largely giving in to the will of the Uzbek 
representatives.453  
On 16 September 1924, the CEC of Turkestan ASSR made a decree to “present the Tajik nation 
with the right to secede from the Turkestan Soviet Socialistic Republic and to form the 
Autonomous Tajik Province [Oblast].”454 Three days later, the 5th Congress of the Soviets of 
Bukhara, “[e]xpressing the high will of the people of Bukhara” announced an “agreement to 
form, together with the Uzbeks of Turkestan and Khorazm, the Uzbek Soviet Socialistic Republic 
and Tajik Autonomous Province [Oblast].”455 Shortly thereafter, the processes surrounding the 
establishment of an autonomous Tajik province were finalized, following the “approval” of the 
people of Eastern Bukhara; in their 1st Congress, the parliamentarians of Eastern Bukhara 
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welcomed the decisions made by the higher-ranking party institutions.456 Overall, none of the 
politically dominant local elites in Central Asia chose to represent the Tajiks or to advocate for 
the establishment of a Tajik state. Instead, they bet on the Turkmen, Kirgiz, and Uzbek identities. 
During four years following Lenin’s suggestions to create “Turkmenia,” “Uzbekia,” and “Kirgizia”, 
these proposed entities were chosen as form-factors of national statehood by the local elites. 
It is common to argue that the Tajik-speaking elites of Bukhara betrayed the Tajik nation during 
territorial delimitation. However, the struggle at the time was not only one for national identity. 
The main concern of the elites was to emerge from NTD with larger territories under their 
control. For the elites of Bukhara, the main issue was to concede as little territory as possible to 
the Turkmen leaders and to gain as great an area as possible from Turkestan. There was little 
doubt that the Transcaspian province of Turkestan was going to be Turkmenia.457 To prevent 
possible separation of the Turkmen-dominated territories of Bukhara and Khorazm, the 
leadership of Bukhara bet on the Uzbek identity.  
As Karasar rightly observed, Khojaev, the head of the Bukhara clan, had ambitions to take the 
'best and most delicious' pieces of the Khorazmian PSR and Turkestan ASSR, and to establish a 
Greater Uzbekistan, prosperous and wealthy, having discarded all of its impoverished parts.”458 
Even though making Bukhara an independent nation had been his primary aim before territorial 
delimitation,459 he decided to take advantage of the Soviet raionirovaniie/razmezhevaniie policy 
and increase the scope of Bukhara’s territory.460 As Khalid argues, “Bukhara did not disappear 
without a trace: Uzbekistan was explicitly created ‘on the basis of Bukhara’.”461 According to 
Arapov, the establishment of Uzbekistan represented the revival of Bukhara and its enrichment 
as a result of new resources from Turkestan and Khiva.462 In this struggle, the Khojaev-led elite 
of Bukhara was at odds not only with the Turkmens and the government of Khorazm but also 
with the elites in Turkestan, the most influential of whom decided to establish a bigger “Kirgizia”. 
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Amid these struggles, representing the Tajik nation or fighting for its interests was not a 
desirable strategy the politically dominant elites of Central Asia. 
1.2. The establishment of the autonomous Tajik Republic and the emergence of 
Makhsum as a Tajik national leader 
On 11 October 1924, three days before the actual processes of NTD started,463 the Political 
Bureau of the CC of the Russian CP decided to provide the Tajiks with an autonomous republic 
instead of an autonomous province.464 This decision was approved by the CEC of the USSR on 24 
October 1924. 465 By 27 October 1924, the establishment of the Central Asian republics and 
autonomies as territorial entities was finalized.466 Tajik historians link the sudden change of the 
status of Tajik autonomy to a full-fledged republic to Nusratullo Makhsum.467 Right before the 
establishment of the Tajik ASSR in late October 1924, Makhsum was the Chair of the Regional 
Executive Committee of the Eastern Bukhara Province. It was at this point that he gained access 
to documents on NTD. He found NTD to be unfair to the Tajiks, so he, to use Rahid Ghani 
Abdullo’s words, “constantly bombarded Moscow with the documents of appropriate contents 
– letters, reports, so on.”468 One of his letters to Stalin is often quoted. In that letter Makhsum 
wrote that “[t]he borders of the ‘Tajik Autonomous Province’ have been determined incorrectly, 
because many places with a Tajik majority population, border the planned Tajik province [i.e., 
the Tajik Autonomous Province], but remain outside of its boundaries, instead appearing within 
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Uzbekistan”. He also argued that“[t]he decree about the inclusion of Tajikistan to Uzbekistan in 
the form of an autonomous province infringes the national rights of Tajiks […].”469  
To solve this “unfairness” toward the Tajiks, in his letter Makhsum proposed two measures; the 
first was to “include Ura-Tiube, Khodzhent, Kanibadam, Isfara, Sokh, Rishtan, and Uch-Kurgan, 
as well as other bordering places with a Tajik majority population within Tajikistan”; the second 
was to, “present Tajikistan a full opportunity to be established completely freely with the 
conditions, similar to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, without any dependence upon the latter. 
The geographic conditions and the number of the population of Tajikistan fully meet the 
conditions of its organization into an independent republic.”470 Makhsum’s letter may have 
influenced Moscow’s position on the status of Tajik autonomy.471 Thus, the plans of the Special 
Commission on NTD were overwritten by the Russian CP.472 The CEC of Eastern Bukhara, headed 
by Makhsum, sent a telegram to the CEC of the USSR saying that “[t]he decision of the Central 
Committee [of the Russian CP] about the Tajik [Autonomous] Republic, undoubtedly, is of the 
correct approach to take in order to achieve a solution, both in relation to the political and 
economic issues.”473  
Since then, and up until his removal from his post in 1934, Makhsum acted as head of the Tajik 
state. The reason why the Bukhara/Uzbek government’s picked Makhsum was that he was an 
acting governor of East Bukhara, which was about to become the biggest part of the new Tajik 
political entity. In Eastern Bukhara, he started his career in  local managerial positions – he was 
Chair of the Regional Committee for Food Supply to the Red Army in Gharm (1921-22), one of 
the three Plenipotentiaries on the Issues of Eastern Bukhara (1922-23), a member of the 
Emergency Dictatorial Commission on the Issues of Eastern Bukhara (1923), and the Deputy 
Chair of the RevCom of Gharm (1923). Right before the establishment of the Tajik ASSR in 1924, 
Makhsum was working as a Chair of the Regional Executive Committee of the Eastern Bukhara 
Province. In the newly-established autonomous Tajik Republic, he worked as Chair of the Tajik 
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RevCom in 1924-1926, 474 which was set up by the Uzbek RevCom in November 1924. 475 On 7 
December 1924, the Tajik RevCom announced the establishment of the Tajik ASSR within the 
Uzbek SSR. 476 The function of the Tajik CP was temporarily filled by the Uzbek CP’s 
Organizational Bureau in Tajikistan. The Tajik RevCom, together with the Organizational Bureau, 
moved to Dushanbe city in early 1925.477 On 15 March 1925, at a public event organized by the 
Tajik RevCom and Organizational Bureau, the masses of Tajikistan were informed about the 
establishment of the Tajik ASSR.478 Stalin sent a congratulatory letter to the Tajiks on this 
occasion.479  
The final stage of state-building in regards to the Tajik ASSR was the replacement of the RevCom 
with an elected government. The elections were announced to take place in November 1926.480 
The inaugural Congress of the Soviets of Tajik ASSR took place on 1-12 December 1926.481 The 
Congress made several historic decisions. Firstly, it adopted a Declaration about the 
establishment of the Tajik ASSR. The text of this declaration states: “The first inaugural All-Tajik 
Congress of the Soviets, on behalf of the peasants of Tajikistan, confirms, before the whole 
world, an uncompromising decision to voluntarily join the Uzbek SSR and consequentially the 
USSR in claiming the rights to be an autonomous republic.”482 Secondly, the Congress elected 
the CEC Tajik ASSR, which replaced the Tajik RevCom. 483 Makhsum was elected as Chair of the 
CEC and stayed in this post until 1934.484  
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The newly-established, autonomous Tajik Republic had a territory of 135,620 sq.km. From 
Bukhara PSR, it inherited four provinces (i.e., Garm, Dushanbe, Kulob, Qurghonteppa, and all of 
the parts of former Eastern Bukhara) and one district (Karatag) with the population of 603,838 
people. Out of the territories of the former Turkestan ASSR, the autonomous Tajik Republic 
initially received the Panjakent and Uroteppa districts,485 which had a population of 135,665. 
This population was made up of 65.4% Tajiks, and 32.8% Uzbeks486. The territory and population 
of the Republic increased further on 2 January 1925, when the Presidium of the CEC of the Soviet 
Union decided to give the Pamir region (renamed as Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province) 
of the former Turkestan ASSR to the Tajik ASSR.487  
Relations between the government of the Uzbek SSR and the Tajik ASSR have been tense. 
Historical documents show that Makhsum was frustrated with the lack of attention given by 
Uzbekistan to Tajikistan’s socio-economic conditions. He was straightforward and 
unceremonious in his talks with Uzbek leaders. The minutes of one of the meetings in the 
Congress of the Soviets of Uzbekistan, in which Makhsum participated as the Head of the 
autonomous Tajik Republic, show him fiercely criticizing the Uzbek leadership, especially 
Khojaev.488 For instance, Makhsum complained that Uzbekistan had shown no leadership in 
affairs of Tajik autonomy: 
[F]or the last two and a half years, there has been no observation, no 
examination of the Tajik Republic organized by the government of Uzbekistan. 
It has not examined any of our work [to check] what we are doing, how we are 
doing, and what we should do.489 
He was also dissatisfied with the unfair distribution of goods and resources to Tajikistan by the 
Uzbek ministries and agencies: 
Let’s take the provision of the goods to the Republic [of Tajikistan]. We are still 
receiving no more than 50% of what we are entitled to [from the Uzbek 
narkomats and Uzbek organizations, such as Uzbektorg, Uzbekbiliashu, 
Uzbekselkhoz]; we have never received the full amount to which we are 
entitled. […] The Uzbek CEC and economic organizations should put an end 
this abnormality.490 
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Makhsum was sure that the Uzbek side was only interested in gathering a greater 
agricultural harvest from Tajikistan: 
[H]ow are we being served by Uzkhlopkom, Uzpakhtasoiuz, and Uzsel’soiuz? 
Very badly. These organizations are preoccupied with expanding the fields; 
their only concern is that the Tajik Republic should yield more cotton. 
However, Uzbkhlopkom has never given any thought to giving us more 
[man]power, to paying more attention to our republic or providing us with 
necessary goods, and so forth.491 
On top of political and economic discrimination, Makhsum was concerned about the conditions 
of the Tajik ethnic minority in Uzbekistan. According to him, they were being oppressed and had 
also been barred from receiving an education or any other information in their native language: 
Here, many comrade mentioned in their speeches that one nation is 
oppressing the other, not giving schools, etc. I think this abnormality needs to 
be abolished. Congress should issue a firm directive that the official line of the 
Soviet Union, the line of the Party is that there should not be any oppressed 
nationality, that each nationality should receive proper schooling, and run 
their government in their native language.  
He warned the Uzbek side that should the issues of the Tajik minority not be resolved, there 
would be complaints to higher authorities: 
If [the Tajiks are] hindered in resolving their issues, the people, who are aware 
of the nationalities policies will direct their demands, if not to here, then to 
higher organizations. We need to end these talks about oppressed 
nationalities and give each nation schools, books, newspapers and the ability 
to govern, in their native language.492 
1.3. Tajik ASSR’s Independence from Uzbekistan:  the role of Shotemur 
The secession of Tajikistan from Uzbekistan was deemed to be the achievement of the Tajik 
leader, Shirinho Shotemur.493 After the establishment of the Tajik ASSR, Shotemur was 
appointed to several positions simultaneously. For instance, he worked as a Representative of 
the Central Control Commission of the CP of Uzbekistan in Tajikistan, and the People’s 
Commissar of Inspection of Workers and Peasants in the RevCom of the newly-established 
Tajikistan494. He was also a member of the Organizational Bureau of the CP of Uzbekistan in 
Tajikistan,495 an interim party organization. On top of all of his duties, Shotemur was regularly 
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dispatched to various regions of Tajikistan to establish Soviet governance or strengthen existing 
Soviet government institutions. For instance, in December 1924, he was dispatched to Dushanbe 
to prepare the new capital city for the  arrival of the Tajik government, who were relocating to 
Dushanbe from Samarkand. In July 1925, he was sent to the Kulob region as one of three 
members of the Special Commission, which was formed to regulate the acceptance of new 
members into the ranks of the CP.496  
Shotemur was twice called off from his studies in Moscow and appointed to the highest 
government positions in Tajikistan. For instance, in 1929, while Shotemur was studying at the 
University of Communist Workers of the East (Moscow), the newly-established CP of Tajikistan 
recalled him so that they could appoint him as the party’s Executive Secretary.497 In 
acknowledgment of his services, the Soviet government awarded him with the Order of Red 
Banner in 1930.498 In 1932, he decided to step down from these government positions and go to 
Moscow to study at the Institute of the Red Professorate (Moscow), and in 1933 he was called 
away from his studies, back to Tajikistan so that he might serve as Chair of the CEC of 
Tajikistan.499  
The reason why Shotemur was such a sought-after person during the rule of the Tajik RevCom 
was that he had gained an excellent reputation and a wide variety of experiences, while 
implementing a range of economic, administrative and ideological policies in various provinces 
of Turkestan ASSR. For instance, in 1921, as a part of the prodrazverstka, a Soviet economic-
agricultural initiative on food security, Shotemur was despatched to Ferghana and Khujand.500 
Shortly after, Shotemur was sent to Pamir, his home region, as a member of the newly-
established Emergency Military-Political Troika,501 where he made his reputation as an 
outstanding local representative for the Soviet regime.502 Within a year he took over leadership 
of the troika. When the troika was replaced with the RevCom of Pamir in 1923, Shotemur 
became the Chair of the Committee,503 which means that he was responsible for curating the 
establishment of a permanent, Soviet system of government in this troublesome region of 
Turkestan ASSR. 
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Moreover, Shotemur was also closely engaged with minority politics toward the Tajiks in 
Turkestan ASSR. His first professional encounter with Tajik ethnic issues took place suddenly, 
upon the request of the Bolshevik leadership. So, in 1923, Shotemur was called from Pamir to 
Tashkent, where he was appointed as an Instructor at the National Minorities Subcommittee of 
the Agitation-Propaganda Division of the CEC of the Turkestan CP. One Tajik scholar has 
described this entity as “the first political structure in the centuries-old history of the Tajiks.”504 
Shotemur was tasked with creating and developing the Tajik section of the party.505  
Shotemur did not take part in the work of the national committees on territorial delimitation. 
However, as a Tajik instructor of the Propaganda Division of the CP of Turkestan ASSR, he 
indirectly influenced public debates on NTD. In particular, Shotemur was behind the 
establishment of Ovozi Tojik, a Tajik-language newspaper, which was quite nationalist in terms 
of its editorial policy. The first issue of the weekly newspaper was published in late August 1924, 
when debate surrounding NTD had entered its final phase. In his report to the Agitation and 
Propaganda Division of the CC of the Russian CP, Shotemur stated that, “even though the Tajiks 
make up a large part of the population of Central Asia, they do not have access to print.”506 In 
the same report, he requested financial support to turn the newspaper into a daily publication. 
This support was to be achieved by means of including the paper’s expenditure within the state 
budget during the fiscal year of 1924-25.507 Through articles in this paper, the Tajik intelligentsia 
started to air their concerns about the fairness of NTD for the Tajiks.508 The newspaper had 
played an immense role in the rise of national self-consciousness among the Tajiks.509 He invited 
Sadriddin Aini, another Hero of Tajikistan, to contribute to Ovozi Tojik with his articles.510 
Reportedly, in December 1924, when Uzbek leadership attempted to block the publication of 
the newspaper, Shotemur, together with Aini and other Tajik intellectuals, decided to convert 
the publication into the official newspaper of the Uzbek CP’s Organizational Bureau in Tajikistan, 
which was acting, temporarily, as the Tajik CP.511 
According to Tajik scholar, Qurboni Alamshoh, Shotemur has always been conscious of his Tajik 
identity. He refers to an entry in Shotemur’s resume (anketa); in answering a question about his 
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desired workplace, Shotemur wrote “[ready for] a service to the party, anywhere among 
Tajiks.”512 Another popular story depicts Shotemur as a Tajik nationalist in the Uzbek-dominated 
government of Turkestan ASSR: 
Once upon a time, in Tashkent, while visiting the Council of the Education of 
the National Minorities of Turkestan ASSR, Shirinsho looked for a Tajik section 
and could not find it. [When] he asked the staff member about the responsible 
person for the section, and the reason why there were no books in the [Tajik] 
language, he was told: “For whom it needs to be kept, as nobody asks for [it]. 
The Tajiks do not exist.” Shirinsho, controlling his emotions, proclaimed: “I am 
the Tajik!”513 
There is evidence that Shotemur was dissatisfied with the decisions of the Special Committee 
on NTD. He believed that the Tajiks should, at least, have an autonomous republic instead of a 
province within Uzbekistan. On September 2, 1924, Shotemur reportedly met with the 
communists of Samarkand city, where he expressed his ideas about an autonomous republic: 
The pan-Turkists attempt to prove that there are no Tajiks in Central Asia, 
other than those in mountains of Badakhshan. It can, therefore, be thought 
that they are being generous by providing the Tajiks with an autonomous 
province. [They] assume that the sons of [our] nation belong to other nations. 
It is quite difficult to solve this issue in the current context, where the pan-
Turkists are dominant.  On top of this, unfortunately, some bright-minded 
Tajiks have fallen under the influence of this terrible misery and have lost their 
minds.  People’s fates should not be decided based upon the ideas of weak 
individuals. The Tajik people have the right their own autonomous republic, 
and the current situation requires that this right is realised. We will achieve 
this.514 
Shotemur became more active in his struggle to improve the socio-political conditions of the 
Tajiks, especially those who lived in Uzbekistan, once he joined the Tajik RevCom and began 
acting as a permanent representative of Tajik autonomy in the Uzbek government. According to 
Alamshoev, as soon as he was appointed a Tajik representative in late 1926, Shotemur 
demanded that he be given a decisive voice in cabinet discussions. Up until that point, the Tajik 
representative had only had an advisory role in the Uzbek government.515 Furthermore, 
Shotemur demanded that the Uzbek government provide financial independence to the 
autonomous Tajik Republic. His demand was based on the complaint that loans taken out by the 
Tajik government from the All-Union Cooperative Bank (VseKoBank516) were given initially to the 
Uzbek government, which then did not pass the whole amount on to the Tajik side.517  
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Several letters from Shotemur addressed to the Communist leadership in Moscow show that he 
was concerned about the implications of NTD on the Tajik population in Uzbekistan. One of his 
letters, written in 1926, has become famous in Tajik academia.  Titled “On the Cultural and Socio-
Economic Condition of the Tajiks in the Territory of the Uzbek Republic,” it is a letter of complaint 
about the conditions of Tajiks living in Uzbekistan. In it, Shotemur complained that as many as 
800 thousand Tajiks were being oppressed in Uzbekistan. He blamed the Uzbek government for 
purposefully ignoring the rights of Tajiks to receive education and information in their native 
language and forced them to learn the Uzbek language. Accusing the Uzbek leadership of taking 
anti-party action, he called for the Communist leadership in Moscow to take serious measures 
in this regard.518 Although he did not make direct territorial claims in this letter, Shotemur 
emphasized that  the “ [culturally superior] and organized part of the Tajik population (the urban 
population, which is employed in trade, industry, and craftsmanship, as well as […] intelligentsia) 
remains in the territory of the Uzbek republic.”519 According to him, “exactly this part of the Tajik 
masses is subject to being Uzbekified (obuzbechit’), with all kinds of wild measures being taken, 
including extreme administrative pressure and chauvinistic tyranny.”520 According to 
Alamshoev, most of the regions of Uzbekistan that Shotemur mentioned as places where Tajiks 
were being oppressed were given to Tajikistan when it became independent of Uzbekistan in 
1929.521 Recently, a Tajik scholar claimed to have discovered one more, previously unknown, 
letter of Shotemur’s in the archives. This letter was titled “The Political Reasoning of the Ongoing 
Uzbekification of the Tajik Population in the Territory of Uzbek SSR.”522 Apparently, this letter 
was thematically similar to the one written in 1926. 
Another letter written by Shotemur, dated March 1929, was addressed to Maxim Ammosov, an 
instructor of the CC of the CP of the USSR. This letter attracted Moscow’s attention, directing 
the CP to examine the ever-growing tension between the Uzbek state and the Tajik autonomy. 
Reporting on the economic and political situation in the Tajik ASSR, Shotemur complains about 
the lack of proper attention paid by the Uzbek CP to Tajik issues. He also complains about the 
mistreatment of issues of Tajik autonomy by the Uzbek government, particularly in relation to 
economic and financial issues.523 As one of the solutions to the dire economic situation in Tajik 
ASSR, Shotemur proposed taking away the Uzbek SSR’s newly-formed Khujand province524 and 
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adding it to the Tajik ASSR. He argued that this move would be “completely economically and 
politically beneficial for Tajikistan and the [Khujand] province.”525 Ammosov found that 
“Tajikistan was rightly complaining that Uzbekistan was ignoring it.”526 A few days later, the CP 
of the Uzbek SSR held its fourth convention, 25 percent of which, according to Alamshoev, was 
devoted to the “issues of Tajiks.”527 During this assembly Isaac Zelenskii, the Secretary of the 
Central Asian Bureau of the CP of the USSR, heavily criticized the Uzbek government.528 The Tajik 
delegation present during the meeting also joined in with criticisms of the Uzbek government.529  
The Uzbek side “relatively quickly” agreed to the demands of the Tajik side in relation to the 
Khujand province.530 It should be noted that due to the involvement of the Central Asian Bureau, 
as well as surfacing facts about the engagement of Uzbek leadership in clandestine nationalist 
and anti-Soviet groups (i.e., Milli Istiqlol), the Uzbek government was under significant pressure. 
On 31 March 1929, the CC of the CP of Uzbekistan proclaimed that:  
Considering that the majority of the population of the Khujand district consists 
of Tajiks, the territorial attachment of the Khujand district to the Tajik ASSR, 
the economic inclination of the Ura-Tiube province of the Tajik ASSR to the 
Khujand district …, acknowledge the necessity of transferring the Khujand 
district to the Tajik ASSR.531  
On 3 April 1929, the Congress of the Soviets of the Khujand province “expressed a wish” to join 
the Tajik ASSR.532 The 2nd Congress of the Soviets of Tajik ASSR, which convened on 21-29 April 
1929, approved this wish of the Khujand District Congress and brought it to the attention of the 
forthcoming Congress of the Soviets of the Uzbek SSR.533 The Uzbek side finalized the 
bureaucratic process by “approving” the wish in the 3rd Congress of the Soviets of the Uzbek SSR 
in May 1929.534 After the transfer of Khujand, the Uzbek government apparently attempted to 
downplay the increasing number of accusations regarding violations of the social and economic 
rights of Tajiks. However, the situation was too serious to ignore, hence the following remark, 
which was made by Akmal Ikramov, First Secretary of the CP of Uzbekistan: 
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Let me say a few things about the Tajiks, who are our most powerful national 
minority. Before the national [territorial] delimitation of the former Turkestan 
and Bukhara republics, [and] during the establishment of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan, we were under the heavy influence of pan-Turkist ideology. We 
even had Great-Uzbekistani chauvinism in relation to the minor nationalities. 
[…] In our relationship with Tajikistan there has been a range of distortions on 
the behalf of our Soviet bodies. It has pretty much to do with this Great-Uzbek 
chauvinism. We are struggling against [this chauvinism], though our efforts 
leave much to be desired.535  
This situation was favourable for the Tajik leadership, thus they increased their demands. Tajik 
party officials wrote a letter, addressed to the Political Bureau and the Central Asian Bureau of 
the CP of the USSR as well as to the CC of the Uzbek CP, demanding that the Tajiks be allowed 
to secede from Uzbekistan. They argued that “currently, a favourable time has come to transfer 
the Tajik regions, which were left in Uzbekistan, to the [Tajik ASSR].The construction of the state 
of the Tajik nation should take place under the same conditions as  the construction of other 
Central Asia republics (Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan).”536 The Soviet government in Moscow 
had long discussions over this issue with both Uzbek and Tajik representatives. On 2 June 1929, 
Khojibaev, who was heading the Tajik delegation, reported to Shotemur that the issue was 
complicated. However, he informed Shotemur about the 2-hour meeting that had been had with 
Stalin, who expressed his support for Tajikistan becoming a separate Soviet republic.537 On 12 
June 1929, the Presidium of the CEC of the USSR issued a decree calling for the secession of the 
Tajik autonomous republic from the Uzbek SSR and its accession to the Soviet Union as a 
separate state: 
Considering that due to economic, national and geographical features, the 
Tajik autonomous republic is an entity entirely separate from the Uzbek SSR, 
we acknowledge that it is timely, and important for increasing economic and 
cultural development within Tajikistan, to raise the question of the secession 
of the Tajik republic from the Uzbek SSR  as well as Tajikistan’s accession to 
the Soviet Union as an independent union republic.538 
This decree was “welcomed” by the Presidiums of the CECs of the Uzbek SSR and the Tajik ASSR 
on 13 July and 11 August 1929 respectively.539 The Uzbek and Tajik governments signed a 
document regarding the transfer of the Khujand district to the Tajik ASSR on 4 September 
1929.540 However, the Tajik side demanded the transfer of a few more territories, namely several 
districts of the Samarkand province, including Samarkand city, some districts of the Bukhara 
province, including Bukhara city, as well as some territories of the Surkhandaryo province. 
According to Masov, the Tajik side’s demands were actively vocalized, not only by Makhsum and 
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Shotemur, but also by Abdullo Rahimbaev, Chinor Imomov, and Abdulrahim Khojibaev, who 
“had previously made huge mistakes by agreeing with the establishment of not only the [Tajik] 
autonomous republic, but also the autonomous province”.541 The Uzbek side refused the Tajik 
side’s demands. The Commission on the territorial delimitation of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, 
which had been established to discuss each side’s territorial claims, endorsed all of the demands 
made by the Tajik side.542 Nevertheless, the Tajik republic was established without the 
transferral of the provinces that had been demanded. As the Declaration of the Reformation of 
the Tajik ASSR into the Tajik SSR, adopted by the 3rd extraordinary Congress of the Soviets of the 
Tajik ASSR (15-19 October 1929), shows the Tajik SSR received only the Khujand province:  
Fulfilling the high will of the Tajik nation and other nationalities that live 
alonside it, the Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic is reformed into a 
Soviet Socialistic Republic of the Union, comrising of an autonomous province 
[oblast’] of Gorno-Badakhshan and the districts [okrug] of Khozhand, Gissar, 
Ura-Tiube, Panzhikent, Kuliab, Kurgan-Tiube, and Garm.543 
In a bureaucratic process, decisions made at the 3rd Congress of The Soviets of Tajikistan received 
the “approval” of the CEC of Uzbek SSR on 6 November 1929.544 The CP of Tajikistan was 
established by the decree of the CC of the CP of the USSR.545 With the decree of the CEC of the 
USSR, the Tajik SSR joined the Soviet Union.546 However, the Tajik government did not give up 
on its attempts to take Samarkand, Bukhara and Surkhondaryo provinces of Uzbekistan. In 
November 1929, to review Tajikistan’s demands, the Presidium of the CEC established a 
commission. Alamshoev argues that the Tajik side was represented mostly by Khojibaev, who 
regularly sent minutes of the meetings of the commission to Shotemur. The latter, in his turn, 
kept studying these minutes and in mid-December 1929, wrote a letter to the Soviet leadership 
in Moscow titled “On the Political Evidence for the Process of the Uzbekification of Tajiks Living 
in the Uzbek SSR”.547 In late December 1929, the commission organized a meeting of the Uzbek 
and Tajik delegations, where Shotemur had a fierce debate with his Uzbek colleagues over the 
territories in issue.548 The commission concluded that Bukhara and Samarkand should stay in 
Uzbekistan, while the case of Surkhandaryo required further study. The Presidium of the CEC of 
the USSR convened on 3 February 1930 to discuss the commission’s work and issued a statement 
about keeping Bukhara and Samarkand within Uzbekistan, and transferring the Sukhandaryo 
province to Tajikistan. However, on 13 February 1930, the Presidium re-convened upon the 
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request of the Uzbek government and decided to stop the transfer of the Surkhandaryo province 
to Tajikistan.549  
Overall, Shotemur’s letters played an important role in informing Moscow about the 
discriminatory attitude of Uzbekistan towards Tajik autonomy and the Tajik minority living in 
Uzbek territories. Due to the active role played by Shotemur, Tajikistan became independent of 
Uzbekistan. Along with other Tajik leaders, Shotemur was the part of the team that negotiated 
with the Uzbek side about the borders of the new Tajik republic and the territories that were to 
be included within those borders. One of his contemporaries remembered Shotemur saying that 
“In 999, the independent Tajik state of the Samanids collapsed because of the nomads. Today, 
after 930 years, despite opposition from the descendants of those Turkic nomads, with the help 
of the Central Committee of [the CP of the USSR] historical justice will be had, and in our 
motherland we will build the Soviet Socialistic Republic of Tajikistan.”550  
2. Remembering the “lost territories”: the narratives of “the genocide against the 
Tajiks” and the “Great Uzbek chauvinism/pan-Turkism”  
In Tajikistan, texts about national identity depict the NTD of the 1920s as a national tragedy. This 
assumption is based on two grand narratives. First, the Tajiks became victims of a “genocide” 
organized by the Uzbeks, since the Uzbek intelligentsia ignored the existence of Tajiks in the 
1920s, while Uzbek leadership actively decreased the total number of the Tajik population in 
official documents. Second, during the NTD of the 1920s, the Tajiks “lost” their land to the 
Uzbeks. Both of these “atrocities” were committed by “Uzbek chauvinists/pan-Turkists” with the 
assistance of “cosmopolitan” Tajiks.  Tajik texts concerned with national identity claim that the 
joint efforts of these forces brought the Tajik nation to the brink of extinction. This will be 
discussed later in this chapter. While the scholarly works of Tajik historians serve as the main 
source of such knowledge, the mass media, official narratives and social media also reproduce 
it.  
Since the late 1980s, Rahim Masov, a Tajik historian, has played a large role in establishing the 
events of the 1920s as a national tragedy. Tajikistan: Istoriia Natsional’noi Tragedii [Tajikistan: 
The History of National Tragedy], his three-volume work, sets the nationalistic tone of Tajik 
historiography. These volumes consist of Istoriia Topornogo Razdeleniia (1991) [The History of 
Axe-Line Delimitation], Istoriia pod Grifom ‘Sovershenno Sekretno’ (1995) [The History Stamped 
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as ‘Top Secret’], and Tadzhiki: Vytesneniie i Assimilliatsiia (2008) [Tajiks: Extrusion and 
Assimilation]. 551 As Masov himself states, the three-volume book is used as “a course reading 
material in higher education institutions and as served as a guideline for [writing] the school 
textbooks on history.”552 This is not surprising considering that Masov had institutional power.  
From 1988 till 2015, he was Director of the Institute of History, Archaeology, and Ethnography 
of the Academy of Science of Tajikistan, the highest authority dealing with the Tajik 
historiography. One of the results of his leadership was a 6-volume compendium, titled Istoriia 
Tadzhikskogo Naroda (1990) [The History of the Tajik Nation], which is, according to some 
observers, comparable to B. Ghafurov’s similarly titled 3-volumed magnum opus published in 
1963-65.553 Masov’s 17-year career as the Chief Historian of the nation is a sign of his good 
relations with the Tajik government. He was the recipient of the order of “The Star of the 
President of Tajikistan” for “his outstanding services in the development of history [sic], 
preparation of the scholarly potential [nauchnyi potentsial], and the development of socio-
historical culture.”554 
The main argument of Masov’s Tajikistan: Istoriia Natsional’noi Tragedii, as well as his numerous 
articles and interviews, is that the 1920s were a national catastrophe for the Tajiks, as they 
suffered a “genocide” and “territorial loss” caused by Uzbek leadership and the unpatriotic Tajik 
elite. Masov argues that “[a]s a result of national-territorial delimitation, the main, ancient 
centers of Tajik culture – the cities of Bukhara, Samarkand and Khujand – remained within […] 
Uzbekistan.”555 The Tajik ASSR, according to him, was formed in “the most desolated, backward 
outskirts of the Bukharan and Turkestani republics.”556 He viewed it as nothing less than the 
process of “herding Tajiks into a special autonomous reservation.”557 These fundamental 
arguments were supported and reproduced by, to borrow Horak’s words, “the group of scholars 
gathered around Masov.” Such arguments have become a matter of contestation between Tajik 
and Uzbek historians.558  
As far as the Tajik government is concerned, even though there were no direct accusations of 
the Uzbeks depriving the Tajiks of their native territories, as will be shown below in this chapter, 
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official rhetoric concerning  the 1920s is mixed; it contains both celebratory messages regarding 
the establishment of the Tajik nation-state and lamentations about the tribulations the Tajiks 
had to endure. In fact, the last time the Tajik government raised the issue of “territorial loss” 
was in February 1930, when the Presidium of the CEC of the USSR postponed any actions 
regarding the territorial claims of Tajikistan to the Uzbek side.559 Even though, in 2009, a Russian 
author leaked information during a closed meeting with the Tajik journalists in Moscow, 
President Rahmon of Tajikistan reportedly claimed that Tajikistan “will take back Samarkand and 
Bukhara” from Uzbekistan,560 there has not been any official confirmation or rejection.  
According to Tajik texts about national identity, the Tajiks are either first-comers or indigenous 
to Central Asia, whereas the Turkic nations, including Uzbeks, are late-comers (invaders, 
barbarians, and conquerors). A common argument among Tajik scholars is that the Uzbek nation 
emerged “before history’s very eyes” [na glazakh istorii], implying the comparatively ancient 
nature of the Tajik nation. This assertion was coined by Ivan Zarubin,561 a Russian scholar of the 
Tajik and Pamiri languages, and was later quoted by Rahmat Rahimov,562 a Tajik anthropologist, 
before being widely used by Masov.563 In 2005 it became the title of his book.564 Also, in 2013, 
Masov published an article titled ‘Uzbekistan – Rodivshiisia na Glazakh Istorii’ [Uzbekistan – Born 
Before History’s Very Eyes]. As a result, this term (and the meaning associated with it) was 
further proliferated in Tajik scholarly discourse. A young Tajik scholar, Manuchehr Alimardonov, 
for instance, used the phrase as if it were already established knowledge in his academic article: 
The borders of Tajik nation, which is the most ancient aboriginal population of 
the Central Asia, are within the “Tajik Autonomous Province“. This area 
includes the mountain peaks of Matcha, Karategin and Darvaz. Conversely, the 
nomad “nations”, which were born before history’s eyes took possession of 
valleys and plains.565 
The notion of the ancientness of the Tajiks vis-à-vis the “newcomer” Uzbeks has also made its 
way into official political discourses. President Rahmon, for instance, believes that “[t]he Tajiks 
are one of the oldest peoples on earth. They are the descendants of the Aryans who, in time 
immemorial, spread through Central Asia”.566 This argument uncompromisingly turns other 
nations in Central Asia into “newcomers”. Rahmon openly implies that all of the other ethnic 
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groups of Central Asia are actually “guests” of Tajiks. In his words, “Uzbeks, Kirgizs, Kazakhs, and 
Turkmens have all settled in welcoming Tajik lands.”567  
Second, the Tajiks lost their territories because the Uzbek leadership forced them to assimilate 
with the Uzbeks. The Tajik scholars use the term “genocide” to define this process and argue 
that it started in the Emirate of Bukhara. The Emirate was “a nidus [ochag] of obscurantism, wild 
feudal despotism and a source of tragic life for Tajik people.”568 The Tajik people were 
discriminated against by the “Manghit-Uzbek oppressors.”569 The horrific life of the Tajiks 
continued in Turkestan ASSR570 and in Bukhara PSR.571 Furthermore, the national-territorial 
delimitation process was indicative of a “complete ignorance of the existence of the Tajiks nation 
and of the forceful assimilation (Uzbekification) of the real (aboriginal) people of Central Asia – 
the Tajiks.”572 Thus, NTD was “an open, undisguised anti-Tajik genocide.”573 With the 
establishment of the Tajik ASSR, “the expansionist territorial pretensions of the Turkic-speaking 
tribes cooled down” and “the existence of the most ancient people of Central Asia […] was 
verified.” 574 As far as the Tajiks left in Uzbekistan were concerned, the “genocide” being 
perpetrated against them continued. To put it in Masov’s words, “the process of assimilating the 
Tajiks, which was implemented by the Uzbeks in Tajik cities and regions, which were then 
directly included in the Uzbek SSR became very dangerous, […]. It was an undisguised 
genocide.”575 According to Masov, “the Tajiks of Tajikistan” would be completely assimilated by 
Uzbeks, if Tajikistan remained further within Uzbekistan as an autonomy.576  
Similar narratives about the “genocide of the Tajiks” can also be observed in official narratives. 
For instance, Rahmon argues that “several times the Tajik nation was on the brink of extinction,” 
when “bloodthirsty conquerors” and “nationalist and racist […] aliens” wanted to “wipe the Tajik 
nation from the surface of earth.”577 Especially, “during the establishment of the Tajik 
Autonomous Republic, nationalist circles made significant efforts to decry the distinctiveness of 
the culture and history of Tajik nation.”578 Because, “[t]he aim of such a chauvinistic politics was 
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primarily to eradicate the national distinctiveness of the Tajiks, and to then further deny the 
existence of the Tajik nation.”579 Overall, the Tajik texts concerning national identity imply that 
a “genocide” took place both before and after national-territorial delimitation. This tragedy “will 
not be wiped from the national memory.”580 
3. National heroism versus national treason: comparing the founding-fathers and 
“cosmopolitan” Tajik leaders 
Tajik scholars hail Makhsum and Shotemur as the main force behind the establishment of 
Tajikistan as a safe-haven for the Tajiks. According to them, without this safe-haven, the Tajiks 
would not have survived the “genocide” carried out by the Uzbeks. As far as “loss of territories” 
is concerned, Tajik specialists hold particular Tajik leaders from the 1920s responsible. These 
leaders, as a result of their cooperation with Uzbeks and ignorance of the surrounding 
assimilation, are now remembered as national traitors. Remembering both heroes and anti-
heroes is equally important for national identity. President Rahmon believes that ”[d]iscussing 
and studying the edifying fates of our ancestors as well as recognising  our Motherland’s history, 
no matter how bitter and tragic it is, makes it possible to learn lessons from the mistakes of the 
past.”581  
Tajik historiography is full of narratives about how and why the “bad” Tajiks were as dangerous 
as the Uzbeks in causing national tragedy. The commonly made argument is that “the Tajik 
nation paid a high cost due to the connivance of Uzbekified [uzbekofitsirovannye] Tajiks”. This 
high cost came in the form of loss of language, followed by loss of a chance to establish a state 
in culturally Tajik cities.582 These “national traitors” were as dangerous as the pan-Turkist Uzbek 
elite.583 One Tajik scholar mentions two types of “traitors”; firstly, there are the “Uzbekified” 
Tajiks, those who identified as Uzbeks; secondly, there are the Tajik leaders who agreed with 
the arguments of the Uzbeks during NTD in the 1920s.584 The first group included Faizulla 
Khojaev, Abdurauf Fitrat, A. Rahimbaev, and S. Islamov. The second group included Chinor 
Imomov, A.Khojibaev, and M.Saidjanov. The first type of traitors were guilty of forgetting their 
roots: 
These cosmopolitan “Tajiks” demonstrated themselves as passionate, 
merciless, consistent and conscious conductors of pan-Turkist policies 
regarding the Tajiks, the people, to which, unfortunately, they belonged. 
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Anthropologically they belonged to the Tajiks, but politically, they were ardent 
pan-Turkists, detached from their national roots. They had forgotten that they 
[…] belonged to the Tajik nation […].585 
The second-type of traitor was so heavily influenced by the Uzbeks that they could not 
understand they were causing a national tragedy. Their obedience to the Uzbeks, by some 
accounts, astonished even some of the Russian and Kazakh leaders during that period.586 Even 
Joseph Stalin, a ruthless Soviet leader, admitted that it was not the leadership in Moscow that 
failed to give the Tajiks a state in 1924, but was rather the Tajik national leaders themselves, 
who did not want to have a state for their nation.587 If they had wanted to do so, Uzbekified 
Tajiks and indecisive Tajik leaders could have changed the course of Tajik history, since they 
were the Tajiks who held positions of power: 
Rahimbaev A. R., a Tajik, was the Chair of the Commission on National-
Territorial Delimitation in Central Asia, F. Khojaev, originally Tajik, was the 
Chair of the Government of Bukhara People’s Soviet Republic, A. Fitrat, 
originally Tajik, was the Minister of Education, Islamov S., a Turkicized 
(Uzbekified) Tajik, was The Chair of the Uzbek Commission on National-
Territorial Daelimitation, Ch. Imamov, A. Khodzhibaev, and M. Saidzhanov, 
originally Tajiks, were the members of Tajik Sub-Commission [on NTD].588 
However, these individuals caused the Tajik nation to lose everything to the Uzbeks: 
Tajiks themselves, traitorously, voluntarily, and obligingly offered the Uzbeks 
[what were] originally, historically and factually Tajik territories, cities, and 
provinces, thus, betraying the interests and priorities of their people. This 
“service” led to a national catastrophe. Tajiks, despite having all the necessary 
features – national, economic, political, and moral-legal bases – lost not only 
any real opportunity to establish an independent national Soviet republic, but 
also their original territories. They were then forcefully oppressed and 
assimilated […].589 
Such hatred toward those Tajiks is also emergent in official narratives. President Rahmon 
complained that along with the “chauvinists”, i.e., the Uzbeks, “there were also some Tajik 
representatives, who wanted to cast doubt on the existence of their own ancient nation.” 590 It 
is noteworthy that the incumbent Head of State uses the same keywords that frequently appear 
in the arguments of Tajik historians: 
Analysis of existing documents and sources shows that during that fateful 
historical period the then-governors and a handful of mercenary personalities, 
together with the unconscious and cosmopolitan people, crushed the 
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historical justice, harmed the national and socio-economic interests of Tajiks, 
and refused to acknowledge Tajiks and their outnumbering presence.591  
In contrast to these anti-heroes, Makhsum and Shotemur struggled to preserve statehood, 
territory, unity and identity. According to a Tajik historian, “[a]mong the Tajik politicians of that 
difficult period, only very few, such as N[usratullo] Makhsum, were not infected with the pan-
Turkist disease.”592 “Such heroes as Shirinsho Shotemur and Nusratullo Makhsum fought for 
national unity and preservation of originally [Tajik] territories [so that] Tajiks would not lose their 
original territories and be destroyed by time or other forces.”593 President Rahmon also hails 
these leaders for prioritising the interests of their nation. In his words, "[w]hat makes these 
political activists great is that they, due to their audacity, could, in this comparatively short 
historical period, use the opportunities presented by the first phase of the consolidation of the 
Soviet state for the interests of their own nation.”594  
According to Alimardonov, Makhsum had “a full understanding of the geopolitical situation in 
the region.”595 He is credited for influencing Moscow’s decision to present the Tajiks with the 
right to form an autonomous republic instead of the province, which had been earlier 
planned.596 His letter, addressed to Stalin and mentioned in the previous section of this 
dissertation, is viewed as the most significant effort in this regard. As the text of the letter shows, 
Makhsum was not only dissatisfied with the territories allocated to Tajiks, but also demanded 
that the Tajik territorial entity be given a status similar to that of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. 
Tajik historians believe that even though his demands for an independent state were not met, 
the Tajiks were allowed to establish an autonomous republic instead of an autonomous province 
due to his activism. As Tajik observer believes, “Modern-day Tajikistan is a political heritage, 
which Nusratullo Makhsum left to the next generations, and it is the biggest asset of the 
Tajiks.”597 
As far as Shotemur is concerned, his services before the nation are not limited to the 
achievement of independence. Shotemur tried to accomplish “the consolidation of the 
independent state of Tajiks".598 He expended significant effort upon state-building after 
independence was achieved. For instance, according to Qurboni Alamshoev, Shotemur is 
remembered as the constructor of Dushanbe city, the capital of Tajikistan.599 Shotemur was the 
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author of the constitution of the Tajik SSR of 1937.600 In President Rahmon’s words, "[b]eing the 
Head of the Commission on the Creation and Adoption of the Constitution and State Emblem 
[of the Tajik SSR], Shirinsho Shotemur stood on the outset of the formation of the legislature of 
the Republic and adeptly participated in writing the [Constitution] of Republic of Tajikistan and 
other relevant documents."601 
 He also tried to generate feelings of national pride among the Tajiks. As President Rahmon put 
it, “[t]his person, the fighter with a strong will, who was not afraid of pressures and threats from 
cosmopolites, or the internal and external enemies of the Tajik nation, courageously defended 
the interests of his people.”602 According to official narratives, Shotemur stood behind the public 
events organized in the 1930s that were aimed at the “propagation of the high ideals of national 
self-realization and distinctiveness, patriotism and the unprecedented heroism of our merited 
ancestors.”603 He was also a defender of the rights of the Tajiks. As official discourses put it, in 
times when enemies prevented the Tajiks from having their own newspapers, magazines and 
textbooks, Shotemur and his brother-in-arms succeeded in “defending the historic right of the 
Tajiks to form a national state.”604 The Tajik President further states that: 
In that challenging and inauspicious atmosphere, Shirinsho Shotemur referred 
to the then-Soviet leadership with a letter titled “On the Cultural, Social and 
Economic Conditions of Tajiks.” Though, initially, this patriotic move was 
ignored, eventually the Central Asian Bureau of the Party of Bolsheviks 
approved the reasonable opinions and thoughts expressed in Shirinsho 
Shotemur’s letter. In that difficult and complicated period, when nationalistic 
movements were gaining momentum in all spheres of life, openly and 
courageously raising his voice for the interest of Tajik nation was, in itself, an 
act of heroism performed by Shirinsho Shotemur.605 
Both Makhsum and Shotemur became victims of the Stalinist purge during the late 1930s. As 
Tajik historians believe, in the early 1930s both of them started to complain about the 
increasingly repressive role of Soviet security services. For instance, Makhsum has reportedly 
accused security and police services of losing their ties with the working class and peasants and 
of forgetting about their primary duties.606 Some of his policies did not fit into the class-struggle 
principles of communist ideology; he refused to nationalize the properties and wealth of rich 
peasants, if he believed that they had earned that wealth via their own labour, and did not 
exploit the poor.607 Moreover, his application to free the prisoners in Khujand angered 
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“chauvinists who wore the mask of communists.”608 Some Tajik historians argue that Makhsum 
was removed from his post upon the request of the Uzbek CP.609  
As far as Shotemur is concerned, he was also of a negative opinion about the politicization and 
securitization of agriculture in the republic. As Alamshoev puts it, “Shotemur was against the 
increasingly dominant role of the party and the loss of the Soviets’ real role at grass-roots level, 
[and] that the uniformed services started to gain control over the government.”610 In early 
September of 1937, the Party, together with the NKVD, started “cleaning” the government in 
Tajikistan. Along with Makhsum (who was in Moscow) and Shotemur, a dozen of other Tajik 
leaders were arrested in September 1937. A newspaper article by V. Verkhovskii titled “The 
Enemies of the Tajik Nation” published by Pravda on 10 September 1937 was devoted to them. 
A. Andreev, the Secretary of the CC of the CP of the USSR, who travelled to Tajikistan upon 
Stalin’s instruction, in his telegram to the latter, dated October 1937, wrote that “[a]pparently, 
the enemies worked here very thoroughly and felt themselves quite on the loose”.611 Another 
newspaper article published in Tojikistoni Surkh accused Makhsum, among others, for aiming to 
build a “Greater Tajikistan” by taking away several provinces of Uzbekistan.612 A resolution of 
the CC of the Tajik CP, made on 4 October 1937, described the writers of these articles as 
“enemies of the Tajik nation – bourgeois nationalists, rightist-Trotskyists” and even accused 
them of cooperating with the foreign intelligence services.613 Makhsum and Shotemur were 
sentenced to death in October 1937. 
4. Conclusion 
In contemporary, official discourses of nationhood, Makhsum and Shotemur are “heroes”, 
whereas many other Tajik leaders are “villains”. The heroes halted the further assimilation of 
the Tajiks into Uzbekstan and ended the territorial occupation of Tajik territory by the Uzbeks. 
Conversely, the “villains” were infected by “pan-Uzbekism”. The youth of Tajikistan are 
encouraged to learn from the “heroes” and to hate the “villains.” President Rahmon is 
“absolutely confident” that these heroes "will remain in the hearts of the people for 
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centuries".614 For the people of Tajikistan, Shotemur represents "the highest embodiment of 
selflessness and an edifying creed of patriotism and love for the nation."615 As far as N. Makhsum 
is concerned, Rahmon says, “let his name and valiant struggle for the interests of people serve 
as a bright example for the future generation.”616  
President Rahmon also believes that “[i]n the current conditions of our country, each citizen, 
who thinks himself a patriot, following the example of the mentioned activists, should make the 
interests of state and nation a priority and struggle for the prosperity of Tajikistan, so that his 
descendants may be proud of his deeds.”617 What this means is that the current generation of 
Tajiks are expected to respect their founding fathers, learn from them, serve for interests of the 
state they have built, and defend the Tajik nation from Uzbek threat. President Rahmon believes 
that people like N. Makhsum and Sh. Shotemur dreamt of “sovereignty, territorial unity, 
obeisance to a national language, state emblems, respect to national culture and high values of 
world civilization,” and that there is good reason to be proud that these dreams are coming 
true.618  
Along with the discursive construction of the images of Sh. Shotemur and N. Makhsum as the 
prototypes of an acceptable “Tajikness” in contrast to the unacceptable, “cosmopolitan” and 
pro-Uzbek Tajiksness, the Tajik state has been established as “sacred.” Furthermore, Tajikistan 
is “a symbol of the motherland of suffered generations of Tajiks”.619 Letting further “suffering” 
of the Tajiks occur is unacceptable. Therefore, preventing the reoccurrence of the “national 
tragedy” of the Tajiks “should be the foundation of all activities of the national state, become 
the flesh and blood [sic] of the political line of the state in the mobilization of the real potential 
and opportunities of the nation […].”620 
As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6, the discursive construction of these “heroes” as 
“model Tajiks,” who fought against the Uzbeks, places the politics of national identity and 
ongoing, uneasy relations with Uzbekistan in one context. Knowing the “history of national 
tragedy” and the identities of the “villains” provides us with an “explanatory tool”. This tool is 
useful for interpreting the current, uneasy relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. It 
“shows” that Uzbekistan is continuing to commit “atrocities” against the Tajiks. In this light, 
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President Rahmon, as the only currently living national hero, appears to be carrying on the 
missions of Shotemur and Makhsum and defending Tajikistan against Uzbekistan. The official 
narratives try to emphasize the link between Rahmon and the above-mentioned national 
heroes.   
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Chapter 4. The Linguistic Foundations of Tajik National Identity and the 
Role of Sadriddin Aini 
1. Aini’s activities in the Emirate of Bukhara in the 1910s-20s and his marginalization 
from politics 
1.1. Aini as a progressive mullah and gradual reformist 
Sadriddin Aini was at the forefront of the reformist movement in Bukhara in the 1910s. His main 
concern was the reform of education system, rather than the political system; Aini believed that 
the former would inevitably lead to the latter. One of Aini’s first innovations was the 
establishment of so-called “new method” schools in cooperation with Abdulvohid Munzim in 
the late 1900s.621 These schools relied on a different approach to education than traditional 
madrasahs. In 1910, Aini joined a clandestine society called Tarbiiai Atfol (Education of the 
Children) established by the Young Bukharans. The Young Bukharans found his his gradualist 
approach to reforms of state and society in Bukhara through education outdated. It is often 
overlooked that Aini was against any revolutionary change in society. However, in the latter 
stages of his life he represented himself as pro-revolutionary, and national identity discourses 
in Tajikistan recognize him as such. His disbelief in violent methods of political struggles is among 
the many reasons why Aini was sidelined from politics in Bukhara. His clash with the younger 
generation of Jadids later pushed him towards becoming a pro-Tajik activist. 
In April 1917, the Emir of Bukhara issued a decree promising political reform. Most Jadids of 
Bukhara gathered in one household to discuss how to respond to the decree. The left wing of 
the Jadid movement, led by Faizulla Khojaev, which had long advocated for this change, decided 
to organize a mass demonstration on this occasion. Their aim was to bring the proposed political 
reform to the attention of the masses.622 Also, they wanted to test the prospects of a revolution 
against the rule of the Emir.623 Sadriddin Aini, as he points out in his biography, was skeptical 
about the Emir’s pro-reforms decree, so he was against any demonstrations.624 He was sure that 
the Emir was bluffing and planning to use any demonstrations to arrest the opposition.625 The 
monarch’s expectation was to organize the clash of the reformists and the conservative religious 
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leadership, which was very influential among the population.626 As his memories show, Aini felt 
an apathy toward newly emerging political activism. He had never been in the meeting of the 
CC of Young Bukharans since then, while other gradualist-reformists left the organization at a 
later stage. That meeting marked the beginning of the radicalization of the reformist movement 
in Bukhara and the marginalization of proponents of progressive reform.  
Aini personally suffered from the decision of the Young Bukharans to go ahead with the 
demonstrations. As Aini predicted, the Emir cracked down on the demonstration, as a result of 
which, almost all of the leaders of the Jadids fled Bukhara. Aini was captured and punished with 
75 lashes. Aini wrote later that he almost died from the punishment. The Russian armed forces 
located in Kagan interfered and saved him, along with other prisoners. After two months of 
treatment in Kagan City, Aini permanently moved to Samarkand.  
Another event that distanced Aini from the Jadids of Bukhara was a failed coup by The Young 
Bukharans, in cooperation with the armed forces of Turkestan, which was led by Fedor Kolesov 
in March 1918.627 As a result of this event, known as the Kolesov campaign, the reformists of 
Bukhara were either killed by the Emir or forced to flee from Bukhara. In his book, Bukhoro 
Inqilobining Ta’rikhi, Aini wrote that before “the Kolesov event” he had told one of the Young 
Bukharans that he did not “advise an attack without thorough preparation.”628 In his Bukhoro 
Inqilobi Ta’rikhi and Mukhtasari Tarzhimani Kholi Khudam, Aini implies that Kolesov’s decision 
to use military force against the Emir was a miscalculation and immature, and that The Young 
Bukharans made a mistake by encouraging Kolesov to confront the Emir: 
[One of the leaders of the Jadids of Bukhara]629, on the one hand, hid the 
Emir’s level of readiness from the Soviet government of Turkestan, and on the 
other hand, convinced Kolesov, the Chair of The Soviet commissars of 
Turkestan, that he had “30 thousand armed men undercover”, and that the 
Emir would surrender if Kolesov made a slight effort.630 
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Aini believed that it was too early to be thinking about a revolution overthrowing the Emir.631 
The miscalculation and failure of the Jadids, once more, had personal implications for Aini, who 
lost his brother during this failed campaign: 
As a result of this provocative move, people in Bukhara and its provinces, who 
were suspected of being Bolsheviks, revolutionaries, or who were maligned as 
being linked to these groups, were killed by the Emir in a terrible manner.  My 
brother Sirojiddin was also captured [by Emir] in my uncle’s village, where he 
came to hide, and was taken to jail [obkhona] where I have also been. He was 
killed there after 15 days of painful tortures.632 
Aini openly blamed Faizulla Khojaev, one of the leaders of the Young Bukharan movement, for 
the failure: 
Faizullakhoja is the son of late Ubaydullakhoja. Although he was young 
(approximately 20 years old) he had developed excellent skills in trade. Risking 
his wealth and life, he always stood at the frontline of Bukhara’s revolutionary 
and reformist movement. Unfortunately, due to his adolescence and 
inexperience, he has made big mistakes and caused the total liquidation and 
dissemination [of the Jadid movement]. If he learns from these tragedies and 
redirects his activities onto the actual path of wisdom and logic, he can expect 
to achieve success, otherwise, he will cause a new tragedy every day.633 
This excerpt is available in the original manuscript of Bukhoro Inqilobi Ta’rikhi, but was removed 
from the published versions of the book.634 For his personal security, Aini moved from 
Samarkand to Tashkent in April-October 1918, as the Emir was encouraged by the victory and 
increased his influence in the eastern parts of Turkestan.635 Aini’s negative attitude toward the 
Jadids of Bukhara never improved. For Aini, they were merely self-proclaimed “revolutionaries 
of Bukhara.”636  
1.2. Aini’s ideological drifts in the late 1910s and early 1920s 
Aini welcomed the Russian revolution of 1918 with a poem called “Marshi Hurriyat” (The March 
of Freedom), which is claimed to be written in the motif of the French Marseillaise: 
Hey, the oppressed, the enslaved, 
It is high time for our freedom! 
I have good news for you, comrades, 
It is the dawn of joy all around the world. 
How long will we suffer? 
Be happy from now on! 
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Enough of the injustice, enough of the oppression,  
Hey, justice, why don’t you rule the world? 
Revenge, revenge, my comrades, 
Let the world be taken over by 
Independence, justice, and equality! 
(Laborer, peasant, shoulder by shoulder) 
 
[Ėǐ sitamdidagon, ėǐ asiron, 
Vaqti ozodii mo rasid! 
Muzhdagonī diḣed, ėǐ faqiron, 
Dar jaḣon subḣi shodī damid, 
To ba kaǐ ghussa khurdan ba hasrat, 
Ba’d az in shodmonī namo! 
Bas jafo, bas sitam, ėǐ adolat, 
Dar jaḣon ḣukmronī namo! 
Intiqom, intiqom, ėǐ rafiqon, 
Ėǐ jafodidagon, ėǐ shafiqon! 
Ba’d az in dar jaḣon ḣukmron bod 
Ḣurrii͡at, adolat, musovot! 
(Ranjbar, barzgar, botifoq)]637 
Nevertheless, as is shown above, Aini was sure that organizing a similar revolution in Bukhara 
was impossible. As a former madrasah student and teacher in Bukhara city, Aini was aware of 
the conservative nature of society in Bukhara. Based on an analysis of Aini’s Ta’rikhi Inqilobi Fikri 
dar Bukhoro, a manuscript which was discovered and published by his son, Kamoliddin Aini, in 
2003 in Tehran, Shimada and Tosheva argue that “in September 1920 a revolution took place in 
Bukhara that was not desired by Aini as it was premature and externally supported.”638 In the 
book, which was originally written in 1918, Aini reportedly argued for the importance of 
education and freedom of press in shaping a free society that can gradually pressure the 
government regarding political reforms.639  
Aini was critical about the absoluteness of the Emir’s rule and the moral deterioration of the 
ulema in Bukhara. However, he never advocated the overthrowing of the monarch. In his 
Bukhoro Inqilobining Ta’rikhi, Aini provided rather nostalgic accounts of the periods in the 
history of Bukhara when the ulema were in a position to keep the royal family accountable.640 
He believed that the coalition of Young Bukharans and the Communists were not forces that 
could take over the task of checking and balancing the power of the Emir. The coalition, 
according to him, was dysfunctional due to fundamental differences between the parties: 
In Tashkent and Samarkand, along with the Jadid entities that used to call 
themselves “the revolutionaries of Bukhara,” an organization of the 
communists of Bukhara was established. The members of the Communist 
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organization of Bukhara were the workers and the former soldiers. 
However,the leaders of the “Revolutionaries of Bukhara” were the rich and 
small traders of Bukhara, and some of the members were the sons of mullahs 
(mullozodagon) and religious clerics (makhdum).641 
Furthermore, the socio-political situation during the civil war in Turkestan in 1918 that followed 
the Russian revolution was deteriorating. The nationalities policy of the Communists of 
Turkestan was not appealing to Aini. It is well-known that after leaving Bukhara, Sadriddin Aini 
started to identify himself and the people around him (for instance, his readers) as 
“Turkestanis.”642 The idea of forging the “Turkestani” identity, which he and some other 
intellectuals preferred, was not on the agenda of the Communists of Turkestan. The government 
of Turkestan ASSR rather sought to promote ethnic division of the population. For them, the 
majority of the population of Turkestan were Turks/Uzbeks, whereas Tajiks, Afghanis, and 
Iranians were all known as Persians (Fors); such a division was institutionalized in May 1919, 
when the CP of Turkestan ASSR established the so-called “Persian Section” within the 
Commissariat for National Affairs.643 At that time, Aini used to work for both Tajik and Uzbek 
newspapers in Samarkand (i.e., Shu’lai Inqilob and Mehnatkashlar Tovushi).644 At that stage, he 
would not want to see similar socio-political issues happen in Bukhara. 
Instead of communism, Aini probed an alternative ideology that sought to keep Turkestan 
undivided and even independent from Russia. During the political turmoil in Turkestan, the 
clandestine movements that sought independence mushroomed. For a short time, Aini himself 
was seriously dragged into an anti-communist and nationalist movement. At that time he wrote 
poems calling for the people of Turan645 to wake up. For instance, on 1 October 1919 the 
Mehnatkashlar Tovushi newspaper published Aini’s poem, titled “Turon marshi” [The March of 
Turan]: 
Wake up! The people of Turan, wake up! 
The whole world is in upheaval! 
It is a new era, 
Different epoch, different age! 
Don’t sleep, come on, enjoy the world! 
Will you oversleep this, you benighted, dullard? 
 
[Uǐghon! Turon ėli, uǐghon!  
Tūlqinlandi butun jahon!  
Boshqalashdi butun davron,  
Boshqa davron, boshqa zamon!  
Ukhlama, i͡ur, saǐra jaḣon!  
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Ëtasanmi, zhoḣil, nodon?]646 
It is interesting to note that the revolution had already happened when this poem was written. 
Furthermore, the theme of the poem is about the awakening of the people of Turan, rather than 
about poor and oppressed people. So, the theme of the poem might be about national revival, 
rather than a revolt.  
In 1920, Aini was involved in a group involved with works of nationalist movements in Turkestan. 
The group was led by Bashkir Ahmed Zaki Validi Togan and sought to establish an independent, 
federated republic in Central Asia. Furthermore, the group had close ties with the Basmachi 
leaders. In his memoirs, Togan noted that the Jadids of Bukhara and Turkestan came together 
in the late 1910s to secretly work on a project concerning the future government of Turkestan.647 
The proposed government was planned to be run by members of three parties such as Erk, 
Tarakki Parvarlar, and Alash Orda. A disagreement between the Bukharans and Turkestanis 
surfaced while selecting the leader of the central governing body of the proposed government, 
which Validi called the President of the Joint Committee. The group could not choose between 
one of two candidates for the presidency, namely Sadriddin Aini, representing the Jadids of 
Bukhara, and Munavvar Qori, a Jadid from Tashkent.  
In Togan’s words, “the primary reason was a sort of competition between the Bukharans and 
the Taskentians, as well as a distrust shown by the Bukharans and Taskentians toward the Kazaks 
[sic].”648 The Bukharans “did not even wish to hear” about the candidacy of the Tashkentians. At 
the same time, Aini was not acceptable to Tashkent; “those who supported him were very few 
in number.”649 Moreover, if selected, Aini refused to go underground no matter what happened 
to the organization. Eventually, after the official representative of the government of Turkey, 
who was present at the meeting, interfered and “spoke with the competing Ozbek [sic] and Tajik 
representatives,” the issue was resolved and Togan was selected as President.650 There is no 
evidence about the participation of Sadriddin Aini in any other congresses following the first 
one. However, the fact that Aini was among the leaders of a national movement, which aimed 
to establish an independent Federative Republic of Turkistan, means that he had seriously 
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considered adopting a “Turkestani” identity at some point in his life. His Tajik identity emerged 
much later.  
With the consolidation of power in the hands of the Bolsheviks in Turkestan, the people within 
Aini’s circle eventually chose to go one of the three ways. They either joined the Basmachis to 
struggle against the communists openly, went into exile to continue political opposition from 
abroad, or aligned with the communists to establish new states in the region. Aini chose none 
of these paths. He instead distanced himself from political affairs and for some time found 
refuge in literature, linguistic studies, journalism and teaching.  
1.3. The rise of the former Jadids to power and the marginalization of Aini from 
politics 
After the revolution in September 1920 in Bukhara and the collapse of the monarchy, the 
government of the newly established Bukhara PSR was mostly comprised of leftist Young 
Bukharans, who were allied with the communists. It was unrealistic to expect Aini to be involved 
with the government, since he had split apart from the leftists earlier. Aini himself gave a 
different explanation for his absence from the political scene of Bukhara; “I did not want to 
participate in the work of the government of Bukhara PSR directly, because there were some 
suspicious people among its leadership.”651 According to Aini’s explanation, the government of 
Bukhara PSR released the man who killed Aini’s brother even though he had been sentenced to 
death and then had this sentence altered to 10 years of imprisonment. When the killer, who is 
also believed to be a Basmachi, was seen in a teahouse (choikhona) and entering the house of 
“the brother of one of the government officials of Bukhara,” Aini talked to Muinjon Aminov, the 
Chairman of the CEC of Bukhara PSR, about this case. The latter warned Aini that he might be 
charged for defamation.652 Aini claimed that this was the reason why he was not a government 
official in Bukhara:  
Of course in these circumstances, I could not stay in Bukhara, and I could feel 
it in the days of the formation of the Bukhara Socialist People’s Republic. 
Therefore, by getting a house in Samarkand, I left all the difficulties of that 
time there [sic], and did not go to Bukhara to become a “commissar.”653 
The contacts of the leadership of Bukhara with the Basmachi movement cannot be the reason 
for Aini’s alienation654 because Aini himself had a record of indirect contact with the Basmachis. 
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For instance, Aini was involved in the work of the Turkestan National Union655 and was even 
viewed as a candidate for the chairmanship of the organization. It is noteworthy that the Union 
had well-established ties with the Basmachis.656 Moreover, though Aini was never been a part 
of the central government of Bukhara, for five years he worked in official government positions 
in the newly established state; in 1921-23 he was a consultant to the Consulate of Bukhara in 
Samarkand,657 and in 1924-1925 he was the head of the Samarkand branch of the 
Bukhgostorg.658 So, contrary to his claims that he did not want to have any dealings with the 
“suspicious” government of Bukhara, Aini readily worked for that government. However, 
apparently, a diplomatic-trade representative position away from the capital was all that he 
could get in these political circumstances. Aini had poor relations with Faizulla Khojaev, Usman 
Khojaev and Abdurauf Fitrat due to the disagreements that had occurred between them in the 
past. Aini had never approved of anything these young Jadids did: 
After the February Revolution [people] like Fitrat and Usmonkho’ja came to 
the top of the reformist movement [in Bukhara]. After their return from 
studying in Turkey, they used to promote pan-Turkism. They used to converse 
in the Ottoman Turkish language, not only among themselves but also with 
the people of Bukhara city, who did not know [even] the Uzbek language 
better than them.659 
These issues with regard to personal relations and the mismatch of positions affected Aini’s 
scholarly and literary activities, too. Within 1920-1922 Aini had made three failed attempts to 
publish historical and literary works devoted to socio-political events in Bukhara, with the State 
Publishing House of Bukhara PSR. In 1920, his Bukhoro Jallodlari was accepted for publication 
but was reported “lost” when the author demanded the unpublished manuscript back.660 
Similarly, in 1921, the publishing house accepted Aini’s Bukhoro inqilobi ta’rikhiga oid 
materiallar, but it never went to press.661 Ta’rikhi amironi manghitiia Bukhoro had a similar fate 
in 1922, though later the same publishing house helped Aini to get his work published in 
Tashkent, but not in Bukhara.662  
The analyses of the reformist movement in Bukhara that Aini had included in these works was 
not favoured by the political establishment of Bukhara PSR. For instance, one of the books, 
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Bukhoro Inqilobi Ta’rikhi, was written upon the request of the Minister of Education of Bukhara 
PSR Yo’ldosh Po’latov.663 However, reportedly, Faizulla Khojaev blocked the publication of the 
book in Bukhara.664 As Shimada and Tosheva observed, Aini omitted Khojaev every time he 
analysed the activities of Young Bukharans.665 These scholars believe that, unhappy with Aini’s 
account of events, Faizulla Khojaev wrote his own version of the history of the revolutionary and 
reformist movements in Bukhara, in which he assessed Aini’s opinions as “incorrect.”666 For 
example, the very second sentence in Faizulla Khojaev’s Bukhoro Inqilobining Tarikhiga 
Materiallar mentioned Aini’s book.667 Khojaev acknowledged Aini as “one of the leaders and 
founders” of the Jadid movement andnoted that his book “included valuable materials that 
depicted some periods of the Jadid movement.”668 However, Khojaev blamed Aini for 
attempting to “show Jadidism as a phenomenon that was firmly linked to and indivisible from 
Bolshevism.”669 Moreover, Khojaev criticized Aini’s book for failing to cover the “internal 
dynamics within Jadidism” as well as mistakenly mixing Young Bukharans and Jadids.670 Thus, 
Khojaev provided an account of the political struggle in the Emirate that was an alternative to 
Aini’s version.  
When the Bukhara PSR was dissolved, and the Uzbek SSR was established, the political elite of 
Bukhara moved to support the government of Uzbekistan en masse. However, Aini was kept at 
a distance. He was reappointed to the position he had previously occupied, i.e., the Director of 
the Branch of the Bukhgostorg in Samarkand. 671 With the former Young Bukharans on top of the 
government, there was no hope for Aini to be in politics or publish his works uncensored. 
Therefore, he completely distanced himself from the government of Uzbekistan. As Aini put it, 
“after the national territorial delimitation in Central Asia, Bukhgostorg in Samarkand was 
transferred to Uzbekistan, and I was again appointed as the director of it. However, I wrote a 
resignation letter to the Obkom672 and left this job to completely devote myself to the service of 
the literature.”673 
When the state publishing house of Tajik ASSR, Tajikgosizdat, was established in Samarkand in 
1925, Aini started to work there. This job helped Aini to establish contacts within the emerging 
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Tajik political elite. In his memoirs, Aini writes that “in spring of 1925 after the establishment of 
the Tajik Autonomous Soviet Republic, I signed a contract with its government, started writing 
Namunai Adabiioti Tojik and finished it the same year.”674 As it will be discussed below, this work 
became Aini’s biggest contribution to the defence of the Tajik side’s position in the debates with 
Uzbek officials and nationalists concerning Tajik identity and territoriality. This made Tajik 
scholars believe that the establishment of aseparate Tajik Soviet Socialistic Republic instead of 
the establishment of autonomy within Uzbekistan in 1929 was “Aini’s lifetime dream.”675  
In 1929, when Tajikistan became independent of Uzbekistan, Aini was elected a member of the 
CEC of the Tajik SSR. A few years later, Aini received the title of Honoured Scientist of Tajikistan. 
He also worked as a member of the local legislative assembly (Soviet) in Dushanbe city. 
Eventually he moved from Samarkand to Dushanbe and was appointed as Head of the Academy 
of Sciences of Tajikistan in 1951.676 He emerged as the icon of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic. 
As some Tajik writers used to argue, “Tajikistan is known as the ‘country of Aini’ abroad, 
[especially] in Asian and African countries.”677 
2. Aini as a defender of the Tajik language and identity  
2.1. The marginalization of the Tajik language/identity in Uzbekistan and Aini’s 
reaction 
The debates of Uzbek and Tajik nationalists about language and identity have been one of the 
most important factors in the formation of the “self” and “other” dichotomy in Tajik- Uzbek 
relations. The attack on Tajik language by Uzbek nationalists has been going on since early 1920s. 
For instance, an article in the Turkestan newspaper in 1920 stated that “wanting to use the Tajik 
language is only moving further away from the modern world, using a language which has 
become rare and superfluous. It is vital that Tajiks revert immediately to the Uzbek language 
and stop using the specific Tajik language, for the Socialist movement has settled its fate.”678 
Another often-quoted excerpt of an article published in 1924 argued that “any inclination to use 
this language [Tajik] indicates a desire to distance one’s self from life, because life and the flow 
of history are against it. Secondly, accepting the Tajik language is to accept, not a useful, but a 
useless and superfluous language.”679  
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In the second half of the 1920s, the rebuttals and counter-attacks started to sound from the 
Tajik side, too. Aini had been part of this debate from the Tajik camp. One of the reasons Aini is 
remembered in Tajikistan is due to his weighty contribution to this debate. The importance of a 
national language in the formation of the “self” is widely accepted. Language “must be treated 
as part of a cultural ensemble that serves to create intimacy and communion between members 
of a population, as well as a sense of difference from those outside.”680 Along with boosting 
national cohesion, language also plays a role in “othering”. In other words, “[a] common 
vernacular […] establishes effective boundaries between ‘ingroups’ and ‘outgroups’.” 681 Thus, 
language is an “ethnic marker.”682 Aini played a significant role in the “demarcation” of the Tajik 
“self” and the Uzbek “other” through his contributions to debates on language and identity. 
Aini was bilingual and used the Uzbek language comfortably. For instance, in November 1920, 
in a meeting in Bukhara that was chaired by Kuibyshev, Aini gave a lengthy comment in the 
“Turkic” language about the foreign trade and economic situation in Bukhara.683 He wrote his 
Bukhoro Jallodlarining O’z Aro Musohabalari (1922) and Qiz bola yohud Kholida (1924) in the 
Uzbek language.684 However, when the local press in Uzbekistan became an arena for fierce 
debate between Tajik and Uzbek nationalists on issues of national language, identity, 
territoriality, and history, Aini stood in the defence of the Tajik language. Presumably, he was 
not ready to choose between the languages, because he continued to create in the Uzbek 
language in the late 1920s and early 1930s. For example, his essay, Qulbobo yoki ikki ozod (1928), 
as well as its novel version Qullar (1934), were both written in Uzbek.685 Aini himself has 
translated all his works written in the Tajik language into Uzbek, except for two – Dokhunda and 
Mukhtasari tarjimai kholi khudam.686 Nevertheless, discussions in the press about language and 
identity became increasingly offensive and chauvinistic, and Aini was dragged into them. In 1928 
Abduqodir Muhiddinov wrote the following passage: 
Uzbeks, Kyrgyzs, Kazakhs, Turkmens, and other ethnic groups, which belong 
to the Mongol race, but are viewed nowadays as separate nations, are indeed 
the branches of one nation. The Tajik-speaker people of Bukhara are, in fact, 
also Turks, who under the influence of the literature and culture of Iran, have 
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lost their own language and nationality. We need to make them Turks again, 
and create one big Turkic nation, and establish one great Turkic state.687   
In response to this an article by Abbos Aliev stated that: 
The government of the Emirate [of Bukhara] knew well that the majority of 
the population of the country, especially of Bukhara city, were Tajiks. The 
Manghit Emirs knew that the Persians [pors’ho] had long fought against the 
Turks and Arabs and shed their blood in defence of the independence of their 
languages and literature. Therefore, the government of Emir would use the 
local language – the Tajik language – so that the local population did not 
alienate and attack them; the government adopted Tajik as a state language 
in order to establish good ties with the people.688 
Aini took part in these debates. He stated, in defence of the Tajik language: 
If “some scholars” believe that the Persian language is simple and convenient, 
then the Tajik language, which developed throughout the millennia, formed 
by whole generations, is in practice simple, sounds musical and rich in the 
shades of colours. Yes, it is true that sometimes we used Iranian-Turkish 
words. It means that we seldom visit the mountainous villages and do not 
bother ourselves to learn the truly national Tajik language, and often in the 
editorial boards and publishing houses we have recourse to expressions 
borrowed from neighbours. Now, everything is up to the writers and linguists. 
Their efforts should make the Tajik language wonderful, resonant, and 
melodious. We have to struggle for the cleanness of our language and the self-
sustainability of our literature. If we look at the neighbouring Iranian 
language, we can see that Iranian writers have the same tasks pending; 
making it closer to the primeval language of people and cleaning it from the 
foreign words. Working on the language’s expressions and phrases is 
necessary. That will be a simple Persian language, which is spiritually closer to 
the Tajik language.689 
Later in the same media statement Aini wrote that:  
If we take a keen interest in the Persian language and forget our own, then 
we will leave the populations of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Tajiks) illiterate. It 
is not a secret that the people, despite how we write, will continue speaking 
and writing in their own native language, and our efforts will be not only vain 
but also harmful for our literature. An artificial intervention into the 
development process of the tongue cannot lead to positive results. On the 
contrary, only learning and following the principles of the development of the 
language will bring our literature closer to the people and will make it the 
property and treasure of the people. If we artificially infuse unintelligible 
words of Arabic and Turkish origin, we will look like a person that keeps his 
family hungry and makes donations in the street. 690 
A dominant narrative in Soviet and post-Soviet Tajikistan is that Aini won the debate with the 
Uzbek/pan-Turkists by writing his Namunai Adabiioti Tojik (The Specimen of Tajik Literature), 
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which proved that Tajiks have centuries-old literary traditions and that their language is richer 
and more powerful than many pan-Turkists/Uzbeks assumed. The book is a collection of the 
names and characteristics of the exemplary works of more than 400 poets who wrote in the 
Tajik-Persian language.691 The first part of the book includes information about 80 poets;692 the 
second part covers 132 poets,693 and the last part mentions 200 poets.694 It is a compilation of 
“the best examples of what the nation has preserved during its thousands of years of 
development.”695 Aini believed that by writing this book he shut the mouths of the anti-Tajik 
provocateurs: 
In its times this work has played a major role for the benefit of the nationalities 
policy of the party. Because, back then the pan-Turkists used to sow 
provocations against the national territorial delimitation and viewed this 
nationalities policy of the Party as an attempt to “divide Turks.” Whereas, 
regarding the establishment of the Soviet Tajik Republic, they were more 
provocative and would say that ‘There is no a nation called Tajiks in Central 
Asia; they are all Uzbeks, that under the influence of Iran and the madrasa, 
lost their native language.’ This work, i.e., Namunai Adabiioti Tojik, with its 
historical facts tore the curtain off those provocations and put the seal of 
silence to the mouths of the provocateurs.696 
Aini narrowly avoided reprisal from the Soviet government for this publication, though. The 
reason was a poem included in the book that was written by Rudaki, a Tajik poet. The poem 
hailed the Samanid Emir of Bukhara.697 Aini believed that the government of Uzbekistan 
organized a campaign against his book. According to him, “in Uzbekistan after the speech of 
[Akmal] Ikromov in the Party plenum they [i.e., the Uzbek officials] demanded the banning of 
the book.”698 As criticism of the book grew, Nikolai Bukharin, one of the Communist leaders in 
Moscow, requested the copies of the book be recalled from the shelves of bookstores for being 
“harmful.”699 Aini believed that it was the Uzbek government who organized the ban. In his 
words, “through their personnel in the Tajikistan Publishing House, they banned it in 1930 and 
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condemned this valuable book to be recycled like waste.”700 Tajik scholars viewed this as an 
attack by pan-Turkic Jadids against the Tajik nation’s language and culture.701  
Aini wrote Namunai adabiioti Tojik upon the request of the Tajik RevCom.702 As was discussed 
above, Aini himself acknowledged that the government of the newly established Tajik ASSR 
requested him to take over this task and he “accepted it.”703 Aini’s close connections with the 
Tajik ASSR, especially with Shirinsho Shotemur, who was in Samarkand as the Representative of 
the Tajik govrnment in Uzbekistan, is well-documented. For instance, Shotemur wrote a letter 
in July 1935 to the government of Tajikistan requesting financial support for Aini when the latter 
was ill.704 Reportedly, Aini saw a draft of Shotemur’s famous 1926 letter.705 
In Tajikistan, the book is hailed as a weighty argument against the Uzbek nationalists: 
[Namunai Adabiioti Tojik] includes the best examples of poetry, starting from 
Rudaki up until the 20th century [sic]. The Jadids/pan-Turkists ignored the 
history of the Tajik nation and [thus] denigrated the rights of the Tajiks to be 
counted as a nation. With this anthology, Sadriddin Aini proved the existence 
of the Tajik nation, its history, and its right to have its own republic.706  
Aini provided complete and reliable information about the centuries-old literary tradition of 
Bukhara. Qoraev and Vohidov believe that no one had ever done this before Aini.707 According 
to Lahuti, “to find out a certain manuscript of a Tajik poet, Aini had to roam in the streets of 
Bukhara for many days, going from one house to another, until he finally found it.”708 It is 
believed that thanks to this book, the Tajik people were able to become familiar with their 
literary heritage.709 Abdusalom Dehoti, a Soviet Tajik poet, goes as far as to state that people in 
Tajikistan were not aware of the word “literature” [adabiiot] before Aini’s Namunai Adabiioti 
Tojik was published. They “used to divide everything written into two categories: first, prose, 
and all the rest was either known as ghazal or poetry.”710 
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2.2. Aini as a Reformer of the Tajik Language 
Sadriddin Aini, similarly to Dante Alighieri, who created a “Standard Italian” based on his native 
Tuscan language,711 founded a standardized Tajik language by successfully integrating traditional 
written Tajik with elements of spoken Tajik in Bukhara. This contribution of Aini to the formation 
of Tajik identity cannot be overestimated. A shared and commonly understood language is “a 
powerful instrument for promoting internal cohesion and providing an ethnic or national 
identity. It contributes to values, identity, and a sense of peoplehood.”712 The more standardized 
the language is, the more potent it is in its function of “imagining” the nation. “As the standard 
emerges, the myth arises that it is the one, true, original form of the language – the language 
proper. All the other dialects, formerly on a par with it, are now taken to be variants of the 
standard, regional ways of using it, or decadent misuses.”713 “Standardization is more easily 
achieved in writing than in the speech.”714 This passage of Kamusella’s succinctly summarizes 
the importance of the written language: 
[The written form of language] detaches language from the human agent and 
allows preserving and transferring messages as objects. In this manner, the 
previously limited face-to-face situation in communication can be broadened 
to involve larger groups of people, who will never meet most of their fellow-
nationals. As a consequence, written language became the principal tool for 
creating national cohesion.715 
Aini’s literary works are known for fulfilling exactly the same function for the Tajik nation. What 
makes Aini’s prose valuable to Tajik readers is the fluency and accessibility of the language used. 
Before Aini, Tajik literature was dominated by poetry, as a result of which the literary Tajik 
language consisted of elements (fluid sentence structures, vocabulary rich in foreign and archaic 
words) that made it suitable and creative enough for poems. For these reasons, the literary 
language was seen as superior to the ordinary, spoken language. In her afterword to the Russian 
translation of Aini’s memories, Rosenfeld masterfully depicted the features of the Tajik 
language:  
The prosaic writers used to automatically utilise linguistic and stylistic means 
borrowed from the arsenal of the poetry, without considering the 
characteristics of the narrative form. It explains the extraordinary complexity 
of the Tajik and Persian languages and their inappropriate obstruction with 
the archaic lexicon and Arabisms. Many prosaic works of the XIX and early XX 
centuries, which get published nowadays, can hardly be understood by a 
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contemporary Tajik reader, thus are usually annotated with the lexicographic 
commentaries.716  
Along with introducing the realist genre to Tajik prose, Aini recalibrated the Tajik language so 
that it met the requirements of realist prose. This meant the incorporation of significant 
elements of the spoken language into the literary language, which Aini did impressively well. 717 
The dialect that Aini relied on was the spoken language of his community in Bukhara, whereas 
the literary language that he utilized was the Tajik language that was deemed the literary Tajik 
language of the Samanid period. 718  It is claimed that the Tajik language of the Samanid Empire 
was comprehensible for ordinary people and had a fluid sentence structure.719 Therefore, some 
characters in Aini’s writings “speak” in the literary Tajik language rather than in their local 
vernacular, even though most of the characters in his works are the people of Bukhara.720  
As one Soviet Tajik scholar put it, Aini “could differentiate the positive aspects of the everyday 
spoken language (slang) and the language of the past periods from their negativities, and as a 
result, could masterfully employ the positive dimensions of the classic language and the patois 
of the Tajiks.”721 In this regard, Aini “invented” a qualitatively new literary Tajik language, which 
could be observed already in his Odina. The fluency and simplicity of the language in Aini’s first 
Tajik novel, Odina, impressed Tajik readers and encouraged young Tajik writers. Sotim 
Ulughzoda, a Tajik Soviet writer, received the following impression from the novel: 
When I started reading it, it immediately absorbed me; its language was 
simply fascinating. I have never heard or read such wonderful words. They are 
so good, beautiful and fluent that it is as if you are listening to pleasant music! 
It seems to me that there is nothing more beautiful and pleasant than the 
Tajik language.722 
Aini had a personal passion for the reformation of the Tajik language and could get 
overwhelmingly emotional during discussions of reforming the Tajik language. Braginskiǐ 
provided two episodes from Aini’s life confirming how sensitive Aini was to language reform. In 
one instance, Aini is remembered to have said in a conference in Tashkent in 1928, devoted to 
the new Tajik alphabet, that he could not be calm when discussing such things. He further 
apologized for being sharp in his statements and for looking as if he were going to engage in a 
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physical fight.723 Another example is Braginskiǐ’s own communication with Aini, during which 
Aini got angry about Braginskiǐ’s proposal to reform of the isaphet –ro by replacing it with –ia in 
the Tajik language (the former construction is usually used in written poetic Tajik language, 
whereas the latter belongs to the local slang in Bukhara).724 Though Aini did not always favour 
the radical reforms, he could himself easily use a particular word from the spoken language of 
Tajiks of Bukhara, which looked like a new word for the most people in Tajikistan. It gave some 
scholars reason to argue that Aini had coined new Tajik words.725 Back in late 1970, a Soviet Tajik 
scholar argued that the elements of local languages in Aini’s writings are so plentiful and 
colourful that there was a necessity to create a dictionary listing them.726  
Overall, Aini was a dominant figure in the reformation of the Tajik language in the 1920s-1950s. 
He masterfully invented a qualitatively new Tajik literary language that is understandable to a 
lay reader. His solid education in Bukhara city allowed him to read the classic texts, while his 
provincial background was very useful in terms of interpreting them in simple terms. As an 
experienced educational reformist, Aini was in a position to understand that the classical texts 
were not accessible for ordinary people, including young students. In his literary works, Aini used 
a language that is as rich as the classic literary Tajik language in the way it carries meaning, but 
is also as fluent and straightforward as a daily, spoken language. For this, Aini has become known 
as the founder of the modern Tajik language. In the context of the Uzbek-Tajik standoff, Aini 
proved that the Tajik language was not merely a slang version the Persian language, but rather 
has along classic history and rich spoken slangs. Through the standardization of the language he 
also helped to establish a more effective “imagination” of the Tajik community. 
3. The Tajik nation and its oppressors in Aini’s writings 
3.1. An analysis of Aini’s literary works 
The main theme of Aini’s writings is the struggle for justice and change. This leitmotif was 
acceptable for the Soviet government as it fit into narratives about the struggle of classes. The 
characters in Aini’s prose are positive or negative depending on their relation to the revolution; 
anyone who opposed the revolution or did anything in the past that was not in line with the 
revolutionary ideology was a bad character, whereas those, who benefited from revolution and 
participated in it are by default positive personages.727 As a rule, a personage on the good side 
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of the fence was a representative of the Tajik nation. Braginskiǐ notes that “the themes of his 
novels are taken, as a rule, from the life of the Tajik people.”728 According to a Tajik scholar, 
“Aini’s best writings […] expressed the very essence of great changes in the life and self-
consciousness of the Tajik people that marched out of the feudal Middle Ages toward the bright 
path of socialism.”729 There is an argument that Aini was preoccupied with the fate of the Tajik 
nation before the revolution and, as his literary works kept emerging, Aini voiced his concerns 
more loudly:  
Aini’s creative works concentrate on the issues of the historical fate of his own 
nation. It has always been so, from the onset of his career as a writer. For 
instance, [we can take] Aini’s earlier, still naïve work called “Khonavodai 
khushbakht” or “Oilai Khushbakht” [Happy Household/Family] written in 
1916. Cannot one already feel in this work an anxiety for the fate of his 
nation? […] one can hear, as if the heart of the young writer beats alarmingly 
concerning the fate of his people: will they be literate or will they remain 
illiterate? This holy [sic] feeling of anxiety about the plight of the Tajik nation 
can be felt more in a mature, classic work of Aini such as “Yoddoshtho” 
[Memoirs]. […] In all his writings, one can hear his voice saying, “Where are 
you going, my nation?730 
The emotional narratives about the oppressions and atrocities that the Tajiks faced can be 
observed in Aini’s literary works. For instance, through the words of Odina, a positive character 
in an eponymous novel, Aini revealed the harsh conditions the Tajiks lived in:  
Brother! Poor Tajiks, whose bones rest in the dirty and stinky well, are the 
ones to blame [for their condition]? Their biggest guilt is ignorance and 
backwardness. They do not understand anything. Words like “faith” and 
“motherland” are sacred to them. It is unforgivable for workers. They 
preferred to die like sheep, ingratiatingly looking at the eyes of the 
murderer. It was the same in the past. However, with this challenge, it is 
time to see who our enemy is and who our friend is.731 
In essence, Aini’s writings are about the struggle of the oppressed Tajik people against the 
atrocities of the Manghit rulers. For instance, his Slaves depicts “how the Tajiks spent the last 
century in slavery and how they eradicated it to start a new, more deserving life”732  and 
culminates with the announcement of the Tajik Soviet Republic. 733 As Rosenfeld noted, the novel 
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is about “the struggle of the Tajik toilers against the oppressors.” 734 Therefore, the positive 
characters in Aini’s literary works are deemed to represent the best qualities of the Tajik nation:  
In the essays and novels of Aini, the positive and negative characters differ 
from one another in their deeds, views, social affiliation, and class. The 
representatives of the workers, despite all humiliations and difficulties, bear 
in themselves the best and progressive rudiments that the Tajik nation has 
accumulated. It is them – Odina, Gulbibi (from the essay “Odina”), Yodgor, 
Gulnor (“Dokhunda”), Ergash, Fotima (“Slaves”), Saidmurod, Ustoamak 
(“Memoirs”) – that are the true bearers of the best national characteristics. 
They are drawn by a soft and expressive brush and immediately deserve the 
sympathy of a reader. The representatives of the exploiter classes [sic], from 
Klych khalifa, Arbob Kamol to Kutbiia, represent inhumaneness, insidiousness, 
spiritual bankruptcy. The writer [Aini] did not spare bright colours when 
creating the images of the enemies. […] The personality of the heroes gets 
revealed in the extreme dramatic situations and collisions [between the 
positive and negative characters]. Through the disclosure of their moral 
image, the objective historical movement of the society, the destruction of 
the foundations of the feudal Bukharan Emirate gets exposed.735 
The oppressors of the Tajiks are either the Manghit monarchs of Bukhara or the officials, 
religious clerics and the wealthy that thrived under their rule. In Aini’s narration, the history of 
the Manghit rulers of Bukhara appears as, to use the words of a Tajik analyst, “a chain of 
uninterrupted dreadful villainy, and violation of the principles of goodness and humanity.”736 
For instance, Aini’s Jallodoni Bukhoro was about the “brutality of Emir and his officials.” 737 
Another work, Ta’rikhi Mukhtasari Harakati Inqilobi dar Bukhoro (Short History of Revolutionary 
Movement in Bukhara), was known as an “important and valuable source” concerning the 
history of late XIX and the early 20th century due to the facts within it regarding popular 
opposition to the atrocities of the Manghit rulers and the political and spiritual elite.738 In 
general, it is believed that Aini attempted to explain to readers that “bloodshed and moral 
decadence were the inherited sins of the Manghit dynasty.”739  
While in the Soviet period, Tajik versus Manghit narratives of Aini were mostly understood in 
terms of the struggle of the classes. In the post-Soviet times, thisMarxist explanation of history 
is replaced by a nationalist interpretation. In this regard, the Manghit dynasty of Bukhara 
appears in Tajik scholarly narratives synonymous with Uzbek oppression. Through his literary 
and analytical works, Aini has crystallized knowledge concerning the successful struggle of the 
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Tajiks against their brutal oppressors. Thus, he has created grounds for nationalistic 
interpretations.   
3.2. Aini the historian 
Along with facilitating the “imagination” of the Tajik nation through setting standards for a 
nationally acceptable and intelligible literary language via his writings, Aini laid the ground for 
another important aspect of Tajik national identity – national historiography. Aini was aware of 
the strategic importance of historiography; he argued that “history can have a meaning only 
when it becomes a weapon in the hands of people for a struggle to create a future.” 740 As will 
be discussed in the next chapter, it is Bobojon Ghafurov, who has dominated national 
historiography in Tajikistan. However, as Rahim Masov, a nationalist Tajik historian, puts it, the 
non-historians, who were the actual participants in socio-political events and the establishment 
of the Soviet regime, were on the forefront of the first period of the historiography of the Tajik 
nation.741 Without any exaggeration, Aini can be viewed as the single most important “non-
historian” from that period. His personal life and writings are known in Tajikistan as the primary 
sources of Tajik national history for the first two decades of 20th century. Because he has been 
a participant and a victim of political events of that period, his narratives are accepted as the 
ultimate truth. There are three main textual sources of “the truth”; first, Aini’s memoirs (i.e., 
Tarjimai Kholi Mukhtasari Khudam and Yoddoshtho); second, analytical, descriptive works (e.g., 
Ta’rikhi Inqilobi Fikri dar Bukhoro [The History of ideational revolution in Bukhara], Ta’rikhi 
amironi manghitiia Bukhoro [The History of Mangit Emirs of Bukhara] and Ta’rikhi Inqilobi 
Bukhoro [The history of revolution of Bukhara]); and third, Aini’s works of literary fiction. 
During the Soviet period Aini’s accounts of the history of the Emirate of Bukhara were viewed 
as unquestionably authentic sources of Tajik national history. One prominent Tajik historian, 
Zarif Rajabov, wrote a book reviewing the historiographic importance of Aini’s literary works.742 
Among the reasons for such claims is the belief that Aini lived through everything he tells to his 
readers. 743 To use the words of Rosenfeld, who translated Aini’s memoirs from Tajik into 
Russian, “what the writer himself lived through [and] observed in the fates of his fellow 
countrymen and contemporaries allowed him to create his literary works with profound 
content, fully corresponding to vital truth.”744 Drawing parallels between Aini’s life and that of 
the whole Tajik nation, Akobirov and Kharisov argue that “[i]ndeed the life of S. Aini and his 
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works are the life of the Tajik nation [sic], they represent an epoch in the development of the 
nation. One cannot be dealt with separately from another.”745 Mirzo Tursunzoda said the 
following about these links: 
It happens that the life of an entire nation, all stages of its development are 
incarnate in the life of one personality. The fate of Sadriddin Aini merrily 
combines all the phases of the struggle and development of his nation. Aini’s 
life path, stemming from the dark kingdom of ignorance and lawlessness, 
tightly intertwined with the life of its people, develops and reaches today’s 
bright, happy days.746 
Aini presented his works as “the truth”. Regarding the first version of his Jallodoni Bukhoro, 
published in the Uzbek language with the title of Bukhoro Jallodlarining O’z Aro Musohabalari, 
he said the following, “It is a true story, written about the catastrophes that took place in 
Bukhara in 1918”.747 Aini was confident that he was uniquely positioned to be able to describe 
Tajik society and the history of Bukhara better than anyone else. In the early 1930s, when one 
Russian literary practitioner asked Aini whether any of the young Tajik writers could have written 
Dokhunda, Aini replied that to be able to write it the young person first had to be punished with 
75 slashes from the Emir of Bukhara.748 On another occasion, Aini said the following: 
I am not in need of diagrams, statistics or numbers to be able to write about 
what the Soviet government did to this people and this country. It will suffice, 
merely, to write about my personal life within two thirty-year periods, and 
this account will be more persuasive than any statistics.749 
Nevertheless, Aini made plenty of errors in providing the correct dates of his own early 
publications.750 However, Aini had so an unstained reputation as a writer and the literary master 
that a Tajik author argued that “if there are one or two mistakes in the works of Aini, I guess, 
they have occurred because of editors and proof-readers.”751 According to another Tajik scholar: 
Much evidence could be brought to prove the authenticity of the “Memoirs” 
[of Aini], but there is no need to do so, for alive are those people, who were 
the eyewitnesses, if not of the events depicted [in the book], then of the 
whole order of life in the Emirate of Bukhara.752  
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Similarly, a Russian biographer of Aini states that “[t]he most important peculiarity of his 
“Memoirs” (“Yoddoshtho”) is their historical authenticity: the actions and events described in 
[his memoirs] are real facts; the people about whom the author writes are his contemporaries, 
whom he happened to meet in life.”753 While the “eyewitnesses” never challenged Aini’s role as 
a“true historian” of the Tajik nation, “a new generation of Tajik and Uzbek nationals grew up, 
who were brought up with an entirely different spirit, and for whom most of what [Aini] wrote 
in the “Memoirs”, was already incomprehensible.”754 For them, Aini’s narratives were nothing 
less than established knowledge and historical truth. For non-Tajik and non-Uzbek readers, Aini’s 
texts are the sources of introduction to previously unknown facts about social life in the Emirate 
of Bukhara.755 
Along with his literary works, Aini also authored some analytical-descriptive studies of the 
political and social history of Bukhara. In February 1918, Aini wrote a book titled Ta’rikhi Inqilobi 
Fikri dar Bukhoro (The History of the Ideational Revolution in Bukhara). A significantly edited 
version of this work was written in the Uzbek language in 1920-21, and given the title Bukhoro 
Inqilobi Ta’rikhi. As Aini himself remembered, the latter was the translation of the former, which 
was done upon the request of Yo’ldosh Po’latov, Minister of Education of Bukhara PSR.756 
Indeed, on 24 September 1920, the Ministry of Education of the Bukhara PSR established a 
special commission assigned with writing the history of the revolution in Bukhara. Aini was 
among the scholars who took over this task.757 On 16 November 1920, Aini visited Bukhara as a 
correspondent for Shula’i Inqilob. There, he met with the Minister of Education, Yo’ldosh 
Po’latov. It is assumed that Aini discussed the proposal to write his Bukhoro Inqilobi Ta’rikhi 
during this meeting.758 However, as is mentioned above, the publishing house in Bukhara 
refused to publish it. 
Analyzing the only available manuscript of this book in the Institute of Oriental Studies of the 
Academy of Science of Uzbekistan, Shimada and Tosheva found out that Aini started Bukhoro 
Inqilobi Ta’rikhi on 21 December, 1920, and finished on 23 March, 1921. They also discovered 
that all 8 chapters of Part 1, as well as Chapter 1 of Part 2, of the book were actually written as 
separate newspaper articles and published in the Mehnatkashlar Tovushi between 1 September 
1920 and 5 February 1921 under the rubric of “Bukhorodagi inqilobii harakatning qisqacha 
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ta’rikhi” (A Concise History of the Revolutionary Movement in Bukhara).759 Therefore, it can be 
stated that Aini started writing his Uzbek texts about revolutionary movements in Bukhara 
before the government of Bukhara requested him to do so. The book project that was offered 
by the government of Bukhara to Aini just coincidentally aligned with his plans, which meant 
that Aini’s own explanation of the situation was misinformation. As mentioned elsewhere in this 
chapter, Aini’s vision of the history of the reformist and revolutionary movements in Bukhara 
was not approved by the government in Bukhara; thus the book was not published in Bukhara. 
Only in 1926 was a heavily edited and censored Russian translation of it published in Moscow. 
This edition was later translated into the Tajik language and was used as a source of Tajik 
national history during the 1910s and 1920s. 
Another important work that established Aini’s reputation as an historian is Ta’rikhi amironi 
manghitiiai Bukhoro (The History of Manghit Emirs of Bukhara). As Soviet Tajik narratives put it, 
this work held the “key to understanding the history of the Emirate of Bukhara.”760 It was 
deemed to be nothing less than an “authentic annal of the Tajik nation.”761 Unlike Aini’s previous 
book, this one covered a relatively wide time span of the history of Bukhara, i.e., the period from 
mid-18th century till 1920. Also, unlike the previous book, it was an attempt at a scholarly work. 
Aini not only relied on his observations but also made reference to published sources about the 
monarchs and their rule.762 However, considering that the bulk of the book is devoted to the last 
two Emirs of Bukhara, most of the information is based on the author’s personal observations.763 
Last, but not least, Aini’s literary works were also viewed as a powerful depiction of historical 
processes. It is argued that his scholarly works have served as the “primary documental basis” 
for his literary works such as Odina, Dokhunda, Qori Ishkamba, as well as Yoddoshtho.764 In 
particular, his scholarly texts acting as “the documentary basis for his literary works” can be 
observed in the influence that Ta’rikhi amironi manghitiiai Bukhoro had on Aini’s famous novel, 
titled Qullar.765 Some Tajik scholars believe that Aini’s writings are “realist” (and he is praised as 
the founder of the realist genre) mainly because they are documentaries.766 For instance, 
Dokhunda is “an enormous historical canvas of the periods of the fall of the Emirate and the civil 
war in Tajikistan, the history of the formation of the personality [sic].”767 It also provides the 
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history of the earliest years of Soviet rule in Dushanbe city.768 In general, each literary work 
written by Aini covers a historically significant event or epoch in the life of the Tajik nation. As 
Akobirov and Kharisov stated, “the historians, critics, scholars, and specialists in the study of 
literature will keep referring to Aini’s writings as true annals of historical events during the 
periods of revolution and the civil war.”769  
4. Remembering Sadriddin Aini in Tajikistan: academic narratives and official rhetoric 
Official narratives in Soviet Tajikistan label Aini the founder of the realist genre in Tajik 
literature.770 He is also compared to the Russian poet Pushkin; “whatever Pushkin […] did for the 
Russian language has been done by Aini for the Tajik language.”771 The following argument 
summarizes predominant opinions about the important changes that Aini brought about in Tajik 
literature: “[Before Aini] Tajik literature was not familiar with the genre of the literary realistic 
prose. Poetry predominated for many centuries, just as in Persian literature. Prose was focused 
on scholarly works, travel diaries, historical chronicles, memoirs, business paperwork, personal 
correspondence.”772 The first work of prose authored by Aini is “Khonadoni khushbakht”, an 
essay contained within a school textbook.773 Aini’s first ever novel in Tajik language was Odina 
(1924). Parts of it first appeared in newspaper Ovozi Tojik and it was published as a book in 
1927.774  
Since then, Aini has written dozen of novels that establish him as a prominent writer not only in 
Tajikistan but also throughout the Soviet Union. By 1963 Aini’s books were published in the Tajik 
language in more than 600 thousand copies in 88 editions. The top ones were Yoddoshtho 
(116,000 copies), Odina (62,000 copies), Margi Sudkhur (60,000 copies), Maktabi Ko’hna (59,100 
copies), Dokhunda (55,000 copies), Jallodoni Bukhoro (48,000 copies), Ahmadi Devband (42,000 
copies), Ghulomon (37,275 copies), Yatim (22,000 copies).775 The number of copies was 
significant, considering that the population of Tajikistan as of 1959 was 2 million. Therefore, the 
ratio was roughly one book of Aini for every three citizens of Tajikistan. Aini’s fame as a writer 
went beyond Tajikistan. During the same period, 1.7 million copies of Aini’s works, published in 
72 different editions, were published in Russian language.776  
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Aini was hailed as the master who educated the next generation of Soviet Tajik writers and 
poets. For this accomplishment he is referred to nationally as Ustod Aini.777 Dozens of young 
Tajik writers and poets felt honoured to be his followers. As Akobirov and Kharisov put it, 
“almost all venerable and acknowledged contemporary writers of Tajikistan, such as Mirzo 
Tursunzoda, Sotim Ulughzoda, MirsaId Mirshakar, Jalol Ikromi, Rahim Jalil and others were 
students of the first Tajik academician, the first president of the Academy of Science of 
Tajikistan, Sadriddin Aini.”778 Aini is known as “the flagman of Tajik literature.”779 Aini used to 
maintain personal correspondence with almost all young Tajik writers and poets. In one such 
letter, addressed to Mirzo Tusunzoda, Aini suggested a comparison of his memoirs and literary 
works to see how personal observations could be converted into literary works by contributing 
to their “reality”. 780 Aini’s first Tajik novel, Odina, was so impressive and ground-breaking that 
it set standards for the first generation of Tajik writers.781 
Overall, Sadriddin Aini was known in Tajik SSR as a writer who raised Tajik literature to a new 
level by founding a qualitatively new genre and educating, both personally and through his 
works, a generation of Tajik writers who then took over his task. His emergence as a prominent 
Tajik writer has not been smooth and straightforward; Aini was earlier one of the leaders of the 
educational reform movement in Bukhara and later a journalist in Samarkand. Two sets of 
factors paved Aini’s way toward the engagement with the then newly established Tajik state; 
first, his ideational clash with the younger generation of reformists in Bukhara, who hijacked the 
reform movement and shifted it from its focus on education, and who later emerged as the 
political leaders of Bukhara and then Uzbekistan; second, the fierce debates in the media with 
Uzbek nationalists, who tended to ignore the decency of Tajik as a language and treated it as a 
relic of the Persian language. 
In post-Soviet Tajikistan references to the personality and achievements of Sadriddin Aini can 
often be seen in the public speeches given by the President of Tajikistan. The typical argument 
is that “it is ustod Aini, who, with his patriotic, enlightening articles […] gave a serious impulse 
to the awakening of the Tajik nation.”782 Aini is remembered as contributor to the independence 
of the nation; “when we look back on the history of our press, first of all, we recall the great 
services of ustod Sadriddin Aini, Hero of Tajikistan, rendered in the name of constructing the 
                                                          
777 The Tajik word ustod means teacher, master.  
778 Akobirov and Kharisov, Sadriddin Aini, 130-31. 
779 Iakubov, "Esteticheskaia kontseptsiia Sadriddina Aini," 58. 
780 Akobirov and Kharisov, Sadriddin Aini, 105-06. 
781 Ibid., 86. 
782 "Vystuplenie Ė.Rakhmona na torzhestvennom sobranii, posvi͡ashchënnom 100-letii͡u tadzhikskoǐ pechati," 
TopTJ.com, 10.03.2012 2012. 
121 
basis of our independent state.”783 However, some references to Aini tend to distort the real 
meaning of his sayings, which originally have communist connotations. For instance: 
In the conclusion of my address I would like to remember one more article of 
Master Sadriddin Aini. This article is called “Tajikistan is marching towards 
florescence.” Following the words of the master, I would like to say: yes, 
Tajikistan is prospering, the future of the independent Tajikistan is bright! We 
will certainly achieve our national and strategic goals in the name of 
development and progress of all spheres of life of the country, as well as 
increasing the standard and quality of life or our nation.784 
In remembering Aini’s role in the establishment of the Tajik press, the President of Tajikistan 
drew the following conclusions about Aini’s affection towards the motherland:  
Every reasonable person knows that Motherland is his mother, Motherland is 
his kinsfolk, Motherland is his honour and dignity, Motherland is everything 
that he has, his life! Therefore, every human being, who has not lost his 
humane qualities, loves his Motherland [as strongly] as his own mother [or] 
even more, defends and preserves it.785 
In one of its publications, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tajikistan depicted Aini among the 
people who founded the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Tajik SSR. According to this 
publication, Aini cared about Tajikistan’s foreign policy:  
the master cared about the fact that first of all the foreign relations of 
Tajikistan are not only a very honourable task, but also a difficult and highly 
responsible one. We think that this generation of diplomats should be proud 
of such history when such people are standing in the riverhead of the foreign 
policy of Tajikistan.786  
5. Conclusion 
Aini has convincingly demonstrated that the claims of the Uzbek nationalists regarding the 
unsuitability of Tajik to serve as a national language were groundless. He has made significant 
contributions by defending the Tajik side in debates in the media and through his publications. 
He collected specimens of Tajik literature in order to produce a stupendously important 
anthology, which demonstrated that the Tajik language is backed by a rich and ancient literary 
backdrop, thus reinforcing the literary heritage of the Tajiks. The official narratives of national 
identity depict him as a person who has spent all imaginable effort trying to establish the 
linguistic and literary foundations of Tajik identity. In post-Soviet Tajikistan, though, he is 
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remembered as the person, who strengthened Tajik national identity by struggling against Uzbek 
nationalists. 
Furthermore, Aini’s historical accounts about events in the 1920s are “true” and valuable 
sources that provide evidence of the oppressions and atrocities that the Tajiks lived through 
from the collapse of the Samanid state until they regained national statehood in 1929. Although 
the national historiography of Tajikistan has taken these arguments to new horizons, Aini’s 
accounts remain important as “first-hand” information about both state and society in the 
1920s. Overall, Aini played a pivotal role in the formation of Soviet Tajik identity, and therefore 
his image is being used in Tajikistan to construct post-Soviet Tajik national identity. For all the 
reasons mentioned above, Aini’s figure is central to the politics of national identity in post-Soviet 
Tajikistan.  
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Chapter 5. Central Asia as the Homeland of Tajiks: The Historiographic 
Foundations of Tajik Nationalism and the Role of Bobojon Ghafurov 
1. Bobojon Ghafurov and Tajik national historiography 
1.1. Ghafurov – a Soviet anti-religious propagandist (1926-1941) 
During the earliest stages of his career, Ghafurov worked for propaganda and media 
organizations. His first job was as a “the Cultural Propagandist” at the Komsomol787 organization 
of the Khujand region in 1926. He attempted a short-lived career as a lawyer at the People’s 
Commissariat788 of Justice for the Tajik Republic after attending Law Courses organized in 
Samarkand in 1928-29. In 1930, he was appointed Deputy Editor789 of Qizil Tojikiston, an Uzbek-
language newspaper in Tajikistan. From 1931 till 1935 Ghafurov studied at the Communist 
Institute of Journalism in Moscow. Following his studies, he returned to Qizil Tojikiston to 
become the Editor-in-Chief. In 1936 he joined the CC of the CP of Tajikistan, where he spent the 
next twenty years of his career. He started as an Instructor (1936-37) and Chair (1937-39) of the 
Division of Press and Publishing Houses. During 1939-41 he was a Deputy Chair of the Division 
of Propaganda. This was followed by a stint as a Chair of the Sector of Culture and Education.  
As a journalist and party propagandist, Ghafurov wrote a range of newspaper articles and 
brochures related to agitation and mobilization for the communist cause, as well as focusing on 
anti-feudal and anti-religious propaganda, including calls for women to remove their veils.790 
Mostly, his articles attempted to demystify popular prejudices and beliefs in Tajik society, and 
link existing problems in daily life to dominant religious and feudal norms. As an analysis of the 
thematic focus of his publications shows, around this time he developed an interest in the Ismaili 
sect of Islam.791 Led by this interest, in September 1940 Ghafurov joined the Institute of History 
of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, where he wrote his kandidat nauk dissertation on “The 
History of the Ismaili sect from the early 19th century to the First World War,” and received his 
degree in April 1941. The value of this work, at that time, did not reside in its contribution to 
Islamic or Historical studies, but rather in its relevance to anti-religious propaganda work. 
Similarly, Ghafurov’s monograph titled Padenie Bukharskogo Emirata, a historical account of the 
then-recent revolution in Bukhara, which was written by him in 1940 in co-authorship with N. 
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Prokhorov, was not  research based on history per se; it was, rather, related to the propaganda 
that had driven revolutionary changes following the fall of the Emir. Overall, despite writing 
frequently on historical topics, Ghafurov was still a party propagandist rather than an emerging 
historian. 
1.2. “Breaking the silence”: the Tajik-Uzbek brawl over school history textbooks in 
Tajikistan (1936) 
As a party official, Ghafurov was dragged into ongoing debates held by the Tajik government 
about how best to write the socialist history of the Tajik nation. In 1935, when he returned to 
Tajikistan from his studies in Moscow, the CC of the Tajik CP and the Tajik Branch of the Academy 
of Sciences of the USSR were brainstorming the ideas about prospective history textbooks for 
schools. To discuss a range of proposals, in June 1936, the CC of the Tajik CP initiated a meeting 
of orientalists and historians from Stalinabad, Moscow, and Tashkent.792 Their aim was to “work 
out the history of the Tajik nation from the ancient times to the October Revolution.”793 One of 
the greatly debated textbook projects was proposed by Vasilii Yarotskii, the rector of the Central 
Asian State University in Tashkent, who headed the delegation of scholars from Uzbekistan in 
that meeting. Among other things, he proposed to limit the geography of Tajik history within 
the state borders of Tajikistan. Even though some scholars present at the meeting questioned 
the ideological appropriateness, there were not any substantial counter-argument by the Tajik 
scholars.794 It was only Ghafurov, according to discourses in post-Soviet Tajikistan, who saw the 
real problems with that project.  
Thus, “getting acquainted with the documents of the meeting, Bobojon Ghafurov could not have 
missed this point.” 795 Referring to “numerous remarks on the margins of the conference 
materials and corrections he made,” Pirumshoev, a Tajik historian, argues that Ghafurov 
“expressed his negative attitude toward the prejudiced position of Yarotskii and his 
associates.”796 As evidence, Pirumshoev refers to the “correction” of the word “Tajikistan” to 
the “Tajik people,” as well as to a comment by Ghafurov on the margins of the document that 
reads, “such a completely incorrect and politically harmful concept is present in the works of 
many contemporary historians.”797 It was, what one Tajik journalist called, “breaking the 
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silence.”798 Ghafurov was not satisfied by mere corrections and notes in the margins and even 
went as far as writing a report addressed to the Minister of Education of the Tajik SSR.799 The 
document called the Ministry to reject Yarotskii’s proposal.800 The report, among other things, 
made a proposal to “write the history of Tajik nation, not the [history of the] territory where it 
has currently established its state entity on.”801 To fulfill this task, the author of the document 
proposed the creation of a history section in the Tajik Branch of the Academy of Science of the 
USSR and invited scholars from all over the Soviet Union to work there. This particular case 
encouraged Ghafurov to take the lead in creating the history textbooks of the Tajik nation.802  
1.3. Wartime propaganda and its implications for Tajik historiography 
1.3.1. Ghafurov’s texts on the history of the heroic struggle of the Tajiks against 
the occupants 
In 1941, Ghafurov became the chief propagandist in Tajikistan; he was appointed Secretary of 
the CC of the Tajik CP and made responsible for curating propaganda and agitation. This post 
provided him with the necessary power to follow up on his plans about history books. 
Simultaneously, from 1942 till 1954, Ghafurov served as the Chair of the History Division of the 
Institute of History, Language and Literature of Tajikistan.803 Moreover, under his leadership, the 
CC of the Tajik CP and the Council of People’s Commissars804 adopted a plan to publish a two-
volume History of Tajiks and Tajikistan within 1941-1943. 805 Ghafurov personally wrote letters 
to some leading scholars, inviting them to Tajikistan to get involved in this project.806 As will be 
shown later in this chapter, Ghafurov eventually gathered a group of prominent scholars to write 
a multi-volume history of Tajikistan. However, that did not happen in 1941-43 as proposed 
originally, but rather took place in 1963-65, as the Second World War changed Ghafurov’s plans. 
Furthermore, the history textbook that was debated in 1936 was only prepared in 1959.807  
The Second World War served as the first opportunity for Ghafurov to unite his propaganda 
duties with his emerging interest in history. During the war, the Soviet government called upon 
the practitioners of culture and art to narrate the heroic deeds of historical figures from Russia’s 
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past and from the past of other nations within the Soviet Union. Following the tide of works 
aiming at raising the “heroic spirit” of the Soviet nation, Ghafurov together with N. Prokhorov, 
wrote a propaganda work titled Bor’ba Tadjikskogo Naroda Protiv Chuzhezemnykh 
Zakhvatchikov i Porabotiteley (Struggles of the Tajik People against Foreign Invaders and 
Enslavers) in 1942. This work was published as a chapter in an edited book. Being a Chief 
Propaganda and Agitation Official in Tajikistan, Ghafurov called his subordinates to follow his 
example: 
The current task is to concentrate the attention of our agitators to the nodal 
issues of mass agitation work. First of all, in a bright and figurative way, we 
have to tell about the heroic deeds of the Red Army and its brave fighters, 
heroes of the rear, best Stakhanovites, great patriots of our Motherland that 
are helping the Red Army selflessly and closely. The image of great 
predecessors of the Russian nation is encouraging all brotherly people of our 
country, including the Tajiks, to fight with the fascist barbarians mercilessly. 
The Tajik nation has a rich history full of endless struggle against the foreign 
occupants and enslavers. The names of the glorious heroes of that struggle are 
alive in the memories of the people. These examples from the past of the Tajik 
nation should be used for the revolutionary and patriotic education of the 
masses.808 [emphasis added] 
The authors decided to expand the chapter into a monograph. After two- years of work, a book 
titled Tadzhikskii Narod v Bor’be za Svobodu i Nezavisimost’ Svoei Rodiny: Ocherki iz Istorii 
Tadzhikov i Tadzhikistana (The Struggle of the Tajik Nation for Freedom and Independence of the 
Motherland: Essays from the History of the Tajiks and Tajikistan) was published. Thematically, 
the publication was timely. The monograph was one of the many works published throughout 
the Soviet Union that aimed to raise the spirits of soldiers on the frontlines and workers in the 
rear. However, along with propaganda concerning heroism, the book makes two clear 
arguments; first, the earliest inhabitants of Central Asia were the direct ancestors of the Tajiks, 
which made the Tajiks the indigenous population of the region, and all other nations late-comers 
and occupants; second, territorially, the history of the Tajik people is not limited to Tajikistan, 
as the Tajik people and their historical states have historically been spread all over Central Asia. 
As will be shown elsewhere in this chapter, the coverage of such a narrow geographic and 
temporal span within the work triggered criticism by scholars from Uzbekistan.  
As Pirumshoev observes, “though this book can hardly be called a complete analysis when 
examined against modern-day measures, it is the first scholarly achievement in [Tajik] 
historiography that defined the further direction of historical science in [Tajikistan]” and “served 
as the trial version forfuture fundamental works of Bobojon Ghafurov.”809 Similarly, I. Braginskiǐ 
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argues that “the 22 chapters of the book contained the core of future research.”810 Closer to the 
end of the war, pre-war enthusiasm about writing the history of Tajik nation revived; in his 
speech, during one of the meetings at Tajik Branch of the Academy of Science of the USSR in 
1944, Ghafurov called for serious scholarly attention to be paid to writing the history of the Tajik 
nation.811 
1.3.2. From propaganda to academia: the emergence of Ghafurov as an historian 
Long before he succeeded in gathering a group of scholars to write the history of Tajikistan, 
Ghafurov published his first scholarly research on the Tajik nation. This occurred in 1947 and the 
work was titled Ta’rikhi Mukhtasari Khalqi Tojik (Jildi 1) [A Concise History of the Tajik Nation 
(Volume 1)].812 As one Tajik scholar noted, “as a classical sample, it became a reference point 
[orientir] for all fundamental and composite research of scholars from neighboring states in the 
region.”813 According to the Tajik President, President Rahmon, this work was “the first broadly 
researched work concerning the history of one of the most ancient nations in the world – the 
Tajik nation” and “has become a catalyst in the process of developing a national self-
consciousness and reviving national pride.”814 Furthermore, Rahmon claims that this book 
helped Tajik readers to find the answers to such questions as, “Who were our ancestors? Where 
did they come from? What kind of states did they establish and how did they rule there?”815 He 
further argues that, considering that the book was written when “the idea of farfetched 
internationalism and thoughts about national self-determination were not tolerated, this kind 
of fundamental research by the first person of the republic [i.e., Ghafurov] was by itself an act 
of heroism.”816 The Tajik President further claims that the book has been a good source of 
guidance for him. He states that he learned from the examples of real statesmanship imparted 
by the text, and that his “heart was in pain” due to the self-destructive atrocities committed by 
bad statesmen described in the book.817  
In 1949, a significantly revised and expanded version of the book was published in Russian. A 
Russian scholar, in his review of this Russian edition noted that the “[p]atriotism of the author, 
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his deep love for his nation, his pride for its glorious past, run as a red thread through the book; 
such an emotional inclinationundoubtedly, is transcendent enough to connect with a Soviet 
reader, who might be less familiar with, or completely unfamiliar with, the Tajik nation. It rouses 
in the Soviet readerthe same feelings and moods experienced by the Tajiks.”818 The verdict was 
that this was “the first attempt to create the history of Tajiks.”819 As a result of the publication 
of the second Russian edition of this book, Ghafurov received his doctoral degree from the 
Institute of History of Material Culture, Academy of Science of the USSR in 1953. The success of 
the book encouraged Ghafurov to write a second volume. In order to do that, he decided to step 
down as a government official. His resignation letter read as follows: 
As you know, my main field of specialty is history. In 1949, I prepared the first 
part of the book “A History of the Tajik Nation.” Over the past several years, I 
have gathered data for the second volume of the history of Tajikistan (the 
Soviet period). The appearance of the Soviet era history of Tajikistan is 
important not only for the Soviet reader but also for the all democratic 
countries [sic]. I came to the decision that being in the post of Secretary [of 
the CC of the CP of Tajikistan] I cannot finish work on the second volume of 
this book. Therefore, I would like to ask you to allow me to work on writing 
the Soviet period history of the Tajik nation until the end of 1953. [Post-
scriptum.] Obnosov, the Second Secretary, can be an acting First Secretary of 
the CC of CP of Tajikistan. In the case of my dismissal from my position, I think 
J. Rasulov, the Chair of the Council of Ministers of Tajikistan can be appointed 
as the First Secretary. To his post, N. Dodkhudoev, Chair of Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet of Tajik SSR, can be appointed.820  
This letter did not result in his resignation. Thus, the second volume of the book was never 
written. Seven years later, Ghafurov was dismissed, but for an entirely different reason. In 1956, 
as a part of his campaign against the “cult of Stalin,” N. Khrushchev, a Soviet leader, removed 
Ghafurov from the position of First Secretary of the Tajik CP.821 Ghafurov was appointed as 
Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Science of the USSR. Under 
Ghafurov’s leadership, the Institute of Oriental Studies acquired an international reputation as 
one of the most prominent centers of Oriental studies. His period of directorship is known as 
“Ghafurov’s epoch” at the Institute.822 As a place of cadre preparation and international 
cooperation, the Institute became a valuable asset for the USSR’s foreign policy in the non-
western world.  
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Ghafurov made a significant contribution in this regard, but at the same time, he never stopped 
pursuing his academic interest in the history of Tajiks. For instance, right after his appointment, 
Ghafurov successfully organized the participation of a large Soviet delegation in the 26th 
International Congress of Orientalists, which took place in Munich in 1957. This is known as one 
of the most significant milestones in the international prominence of Soviet Oriental studies. 
The paper Ghafurov presented as head of the Soviet delegation was titled, “The Rise and Fall of 
the Samanids.”823  Ghafurov did not use his new position to write the second volume of the book, 
for which he was willing to resign earlier. Nevertheless, as a Head of the Institute, he successfully 
gathered some well-established scholars to write the long-awaited multi-volume history of the 
Tajik nation. 
A three-volume Istoriia Tajikskogo Naroda [The History of Tajik Nation] was published in 1963-
1965.824 As one of the co-editors stated, it was detailed and strictly scholarly work on the history 
of Tajikistan and other nations within the region and was purely designed for the use of 
scholars.825 The books were “prepared under the initiative and with the direct involvement of 
Bobojon Ghafurov.”826 A Tajik scholar confirms that they were written by a group of scholars 
from Moscow, Leningrad and Dushanbe “under the initiative and direct participation of 
academician B. G. Ghafurov.”827 The fact that the project was based on Ghafurov’s ideas was 
confirmed by one of the editors and contributors.828  For this work, Ghafurov received a state 
award.829 This publication was an important milestone in writing Tajik national history, for it was 
the first collective research and publication of its kind.  
1.3.3. Ghafurov’s magnum opus 
In 1972, Ghafurov’s most famous book – Tadzhiki: Drevneishaia, Drevniaia i Srednevekovaia 
Istoriia [Tajiks: Antic, Ancient, and Medieval History] – was published in Russian. This book, as 
one Tajik historian believes, became “Bobojon Ghafurov’s business card in scholarly circles at an 
international level.”830 Tajikistan’s President Rahmon believes that this publication “put 
Ghafurov permanently in the rank of national geniuses.”831 Interestingly, in Tadzhiki, the author 
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does not make any arguments that have not appeared in his previous works. In fact, Tadzhiki is 
simply a significantly improved version of the latest edition of Ghafurov’s Istoriiia Tadzhikskogo 
Naroda v Kratkom Izlozhenii, published in 1955. B. Litvinskii, a Soviet scholar, who claims to have 
been involved in writing Tadzhiki¸ and whom Ghafurov acknowledged as the editor of the work, 
argues that Ghafurov once suggested that he improve Istoriia tadzhikskogo naroda v kratkom 
islozhenii by including the latest archaeological and numismatic discoveries.832 Litvinskii’s efforts 
to improve the work, so he claims, resulted in a qualitatively new book – Tadzhiki.833 The biggest 
and most easily visible difference between the two works is that Tadzhiki is written in a relatively 
more academic style and has many more references to original sources.  
The title of the book is misleading in the sense that the book does not narrowly focus on the 
Tajiks. Instead, Tadzhiki has lengthy narrations about the origins of the Uzbeks and their place 
in the history of Central Asia. This has caused some scholars to argue that Tadzhiki has become 
“the basis of historical-cultural, ethnologic, economic research of not only the Tajiks but also of 
other nations of Central Asia.”834 However, in fact, this book, similarly to the previous ones, 
represents Central Asia as the Tajik homeland. No matter how accommodating this work is in 
dealing with other ethnic groups within Central Asia, the hidden message was that they were 
latecomers as compared to the indigenous Tajiks. Even though Ghafurov makes this point in his 
previous works, Tadzhiki does so in a bolder, less dogmatic, and more convincing manner. 
According to President Rahmon, the book is powerful and impartial: 
In this way, academician Bobojon Ghafurov has devoted his life to researching 
and writing the history of his nation, and fortunately, has achieved his aim. By 
publishing his great masterpiece Tojikon [the title of the Tajik translation of 
the book] he has gladdened not only the Tajik nation but also the entire world 
of Persian speakers, fans, and admirers of Eastern civilization as well as the 
people of Central Asia with a source of valuable power [sic]. I have to 
emphasize that in writing this work, scholar Bobojon Ghafurov, to use master 
Aini’s words, has followed one of the ‘most important principles of 
historiography – impartial discussion.’835 
The importance of this work for the Tajik nation cannot be overstated. It “not only gave the 
Tajiks a wonderfully drawn picture of their history, but also showed other nations the role of the 
Tajiks in the history of humankind and the Tajik contribution to world civilization.”836  This book 
is the “passport” of Tajiks in “world civilization.”837 It is “a reference book for every Tajik.”838 One 
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Tajik scholar puts Tadzhiki on par with Avicenna’s writings.839 The following passage summarizes 
common beliefs among the Tajik intelligentsia about this book: 
Ask any citizen of our republic about which book they would like to own. You 
bet - the answer will be, “Tadzhiki.” A book that is interesting to everyone; for 
a historian, it is a reference book; for a person far from scholarship – a book 
on the life of a most ancient nation; for a Tajik, whether he is a scholar or a 
peasant – [an object of] pride.840 
“Tadzhiki” has truly given a serious impulse to the growth of the self-
knowledge and self-consciousness of our Tajik nation. It is for this work that 
Bobojon [Ghafurov] was awarded in his motherland with the title of Hero of 
Tajikistan. “Tadzhiki” is an immortal scholarly masterpiece created by the 
scholar as a result of 30 years of work. This work really is a reference book for 
every Tajik – it is as essential as air and water for the further development of 
the historical mentality of our nation.841  
Even though Ghafurov’s historical works serve the interests of the Tajik nation, there is an 
impression that rather than attempting to cultivate a feeling of national pride amongst the 
Tajiks, Ghafurov’s main concerns were to educate decision-makers in Moscow, win the 
argument against his colleagues from Uzbekistan, and secure the support of as many scholars 
from Moscow and Leningrad as possible. It is impossible to otherwise explain the fact that, in 
Tajikistan, Tadzhiki was not translated to the Tajik language for 13 years after its original 
publication in Russian in 1972. The Tajik translation of the book was published in only in 1985. 
It is interesting to note that the book was first translated into Tajik and published in Tehran in 
1983, followed by a Dari translation published in Kabul in 1984. It is also worth mentioning that 
before the Tajik version was released, the book was translated into Polish and Chinese.842 
Overall, this book was the best reflection of Ghafurov’s vision of Tajik national history. 
2. The Tajik “self” and the Uzbek “other” in Ghafurov’s Tadzhiki 
Compared to Ghafurov’s previously published books, Tajiki is relatively bolder in its claims about 
the ancientness of the Tajik nation and its differences from the Persian people. Moreover, the 
work goes to unprecedented lengths to contest the origins of the Uzbeks and their interactions 
with the Tajik population of Central Asia. While the author believes that he has done a favour to 
Uzbeks by acknowledging their role in the history of Central Asia, in fact, what he has done is 
draw the most rigid border possible between the Tajik “self” and Uzbek “other”.  
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2.1. Tajiks and their ancient ancestors 
Similarly to Ghafurov’s previous books, this one also did not provide any explanation for the 
origins of the Tajik ethnonym. He acknowledged that “Tajik” as an ethnonym has been used 
since early 11th century.843 However, he highlighted that there is no consensus about the origins 
of the term, which arguably could have been used in a variety of different forms earlier.844 
However, what was certain for the author is that formation of the Tajiks as an ethnic group was 
completed during the Samanid period.845 The evidence for this, according to Ghafurov, is the 
fact that most of the classics of Tajik literature were created during and after the period of 
Samanid rule.846 Nevertheless, Ghafurov warned that one should not infer that the Tajiks 
emerged a couple of centuries before Arab conquest of Central Asia 847 nor should one assume 
that the Persian-Tajik language appeared in an empty space.    (Ghafurov, 2008)      848 Ghafurov 
rather tried, right from the onset of the book, to establish links between the Tajiks and the most 
ancient population of Central Asia.  
The book begins with the argument that already in the 7-6th centuries BC the Iranian people, 
including Sogdians, Bactrians, Margiani [marghiyoniho], Khorazmians, Parthians, [and] the tribes 
belonging to the Sakas and others have resided in Central Asia.849 According to Ghafurov, Avesta 
has enough evidence to prove that the Central Asian territory, namely, Sogd, Margiana, 
Khorazm, Arya, and others, was inhibited by Iranian tribes.850 Thus, languages such as Sogdian, 
Bactrian, Khorazmian, Khotani, and Saka were Eastern Iranian languages spoken only in this part 
of the world.851 Evidence of the Iranian languages’ dominance in Central Asia is the fact that, 
during the Arab invasion, the locally proliferated languages were Sogdian, Khorazmian, 
Ferganian, and Hephthalitian.852 As the modern-day offsprings of ancient Iranian languages, the 
author highlights Persian, Tajik, Kurdish, Baluch, Pushto, Ossetian, and Pamiri, all of which 
belong to the Iranian group of languages.853 Ultimately, the Iranian tribes such as the Bactrians, 
Sogdians, Khorazmians, Saka tribes, which lived in Central Asia in the 7-6th centuries BC, were 
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the direct ancestors of the Tajik people. To put it in Ghafurov’s words, “based on these peoples, 
especially Bactrians and Sogdians, the Tajik people emerged in the early medieval period.”854 
However, there is one major contradiction in Ghafurov’s theory. It is known that Tajik does not 
belong to the Eastern Iranian languages, however, the dead languages of Khorazmian, Sogdian, 
and Khotan-Sakas, and others, including the currently spoken Pamiri language, do. 855 “The 
modern-day Tajik language belongs to the Western Iranian languages.” 856 As a Western Iranian 
language, Tajik expanded form south-western Persia “towards the north and north-east, 
assimilating many elements from the languages of groups in the north-west.”857 Thus, by the 7-
8th centuries, this language, which Ghafurov calls zaboni Forsi or Farsiye-Dari was dominant in 
the territories surrounding current Turkmenistan,858 northern Afghanistan, southern Central 
Asia and the south of Tajikistan.859 In Bukhara and Samarkand, this language prevailed only in 
the 9-10th centuries, gradually replacing the Sogdian language.860 However, the influence of local 
Eastern Iranian languages resulted in the emergence of various Persian dialects in Central Asia 
that differ from the western Iranian Persian dialects in terms of phonetics and vocabulary.861 In 
places like Yaghnob, the Sogdian language has never been replaced by Western dialects.862 
Ghafurov’s book fails to explain how this language came from Persia to Central Asia. According 
to him, there is no scholarly explanation for the expansion of the Forsi to the mentioned region 
in order to replace local Eastern Iranian languages.863 He rather referred to two hypotheses, 
both of which exclude the possibility of the massive movement of a population from Persia to 
Central Asia. First, the Persian language might have come to the region relatively early, when 
the Manichean religion traveled to the area from Persia.864 Second, it might have been brought 
in by local converts from territories that had already been conquered by the Arabs, mainly, the 
Khorasanians (he notes that there is even a special term for those groups of people, mawali).865 
In any case, in Ghafurov’s theory, the Tajiks are not Iranians who might have come to Central 
Asia from Persia and spread the Persian language in the region by replacing previously dominant 
languages. 
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However, as far as the origins of the Western Iranian tribes are concerned, Ghafurov was sure 
that before appearing in Persia they resided in Central Asia and in the Black Sea region. One 
group of them settled in India, and another one moved to western Iran through Asia Minor in 
the mid-2nd millennia BC.866 Those tribes, according to him, were ancestors of the Persians and 
Medians,867 who replaced the non-Iranian tribes of western Iran such as Elamites, Luwians, 
Kassites, etc.868 In India, the Aryans from Central Asian replaced the people, who had resided 
there before and built the renowned Harappa culture.869 To summarize Ghafurov’s theory, first, 
approximately in the 15th century BC the Iranian people expanded from Central Asia to Persia. 
Those Iranians who left Central Asia eventually became Western Iranians, while those who 
stayed in Central Asia were known as Eastern Iranians. Second, in the 7-10th century AD the 
language of the Western Iranians travelled back to Central Asia to completely replace the 
languages of the Eastern Iranians, however, the Western Iranians did not travel themselves. 
Third, the Tajiks are the descendants of the Eastern Iranians, who adopted the language of the 
Western Iranians. 
2.2. Turkic tribes 
According to Ghafurov, the first arrival of the Turkic tribes in Central Asia took place in the 
middle of the 6th century AD, when they clashed with the locally dominant Hephthalites.870 
Before coming to Central Asia, the Turks established a huge empire that stretched from the 
Korean peninsula to the shores of the Black Sea.871 In the 560s, the Turks defeated the 
Hephthalites and later clashed with the Sassanid dynasty of Iran,872 even though the Iranian Shah 
was the ally of Turk Khakan in his campaign against the Hephthalites. These narratives imply two 
things. First, that the Turks came to Central Asia en masse as late as the mid-6th century, which 
supports the argument that Eastern Iranian tribes were the Aboriginal people of the region. 
Second, the Sassanid  Shahs of Persia were hostile to Central Asian Iranians, considering that the 
Hephthalites were one of the Eastern Iranian groups.873 In short, for the Tajiks, who are claimed 
to be the direct ancestors of the Eastern Iranians, both the Turks and Western Iranians were 
hostile. 
Regarding the general implications of the arrival of the Turks in Central Asia, Ghafurov says that 
“the Turkic tribes penetrated into the oases; some of them settled down, while others 
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preoccupied themselves with cattle-breeding on the outskirts of the oases. Some Turks settled 
in the cities, too.”874 Political and military power was in their hands as “Turkic or Turkicized [local] 
rulers were still the heads of most provinces.”875 They have brought some positive changes in 
craftsmanship and military technology to the region.876 The 6-8th centuries witnessed the 
accelerated synthesis of the culture and traditions of the Iranian and Turkic-speaking population 
of Central Asia.877  
Even though there were a significant number of settled Turkic people during the Samanid period, 
the author is confident that the Tajiks made up the majority of the peasant population of Central 
Asia.878 The number of the Turkic-speaking population started to grow significantly only during 
the Qarakhanid rule (840-1212 AD) as a result of the inflow of more Turkic people and the 
Turkicization of the Tajik population.879 The first millennia AD witnessed the Turkicization and 
Mongolization of local residents.880 Later, when the Mongols came to Central Asia, some of their 
tribes (Manghit, Jalair, and Barlas) were Turkicized rather than Tajikicized, because the Mongols 
and Turks had links and there were significant numbers of Turks in Central Asia by this time.881 
As a result of the Turkicization of the settled Tajik local population of Khorazm, Tashkent, and 
Fergana, a new group of sedentary people known as “Sarts” emerged; this term was equally 
used to refer to both the Turkic-speaking and Tajik-speaking population.882 Overall, the 
migration of the Turkic tribes caused a range of synthesis and assimilations between the Eastern 
Iranian groups including the Sogdian, Khorazmian, Farghanian, and Tokharian groups, in terms 
of language, culture, economy, lifestyle, as well as anthropological features.883 Ghafurov claimed 
that a new Central Asian race emerged as a result, which he dubs a Pamiri-Farghani.884 This race, 
according to him, comprises Tajiks and Uzbeks, “though the elements of the Mongolian group 
are quite visible in the features of the Uzbeks.”885  
2.3. Uzbeks 
Unlike any other previous publication, in Tadzhiki Ghafurov goes to lengths to describe the place 
of Uzbeks in Central Asia. To begin with, Ghafurov stated that the arrival of the nomadic Uzbeks, 
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led by Shaybani, in Central Asia in the late 15th and early 16th centuries gave the Uzbek nation its 
ethnonym. However, this was not the most important event in the history of the Uzbek nation, 
because this even merely resulted in the establishment of the Uzbeks ethnonym. Shaybanids 
were of the same ethnic stock as the momads that previously invaded Central Asia and settled 
there.886 Regarding the ethnic composition of the Uzbeks, he stated that ancient Iranian 
elements played a major role in the formation of the Uzbek nation.887 According to Ghafurov, 
the Uzbek nation was formed on the basis of the Turkic-speaking people of Central Asia, which 
in their turn, emerged due to the assimilation of the Turkic tribes (which had started to come to 
Central Asia in the 6th century) by the local the Sogdian and Khorazmian groups, as well as the 
tribes of Sakas and Massagetae.888 During its formation, the Uzbek nation “enjoyed the cultural 
heritage of the ancient settled [people].”889 If the significant Turkic elements are not considered, 
the Uzbeks and the Tajiks are the result of a similar ethnic consolidation process. As far as the 
linguistic foundation of the Uzbek nation is concerned, Ghafurov believed that it started to 
emerge in the 11-12th centuries, when the old Uzbek language was formed.890  
Since the Timurid period, the literature of the two neighboring peoples, the Tajiks and the 
Uzbeks, has become more integrated.891 The friendship of Alisher Navoi and Abdurahman Jami 
was, according to Ghafurov, “the symbol of a marvelous friendship of two brotherly nations – 
the Tajiks and Uzbeks.”892 The following passage outlines Ghafurov’s view about the positive 
relations between Tajiks and Uzbeks: 
The Tajiks and the Uzbeks – the peoples, the formation of whose nationhood 
is based on common ancestry – are intimately related to each other. The 
Uzbeks have enjoyed the cultural heritage of the Tajiks, whereas the Tajiks 
have benefited from the unique culture of the Uzbek people. The 
characteristics of the material culture, customs, arts and craftsmanship of the 
Tajik and Uzbek people are so close to each other that it is not possible to 
distinguish one from another. The histories of these people in the pre-ancient, 
ancient, as well as the medieval period, were very similar and mostly identical; 
moreover, their development took place in the same territory. Nevertheless, 
two nations emerged, which currently have transformed into the Tajik and 
Uzbek socialistic nations.893 
In the 14-15th centuries, the Tajiks were Uzbekified, and the Uzbeks were Tajikified, which, for 
Ghafurov, meant mere bilingualism.894 The culture and lifestyle of the Tajiks and Uzbeks became 
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so similar that it was difficult to draw a borderline between them.895 Moreover, Ghafurov 
highlights the similarities in vocabulary and grammar in the Tajik and Uzbek languages.896 He 
also reminds the reader that the ethnic consolidations of both nations took place within the 
same political entities and that they had to fight common enemies in many cases.897 
Disagreements, when they arose, were always been solved based via peaceful means.898 The 
author further insisted that the ethnical differences mentioned in the book should not be 
interpreted as any indication of the superiority of nation over the other.899  
It can be observed that Ghafurov attempted to play down any possible friction his work might 
create between Tajiks and Uzbeks. For instance, he emphasized that quarrels between Binoi and 
Navoi, Tajik and Uzbek poets respectively, were nothing more than the gossip of the historians. 
In fact, as Ghafurov believes, Binoi held a positive opinion about Navoi and even wrote poems 
in Uzbek.900 Moreover, the literary works of Navoi were read in the madrasahs of Bukhara, 
which, according to Ghafurov, had a significant impact on introducing the languages of the two 
nations to each other.901 The Uzbeks can claim a shared ownership of the history and culture of 
Central Asia.902 In other words, the “Uzbeks have not only been the equal participants in the 
historical events that have occurred in Central Asia in the last four centuries, but were  also equal 
participants in the very early periods.”903 Moreover, “[b]oth Iranian-speaking and Turkic-
speaking nations have produced outstanding persons of science and culture, who are the pride 
of all the nations of Central Asia.”904 Thus, the core mass of the Uzbek people is the local 
indigenous population of Central Asia.905 Finally, Uzbeks, unlike Kyrgyzs and Kazakhs, belong to 
the “Europoid” race, as do Tajiks; but, unlike Tajiks, some Uzbeks have the imprints of the 
Mongoloid physiognomy.906  
Nevertheless, Ghafurov openly blames the Uzbeks for several transgressions against the local 
Tajiks. For instance, “[b]y occupying the pastures, the Uzbek nomadic tribes that came to Central 
Asia have squeezed out not only local nomads but also the local settled population.”907 The 
practice of rewarding Uzbek royal family members and noble leaders led to the scarcity of 
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land.908 During the rule of the Uzbek dynasties, ancient Tajik provinces like Herat and 
Badakhshan were lost forever to Afghan emirs, as a result, many Tajiks lost contacts with their 
compatriots on the right shore of Amudarya.909 Consequently, a significant proportion of Tajik 
population was left out in Afghanistan.910 Due to the weak strategic planning of the last Emirs of 
the Manghit dynasty, the Tajik cities of Khujand, Uroteppa, and Nau were conquered by the 
Russian Empire.911 The author kept highlighting the Uzbek identity of the feudal and ruling elites 
whenever mentioning their negative deeds and features.912 In general, despite his attempts to 
acknowledge the equally important place of the Uzbeks in the history of Central Asia, in Tadzhiki, 
Ghafurov narrated the Tajik-centric history of Central Asia. His explanations regarding the origins 
and role of the Uzbeks are not accepted by historians from Uzbekistan, even though as 
compared to the stance taken in his previous publications, in Tadzhiki, Ghafurov makes 
unprecedented “concessions” to fit the Uzbeks into the history of the Tajik nation.  
3. The Tajik “self” and the Uzbek “other” in Ghafurov’s historiography: A view from 
post-Soviet Tajikistan 
Tajik scholars are sure that Ghafurov designed his scholarly works as a response to the pan-
Turkist discourses that undermine Tajik national identity. According to Ilolov, pan-Turkists 
believe that the “Tajiks were either migrants from Persia, or were Arabs that adopted the 
Persian language, whereas the Turkic-Mongol nomads were viewed as the ancient indigenous 
population of the region and the direct inheritors of those cultural values, which were indeed 
created by many generations of Tajiks.”913 For Ilolov, these were “baseless, provocative ideas.” 
He believes that Ghafurov used his weight as a statesman for the “interests of historical science, 
which was for him a principal means of cultivating self-knowledge and national self-
consciousness as a counterweight to opposing ideas of nationalist streams of panturkism.”914 In 
particular, Ghafurov was a pioneer in “promptly and clearly” showing the non-Persian915 and 
non-Turkic916 origins of the Tajiks. In a similar way, another Tajik scholar, Pirumshoev, highlights 
Ghafurov’s “service in defining the origins of the Tajik nation [and] boldly standing against the 
baseless [and] biased opinion of a pan-Turkist stream regarding the allegedly Persian and Arabic 
origins [of Tajiks].”917 According to Pirumshoev, during his 5-year-long education in Moscow at 
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the Institute of Journalism, Ghafurov obtained knowledge on the history of the region that 
helped him to understand the “mistakes” of NTD in Central Asia: 
Bobojon Ghafurov started more often and confidently coming to the 
conclusion that only historical awareness can provide the required impulse for 
the development of national self-consciousness. Only this can make it possible 
to understand the unforgivable mistakes of those national traitors, who could 
not distance themselves from the infectious influence of pan-Turkism. […] 
Even though they participated in the work of the Commission on national 
territorial delimitation (1924) in the region, they could not stand for their own 
legitimate rights to [get] those lands, where Tajiks lived compactly […].918  
Hamdampur, a political commentator and editor-in-chief of a Tojikiston newspaper, states that 
“preservation of [Badakhshan and Yagnob] languages was sacrosanct for Bobojon Ghafurov,” 
because by doing so Ghafurov gave a serious “a blow against those, who tried hard to prove that 
the Tajiks were not the indigenous population [of Central Asia].”919 In post-Soviet Tajikistan 
Ghafurov’s discourses about the Tajik-Uzbek mutuality and similarity are ignored and 
misinterpreted. For instance, according to Ilolov, “Multiple intersections of the path [of Tajik 
nation] with close neighboring nations, which are foreign in terms of racial-ethnic features, 
might have had some influences on Tajiks. However, [that influence] could not be a determining 
force in the formation of Tajik nationality [narodnost] or in the establishment of Tajikistan. It is 
the historical truth, which rests on the basis of the research of academician B. G. Ghafurov.”920 
4. The reaction of scholars in Uzbekistan to Ghafurov’s Tajik-centred version of 
Central Asia’s history 
Ghafurov’s main concern has been to write a history of the Tajiks as separate from the history 
of other nations in the region: 
[T]here is still an opinion that there is no need to separately work out the 
history of Tajik and Tajikistan, Uzbeks and Uzbekistan, Turkmens and 
Turkmenistan, etc. and that it is more appropriate to write one history of 
Central Asia common for all Central Asian nations. Obviously, beyond 
peradventure such a view is absolutely incorrect.921 
However, the way that he represented the history of Tajiks triggered criticism from historians of 
neighboring Soviet republics, mainly from Uzbekistan. No matter how carefully Ghafurov chose 
his words in hailing the role of Uzbeks in the history of Tajiks and the Central Asian region, his 
position on the origins of Uzbeks proved unacceptable to the historians of Uzbekistan. 
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Moreover, one of the concerns of the historians of Uzbekistan was to write the history of the 
Uzbek nation within the geographical boundaries of modern-day Uzbekistan, and they expected 
the historians of other nations to follow the same principle and refrain from going beyond their 
state borders and “penetrating” into the territories of neighboring countries. Ghafurov 
completely ignored this principle, as for him, the history of Tajiks and Tajikistan were not 
overlapping.   
All of Ghafurov’s publications faced criticism and counter-arguments from historians who had 
studied the history of Uzbekistan and Central Asia. The ethnic background of those scholars was 
not necessarily Uzbek, and they were not necessarily based in Tashkent. When Ghafurov’s 
Tadzhikskii narod v bor’be za svobodu i nezavisimost (the previously mentioned book chapter 
co-authored with Prokhorov) was published, an Uzbek writer, Rahmon Nabiyev, wrote a similar 
book titled O’zbekiston Xalqlarining Chet El Bosqinchilariga Qarshi Kurashi (Epizodlar) [The 
Struggle of the People of Uzbekistan against the Foreign Invaders (Episodes)]. In a relatively 
short book, the Uzbek historian attempted to present the struggle of the local population in the 
territories of modern Uzbekistan against the invasions of Alexander of Macedonia, Arabs, 
Mongols, and Nazi Germans.922 The two publications depicted the same events. However, 
Ghafurov and Prokhorov called the local populations Tajiks, while Nabiyev called them Uzbeks.  
The same book chapter of Ghafurov’s faced criticism from S. Tolstov, who demanded to ban its 
publication, in particular.923 Tolstov, in his book, which was published a year before Ghafurov’s, 
represented the history of Central Asia as that of “the people [narody] of Uzbekistan.” According 
to him, “the people of Uzbekistan” were the descendants of all the ethnicities and nationalities 
that lived in the region, including Scythians, Khorazmians, Sogdians, Bactrians, etc.924 Back in the 
late 1930s and early 1940s, unlike Ghafurov, Tolstov was a famous scholar with extensive 
experience in archaeology and ethnography and was the author of an award-winning book – 
Drevnii Khorezm [Ancient Khorazm].925 Tolstov’s position was a serious hurdle for Ghafurov. 
Nevertheless, Ghafurov’s chapter was published.  
Following the criticism, the authors included the following statement in the foreword when they 
expanded their chapter into a monograph: “The editorial board of the History of Tajiks and 
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Tajikistan, and the Institute of History, Language, and Literature of the Tajik Branch of the 
Academy of Sciences of the USSR hopes that these circumstances will not be evaluated as an 
underestimation of or dismissal of the rich history and cultural past of the other national of 
Central Asia.”926 Ghafurov had his own counter-arguments to Tolstov’s vision of ethnogenesis in 
Central Asia; “[…] Professor Tolstov makes a discovery in the history of the people of Central 
Asia. As if the Tajiks, who speak the Iranian languages […] have no right to claim the past of the 
Iranians, whereas the Turkic-speaking nations of Central Asia – Uzbeks and Turkmens – do have 
such a right.”927  
The Russian translation of Ghafurov’s Ta’rikhi Mukhtasari Khalqi Tojik was also received with 
some criticism. As one reviewer put it, the work overwhelmingly focused on the entire Central 
Asian region, leaving the territory of Tajikistan out of sight: “It seems to us that more space could 
be allocated to the depiction of the events that took place in the mountainous regions that 
currently make up most of the territory of the Tajik SSR. This criticism also applies to previous 
Tajik editions of the book.”928 It was a call to limit the history of the Tajiks to the history of 
Tajikistan. For reasons discussed in the other parts of this chapter, it was not acceptable to 
Ghafurov to limit his historiography to events that occurred within the borders of Tajikistan. In 
the same year that this book was published historians from Uzbekistan started to publish a two-
volume history of Uzbekistan.929 Those books not only touched upon the issues of Uzbek-Tajik 
ethnogenesis but also labelled the Tajik/Persian-centric historiography as pan-Iranism. Along 
with refuting the pan-Turkist agenda as having “nothing to do with historical science,” A. 
Yakubovskii, in the foreword to the second volume of the book stated the following about pan-
Iranism: 
The reactionary pan-Iranists view the Iranian cultural world as historically 
united [sic]. Some argue that the center, from where the “Iranian” culture 
proliferated, was Iran (Persia), but some others [believe that it was] 
Afghanistan. This is a crude distortion of history. There is no single Iranian 
nation; there are different Iranian-speaking nations […].930 
Furthermore, according to Yakubovskii, it is extremely difficult to write separate histories of the 
Uzbeks and the Tajiks, because “historically Uzbeks and Tajiks are so intertwined (territorially, 
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economically, politically, and culturally) that, at first glance, it might seem  almost impossible to 
divide the history of one from that of the other.”931 He further argues that both nations are 
similarly ancient; “[…] the Tajiks existed and were cultured significantly earlier than they 
acquired their ethnonym. The same can be said about the Uzbeks, who received their ethnonym 
significantly later than Tajiks, even though they have been living in the very heart of Central Asia 
from deep ancient times.”932  
As far as the origins of Uzbeks is concerned, Yakuboskii believed that they emerged as a Turkic-
speaking nation long before the nomad Uzbeks arrived in the 15-16th centuries.933 “Thus, the 
history of the Turkic-speaking population of Mawarannahr [as well as] the ancient history of 
Sogd, Khorazm, Farghana, Shash is the history of the Uzbek nation.”934 It implies that even 
though the Turks established their first state in the region in the 6th century, “one can hardly 
find any serious historian who would doubt the existence of the Turkic-speaking population [in 
Central Asia] before the 6th century.”935 Uyghurs were there long before the ethnonym Turk 
appeared. The last argument, and the most innovative argument so far, was that along with 
ancient indigenous and newly arrived Turkic tribes, Turkicized Sogdians and Khorazmians, there 
were Tajiks in the content of the conglomerate of the Uzbek proto-nation.936 
For the Tajik side, this seemed like nothing more than an attempt to belittle the place of their 
nationand inflate the role of the Uzbeks in Central Asian history. As one Tajik historian noted, 
“[k]nowing the opinions and jealous attitudes […] of some of his colleagues in the Central Asian 
region, [Ghafurov] defended his views with a surprising patience and persistence, expanding the 
range of the reliable sources, both archaeologic and manuscriptal.”937 However, Ghafurov’s 
“self-defence” was not only about expanding the sources. He had used his political connections 
efficiently. It is well-known that Ghafurov enjoyed Stalin’s support. In the capacity of the First 
Secretary, he reportedly met Stalin, where he had a chance to discuss Tajik national 
historiography with him. The following transcript of the 1948 meeting was published in an online 
newspaper in Tajikistan: 
Ghafurov: Comrade Stalin, people have heard your speech during the 
reception of the participants of the [ten-day long celebration of] Tajik arts. 
Allow me to use it in my work. 
Stalin: (after reading the speech from beginning to the end) Not bad, I will 
return it to you tomorrow. 
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Zhdanov: (to Stalin) Comrade Ghafurov is a historian, he is writing the history 
of the Tajik nation. (To Ghafurov) I guess, you finished working on it already? 
Ghafurov: Yes, Andrei Aleksandrovich, I have finished the first volume. 
However, Joseph Vissarionovich, there are some contradictions. 
Stalin: What kind of [contradictions]? 
Ghafurov: There are two views in the science of history; one of them raises 
the history of Turks of Central Asia to the extremes, the other states that the 
former nations that inhabited Central Asia were Iranians. We stick to the 
second view. We are blamed as the racists for this.(Stalin and Zhdanov 
laughed). 
Stalin: If this is correct from the scholarly point of view, then what is wrong 
with it? Prove that you are right. 
Ghafurov: Joseph Vissarionovich, the Tajik people, know that our republic was 
formed under your direct supervision and upon the order of [CC of the Russian 
CP]. Though back then there were individuals among Tajiks, who [tried to] 
prove that there were no Tajiks in Central Asia. You have received a telegram 
from them about this. 
Stalin: Yes, there was some Rahimbaev, who wanted to prove that there were 
no Tajiks in Central Asia. Not only they are there, but also they have, as you 
see, established their republic. It is a separate nation, different from Uzbeks, 
Kazakhs, Kyrgyzs, and Turkmens. Turks, as it is known, settled in Central Asia 
in the 11-12th centuries AD, while the Iranians inhabited in these lands in the 
5th century BC. 
Ghafurov: Even in the 6th century [BC], comrade Stalin. I would like to ask for 
one more thing from you. May I raise this issue? The problem of national self-
consciousness. 
Stalin: Raise and prove it.938 
Regarding this meeting, Ghafurov, in one of his letters to I. Orbeli, the Head of the Hermitage 
Museum, wrote the following:  
You might have already been informed about my conversation with Comrade 
Stalin about the issues of the history of the Tajiks and Tajikistan. Joseph 
Vissarionovich highly evaluated the history of the Tajiks and put an urgent task 
before us – wider popularization of our rich past. 
Upon the order of Comrade Stalin there shall be a meeting of the [CC of the 
CP of the Soviet Union], where it is expected that the issue of the history of 
the Tajiks and Tajikistan will be discussed.939 
The three-volume book, Istoriia Tadzhikskogo Naroda, edited by Ghafurov was also criticized by 
a scholar from Uzbekistan for representing the Iranian-speaking people in Central Asia as the 
region’saboriginals and the Turkic-speaking population of the region as the newcomers. Again, 
A. Yakubovskii, leader of the Sogdian-Tajik archaeological expedition in Tajikistan, was on the 
forefront. In his review of this work of Ghafurov’s he wrote: 
Regarding the issue of ethnogenesis, we would like to bring one reproach to 
the author. He observes the Turkic element in Central Asia only from the 6th 
century onwards. Until this time, in his opinion, there were only the tribes and 
nations of the Iranian-speaking system [sic] in the Central Asian interfluve. 
Was that the case? The author forgot one truth: that nations are older than 
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the names that they bear. Our historical science, particularly, archaeology, 
discovered the facts that allow to assert that there was the Turkic-speaking 
population in Sogd even before the 6th century. It may be assumed that the 
author will agree with the correctness of this point of view in the new edition 
and make appropriate changes in the text.940 
Along with their criticism, Uzbek historians attempted to write their own versions of the history 
of Central Asia. Some of them addressed particular issues, such as the Shaybanid dynasty and 
its role in the formation of the Uzbek nation. B. Ahmedov, in his Gosudarstvo Kochevykh Uzbekov 
(The State of Nomad Uzbeks), states that even if the nomad Uzbeks of the Shaybanid tribe gave 
the Uzbek nation its ethnonym, after arrival in Central Asia, they dissolved in the masses of local 
inhabitants. Thus, Shaybanid tribes did not constitute the entire Uzbek population, but rather 
were only a small part of it.941 Therefore, Ahmedov believed that it is not accurate to argue that 
the Uzbeks appeared in the 16th century. Uzbeks, according to him, are a 3000-year old nation 
and are one of the most ancient inhabitants of Central Asia.942 
Others attempted to cover the entire history of Central Asia to allocate the central role to Uzbeks 
and Turkic tribes, and the secondary role to Iranian and Tajik groups. One example of such works 
is Etnogenez i Formirovanniie Predkov Uzbekskogo Naroda (Ethnogenesis and Formation of the 
Ancestors of the Uzbek Nation) written by M. Ermatov in 1968. In this book, Ermatov argues that 
“[t]he history of Uzbeks from the ancient times is linked to the territory of Central Asia, 
particularly, to regions of Central Asian interfluve of Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya, Fergana Valley, 
Tashkent and Khorazm oases.”943 Thus, the ancient “Sakas, Massagetae, Yuezhi, Hephthalite, 
and others, as well as the settled aboriginal inhabitants of Khorazm, Sogd, Farghana, Uzkent, 
Sairam, Tashkent and other regions of Uzbekistan” are the ancient ancestors of the Uzbeks.”944 
Regarding the Uzbek ethnonym, the author argues that “no matter when the term “Uzbek” 
appeared, the people have […] existed and developed into nation since ancient times.”945  
As far as the Iranian tribes are concerned, the Uzbek historian argues that “some contemporary 
scholars do not want to accept reality and count the ancient inhabitants of Central Asia as 
Iranians, calling them Eastern Iranian tribes.”946 He further states that “[t]he ancient eposes 
narrate about the heroic struggle of the ancestors of the Uzbeks and other nations of Central 
Asia against their Iranian colonizers and later against Greek occupants.”947 Based on this, he 
implies that the Iranians were foreign occupiers and that their languages were brought into the 
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region; “Iranian (Persian) ethnic groups in the territory of Sogdiana appeared in the beginning 
of the first millennia BC, not as an aboriginal people of the region, but as the occupants.”948 They 
were a minority compared to the settled and nomadic tribes of the “aboriginal Turkic-speaking 
population” of Central Asia, which was “the overwhelming majority.”949 Referring to a range of 
ancient European and Persian sources, the Uzbek historian attempts to prove that the Sakas 
have never belonged to Iranian tribes in linguistic and ethnic terms.950 According to him, the 
Sakas were a confederation of multiple tribes that conversed in dozens of languages. He has 
made similar arguments about the Massagetae.951 Also, he argues that the Khorazmians 
belonged to the Saka-Massagetae tribes,952 and that they were a mixture of Sakas, Massagetae, 
and Iranians.953 He also questions if the Sakas and Massagetae were Aryans: 
If Sakas and Massagetae belonged to the Aryan (Iranian) ethnic groups of 
people, then why it was necessary to characterize them separately from the 
Aryans? It is interesting that the antic authors relate Sakas and Massagetae to 
the Scythian nations, whereas they do not relate Persians and other Iranian 
tribes to them. It clearly evidences the belonging of the above-mentioned 
local tribes and people to another, particularly to Turkic ethnolinguistic 
group.954 
After asserting that the Iranians were a minority and conquerors, the author attempts to 
question the Iranian background of the Tajik nation. He notes that the Tajiks have the same 
ethnic origins as the Uzbeks. According to him, “the ethnogenesis of the Uzbek and Tajik nations, 
as well as the socio-economic and linguistic phenomena related to them, nations which both 
touch the vast basin of the Zarafshan, Amudarya and Syrdarya rivers, cannot be viewed 
separately from one another, [as] they are tightly intertwined between themselves.”955 Thus, 
claims regarding the pure Iranian origin of the Tajiks are deemed to be incorrect: 
Some scholars relate Tajiks to the Eastern Iranian tribes of the 11-12th and the 
13th centuries, whereas in reality [by that time] it has been long since nothing 
was left of the Iranian tribes in the most direct meaning of this word. Such 
assertions are nothing more than the repetition of the arguments of pre-
Revolutionary bourgeoisie theoreticians in regards to the Aryan origins of the 
nations of Central Asia, in particular, the populations of Sogdiana and 
Khorazm, which according to them were pure Iranian tribes. It seems to us 
that the Tajiks have been around since antiquity, as were the ancestors of the 
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Uzbeks. Both groups formed from the mixture and bundling of two nations – 
Persian-speaking and Turkic-speaking.”956 
Last, but not least, Ermatov argues that the Tajiks, as a nation, were formed in the territories of 
Tajikistan. According to him, “the Tajiks have been formed in their native lands (the territory of 
contemporary Tajikistan) […].”957 Overall, Ermatov’s version of Central Asian history appears to 
challenge Ghafurov’s representation of the regional history.  
Along with general criticism, some fundamental analyses followed in Uzbekistan that challenged 
some of Ghafurov’s arguments. For instance, in 1968, the vice-President of the Academy of 
Science of Uzbekistan, Ibrohim Muminov, published a work titled Amir Temurning O’rta Osiyo 
Tarikhida Tutgan O’rni va Roli: Yozma Manbalar Ma’lumoti Asosida (The Place and Role of Amir 
Timur in Central Asian History: Based on Information From the Manuscripts). The image of Amir 
Timur in this book was a complete opposite of how Ghafurov described him in his works. First, 
according to Muninov, Amir Timur was the son of a Turk aristocrat,958 not a Turkisiced Mongol 
as Ghafurov argued. Second, the Uzbek scholar claims that Timur had done unprecedented 
reconstruction works in Samarkand,959 whereas in Ghafurov’s representation, Timur’s deeds 
were all about destruction and atrocities. Muminov believed that there was a serious reason 
why Timur’s tomb was still painstakingly preserved: “The people of Central Asia respect Timur, 
who was a builder and admitted the value of culture, they have been preserving his tomb in 
Samarkand.”960 Finally, listing the ethnic groups living in Samarkand during Timur’s rule, 
Muminov mentions the Turks, Arabs, and others, but not the Tajiks.961 
Muminov was reportedly criticized for idealizing Timur by scholars and some CP officials in 
Moscow.962 The pressure grew to be so great that the Uzbek CP considered punishing him, 
however, as one Uzbek scholar claims, this was a mere show as the Uzbek CP and leadership 
was involved in promoting Timur’s positive image.963 “Undoubtedly, it was impossible for the CC 
of the CP of Uzbekistan [and] its First Secretary Sharof Rashidov not to be aware of Ibrohim 
Muminov’s activities and the works he was doing, including, his publication and thoughts on 
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Timur.”964 Rashidov knew Muminov personally from the 1940s, and assisted with his transfer 
from Samarkand State University to the Uzbek Academy of Science in Tashkent.965 
Publication of Ghafurov’s Tadzhiki triggered a criticism of not only scholars but also the 
government of Uzbek SSR. Sharof Rashidov, the leader of Uzbekistan at that time, was unhappy 
with the work and sponsored a scholarly counter-attack, though it did not work.966 Reportedly, 
he personally wrote a letter of complaint to the CC of the CP of the Soviet Union, blaming 
Ghafurov for propagating nationalism and the cult of the Tajik nation.967 Moreover, according to 
Ikrami, the Uzbek side “hired” two scholars from Moscow and Leningrad to write negative 
reviews of Tadzhiki. He argues that Ghafurov himself said the following about the attacks by the 
Uzbeks: “Almost every day, a leading official of Uzbekistan, upon his or her visit to Moscow, calls 
me. When I answer the phone, he or she showers me with insulting words and hangs up.”968  
5. Conclusion 
Even though it was completely in line with the Soviet policies of nation-building and historical 
science, Ghafurov’s historiography posited fundamental challenges to the post-1924 political 
map of Central Asia. It assured that the Tajiks, as a nation of people, do not fit within the borders 
of Tajikistan. Consequently, it bothered the Uzbek side as it undermined the state borders of 
Uzbekistan. With his writing, Ghafurov empowered the Tajiks in the historical debate that they 
have long been having with the Uzbeks. Considering its consequences, the Uzbek government 
and historians attempted to challenge and moderate Ghafurov’s views. They criticized his 
position, wrote alternative histories and imposed political pressure.  
The results were not what the Uzbek side expected, even though Ghafurov’s latest works seem 
relatively accommodating towards the Uzbeks, when compared to his earliest works. For the 
Tajik side, attempts to challenge Ghafurov’s historiography by scholars in Uzbekistan was 
nothing more than “another attempt” to deprive the Tajiks of their identity, history, and lands. 
Even though Ghafurov’s scholarly works did not result in a review of political borders the 
favoured the Tajiks, theythey became the sources from which the Tajik nation derived 
ontological security; Ghufarov’s books established the aboriginality of the Tajiks and thus, made 
a strong case for their ownership of the major areas of Central Asia. Furthermore, Ghafurov’s 
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publications clearly highlighted the main “other” of the Tajik nation and the source of ongoing 
ontological insecurity – the Uzbeks.  
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Chapter 6. Political and Economic Issues in Tajikistan’s Relations with 
Uzbekistan: the Implications of Identity Politics 
1. Overview 
In terms of structure and contribution to the central argument of the thesis, this chapter has 
both similarities to and differences when compared the previous three chapters. It shows that 
Rahmon’s heroism is similar to the previously discussed Heroes of Tajikistan. Unlike the previous 
heroes, Rahmon’s heroism is in direct relations with the ongoing issues with Uzbekistan and its 
interpretation in Tajikistan. The chapter begins with reviewing two important issues in the 
recent history of Tajikistan – the civil war and the construction of Roghun dam – that have 
caused significant friction in bilateral relations with Uzbekistan. The emphasis will be made on 
demonstrating that Uzbekistan’s involvement in both issues and its coverage in the texts of 
national identity have significantly deteriorated relations with Tajikistan, thus causing national 
resentment and triggering the national memories about the Uzbek “other”, against which the 
National Heroes such as Aini, Shotemur, Makhsum and Ghafurov have struggled. In light of these 
memories, Rahmon, who is portrayed as successfully fighting against Uzbekistan to defend the 
Tajik nation, emerged as a National Hero who is continuing the deeds of the previous heroes. 
The chapter ends with the review of currently emerging texts of national identity that construct 
Rahmon’s heroism, thus further exacerbating the self/other dichotomy in relation to Uzbeks and 
Uzbekistan. This reciprocal relation between the domestically dominant concepts of “self” and 
“other” and existing problematic relations with the neighbouring nation is exactly what the 
theoretical chapter of the thesis assumed. Thus, this chapter, along with building upon the 
previous chapters, brings the focus of the thesis to the themes related to the theoretical 
assumptions made in the second part of Chapter 1. Based on the findings of this chapter, the 
Conclusion of the thesis links the theoretical assumptions with the empirical investigation of the 
thesis. 
2. The Tajik civil war and Uzbekistan’s involvement 
1.1. Social unrest in Tajikistan in the late 1980s and early 1990s  
Influenced by glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union in the second half of the 1980s, 
Tajikistan experienced democratic changes followed by the spark of nationalism and the revival 
of Islam. Replicating these developments, various new political parties and movements entered 
the political arena; Rastokhez (1989), the DPT (1990), La’li Badakhshon (1991), as well as the 
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IRPT (1990).969 They were more or less linked to particular regions of Tajikistan.While Rastokhez 
and the DPT were formed by the nationalist and national-democratic groups of the capital 
territory, La’li Badaskhshon was a movement founded by the Pamiri elite, which was 
underrepresented within the political system of Tajikistan. IRPT was dominated by the Gharmis, 
the people of Gharm province of Tajikistan. 
Democratization, the rise of nationalism and regionalism, as well as the revival of religion in the 
1980s, served as channels of expression for people’s dissatisfaction with the deteriorating 
economic situation in the Soviet Union. As Scarborough summarizes it, the “sharp and 
unprecedented collapse of the Tajik economy led to many Tajiks being forced onto the streets 
and rebelling against a social order,  that by 1991,  no longer fulfilled any of the guarantees it 
had long ago promised and made good upon.”970 Ever-present disagreements between various 
groups living in Tajikistan began to turn into nationalistic clashes. For instance, in the 1980s, a 
quarrel between the Tajiks and Kyrgyzs in the Isfara region, over the use of agricultural lands, as 
well as a disagreement between the Tajik and Uzbek groups in the Ghonchi (Devashtich) region 
of Leninobod, turned into violent ethnic clashes.971 Newly emerging nationalistic groups started 
becoming bold in the demands they were making to the Soviet government of Tajikistan. On 25 
February 1989, there were demonstrations organized by forces in Dushanbe calling for the 
announcement of Tajik as the state’s official language. 
The first serious clash between the nationalist groups and the Soviet government took place in 
February 1990 when the Tajiks rallied against the Armenian refugees from the Azerbaijani-
Armenian conflict zone, who were rumoured to have decided upon finding accommodation in 
Dushanbe city. The demonstration turned violent after the government mobilized 6000 soldiers 
and a few tanks.972 Along with chanting the mottos like “Tajikistan for the Tajiks!” the 
demonstrators soon turned their anger against the Soviet regime and the CP. Pressure from the 
first ever mass demonstration on the streets of Dushanbe forced the First Secretary of the Tajik 
CP, Qahhor Mahkamov, to resign. However, his resignation was not accepted by the CC of the 
Party. 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, national independence and the redistribution of 
political power in Tajikistan became the main agenda of newly emergent nationalist and 
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religious forces. Thus, the ruling political leadership of the country, which represented both the 
nation’s Soviet past and the unrivaled dominance of the Leninobod province in federal politics, 
became primary targets for agitators. The new opposition started demanding independence and 
the resignation of communist leaders. Mahkamov stepped down and an election was 
announced to fill the post of President of the newly-independent state. A veteran of the Soviet 
political system, Rahmon Nabiev, who beat the candidate for the joint opposition forces, Davlat 
Khudonazarov, in the presidential elections in November 1991, promised to cooperate with all 
political forces. However, emboldened by the backing of the Parliament, Nabiev cracked down 
on the opposition forces, arresting some members of these forces in March 1992. These 
developments were exacerbated by a particular incident; the Speaker of the Parliament, Safarali 
Kenjaev, insulted the Minister of Internal Affairs, who belonged to the Pamiri elite during 
parliamentary sessions. These debates were aired on national television and ignited a new wave 
of demonstrations in the Shahidon square in Dushanbe. President Nabiev was caught by surprise 
and was virtually paralysed by the size of the demonstrations, the flow of the people from the 
provinces, and the neutrality of the police.973  
1.2. The Tajik civil war in 1992-1997 
Parallel demonstrations in the city, one in the Shahidon Square (mainly composed of young 
citizens of Dushanbe, including some criminals) and another in Ozodi Square (featuring a 
gathering of pro-government people from Kulob and Khujand) were the earliest sign of an 
emerging civil war in Tajikistan. The distribution of power among the regional factions was to 
become the main issue of the civil war. The elites of Leninobod (Khujand),974 Kulob, and 
Leninobod were interested in the status quo of power relations, whereas the Karategin and 
Badakhshan (Pamiri) elites were looking forward to getting more representation in the 
government.975 In late April 1992, to enforce demands, opposition members took several 
members of parliament and two deputy prime ministers hostage. As a result, the Presidium of 
the Parliament removed Kenjaev from his post and added some representatives of the 
opposition (S. Turaev, A. Turajonzoda, A. Sohibnazarov) to the Presidium.976 Nabiev appointed 
Kenjaev as the Head of the Committee for National Security (KNB, the successor of the Soviet 
KGB). Shortly after, Kenjaev was reappointed as Speaker of the Parliament. On 1 May 1992, he 
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ordered that 2000 guns be given to pro-government demonstrators.977  The arming pro-
government individuals and outlawing opposition protesters via the introduction of a curfew on 
5 May 1992, forced the latter to also become armed and occupy the airport, railway station, and 
President’s office. 
Even though these demonstrations ended with the inclusion of eight opposition leaders in the 
newly formed government of national reconciliation, there was no force that could stop 
radicalized, newly-armed people from using violence against their opponents after they 
returned to their home provinces. In particular, the Kulobis and Leninobodis were not happy 
with the inclusion of opposition leaders within the government or with the appointment of 
Akbarsho Iskandarov, a representative of the Badakhshani elite, as a Speaker of the Parliament. 
In the summer of 1992, the armed groups in Kulob and Qurghonteppa attacked supporters of 
the opposition.978 Also, dissatisfied with the growing influence of Pamiris and Gharmis at the 
expense of Leninobodis, the local assembly of Leninobod took all public enterprises located in 
the region under the management of the regional government.979 President Nabiev reportedly 
said that he was invited to become the President of Leninobod.980 
On 31 August 1992, the radical youth of Dushanbe barged into the President’s Office and took 
32 government officials from Leninobod and Kulob hostage. They were demanding that Nabiev 
resign from his role as President. The pressure tactic worked; the cabinet accepted the request 
of the hostage-takers and called for the resignation of the president. Similarly, the local 
Assembly of Leninobod, in the hope that they could replace Nabiev with another Leninobodi, 
agreed to withdraw their support of Nabiev. The president was caught at the airport when he 
was escaping the city on 7 September 1992 and was forced to resign at gunpoint.981 The capital 
city then fell under the control of the armed opposition, and the government became 
dysfunctional. Iskandarov, the representative from the Pamiri elite, who was earlier appointed 
Head of the Parliament, became acting President.  
The Khujandi and Kulobi factions organized a session of the Parliament of Tajikistan in 
November-December 1992. In a session that took place near Khujand city, the rump parliament 
elected Emomali Rahmonov, representative of Kulob elite, as its new head. The armed group 
known as the PFT, which was led by former criminals, led the military campaign against the 
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opposition in Dushanbe. On 10 December 1992, the PFT recaptured Dushanbe. Throughout 
January-February 1993, the PFT forces crushed the opposition in the major centers of Tajikistan. 
The core forces of the UTO and its leadership relocated to Afghanistan and maintained the 
partisanship war from there. In April 1994, under pressure from Russia, the first talks between 
Rahmon’s government and The United Tajik Opposition took place in Moscow.982 Despite the 
opposition’s protests, in mid-1994 the government of Tajikistan decided to organize presidential 
elections. In the election that took place in November 1994 Rahmon was elected as President. 
From 1994 till 1997, the government of Tajikistan and the UTO had eight rounds of negotiations, 
which resulted in a peace accord being achieved on 27 June 1997.983 
1.3. The Uzbek players in the Tajik civil war 
At various stages of the civil war in Tajikistan, there were several Uzbek players; the leaders of 
the Uzbek communities of Qurghonteppa and Hisor, the Uzbek-dominated political and 
economic elites of Khujand province, and the government of Uzbekistan. At various stages, 
Rahmon, as a member of the Kulobi faction, received either support or opposition from some of 
these players. The ethnic Uzbek warlords played a secondary role and assisted the Kulobis in 
their major conflict with the Gharmis.984 Of these forces, only “Mahmud Khudoberdyev and 
Ibodullo Boimatov, who represented the interests of the Uzbek population in Qurghonteppa and 
Hisor, respectively”985 had armed forces and were directly involved in the Tajik civil war. Out of 
all the leaders on all the warring sides in the Tajik civil war “Captain Mahmud Khudoberdyev, an 
ethnic Uzbek, was the only warlord with a solid military background.”986 Khudoyberdyev counted 
himself as a loyal guard of the president. He actively participated in the civil war by fighting 
against the Islamic opposition in 1992-1995. He was focused on defending Uzbek communities 
in Qurgonteppa, which often placed him at odds with Rahmon. He took control of Qurghonteppa 
in 1996 and demanded the resignation of some politicians, a request which was acceded to by 
Rahmon.987  
In June-August 1997, unsatisfied with the terms of the agreement that Rahmon had reached 
with the Islamic opposition, as well as with the growing influence of the Kulobis at the expense 
of the Khujandis, Colonel Khudoyberdiyev used his military power in an attempt to influence 
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Rahmonov. He gave President Rahmon an ultimatum via his occupation of the Fakhrobod pass 
to Dushanbe city. However, he was outnumbered and had to go into exile in Uzbekistan.988 In 
November 1998, he took control of Khujand after invading through Uzbekistan. However, 
Rahmon’s forces eventually defeated him.989 
Uzbek leaders in Khujand mostly stayed away from the military campaigns and were supportive 
of Rahmon as an emerging leader so long as their influence and position in Khujand was not 
challenged. According to Nourzhanov, “[t]he northerners who had dominated Tajikistan 
throughout the Soviet era gave up their first role in Dushanbe in 1992 on condition of retaining 
autonomy in running their own affairs.”990 It should be noted that after the removal of Nabiev 
from the political scene, the Leninobodi elite retained power within the Cabinet of Ministers. 
Considering that the Parliament had abolished the post of President, holding the Prime 
Minister’s Office was vital for the Khujandis. From late-August until late-September 1992, 
Jamshed Karimov,991 who was in the team of President Nabiev, became acting Prime Minister.992 
On 21 September 1992, Abdullojonov, a representative of the Khujandi faction, was appointed 
Prime Minister. Organising the parliamentary session to be held in Khujand, in addition to the 
election of Rahmonov as the meeting’s Chair led to northerners accepting the leadership of the 
Kulobi faction.993 This event can be seen as the practical realization of the Leninobodi-Kulobi 
coalition.994 The formation of the PFT, composed of Kulobi Tajiks and various Uzbek groups, is 
another symbol that is representative of the cooperation between these two groups.  
However, this coalition started to collapse in the second half of 1993.995 The two forces 
inevitably clashed when the growing influence of Rahmon’s Kulobi faction presented a challenge 
to the Khujandis’ previously unrivaled dominance, not only at the federal level but also in their 
home province.996 Using the inability of the central, Kulobi-dominated government to properly 
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perform its political and economic duties as a convenient excuse, the Khujandis began to 
compose and implement their own policies.997 “When Rahmonov tried to deploy Kulobi police 
and military in Khujand in August 1993, the Executive Chairman of the region, Abdujalil Homidov, 
blew up the only bridge connecting Dushanbe with the north and threatened to join 
Uzbekistan.”998 In late 1993, as a last resort against the Kulobi elite, the Khujandis started 
entertaining the idea of either economic-political autonomy or re-introducing the post of 
President.999  
As an attempt to curb the power of the Khujandis further, and as a demonstration of power, in 
December 1993 Rahmon replaced Abdullojonov with a less influential representative of 
Khujand, Abdujalil Samadov. Abdullojonov was a serious contender against Rahmonov.1000 In 
November 1994, Abdullojonov ran against Rahmonov in the presidential elections. Following 
Rahmonov’s victory in the elections, Abdullojonov attempted to form a political opposition. In 
November 1994, with the support of Samadov, and Karimov, he formed a new political 
organization – the National Revival Movement (NRM) – with the hopes of getting elected to the 
parliament. However, the election committee refused to register his candidacy.1001 Abdullajonov 
and his team contacted the UN Secretary-General to assist them in joining peace talks as a third 
party, representative of the Leninobod province.1002  
The constitutional changes that took place during the presidential elections resulted in a 
significant reduction of the Prime Minister’s power. Therefore, the appointment of Jamshed 
Karimov, an old member of the Khujandi ruling faction, as the new Prime Minister in December 
1994 did not add to the power of Khujandis. Replacement of Karimov by Yahyo Azimov, a Kulobi 
politician, in February 1996 completely removed the influence of the Khujandis in central 
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government.1003 In 1997, Abdullojonov went into exile to avoid arrest.1004 The Tajik government 
continued to hold him responsible for the failed coups.1005 Eventually, Rahmon deployed regular 
armed forces to Khujand in 1997 to fight against Colonel Khudoyberdiyev and methodically 
replaced the dominant elite of the region with his own people. 
As far as Uzbekistan is concerned, it had “legitimate concerns” about the Tajik civil war.1006 The 
establishment of the Islamic State of Tajikistan, which was the aim of the UTO, was not in the 
interest of Uzbekistan.1007 Tashkent supported Rahmon’s rise to power in November 1992.1008 
The Ministry of Defense of Uzbekistan organized the transit of the delegation from Kulob to 
Khujand, through Termez city, to participate in the aforementioned session of the Parliament 
near Khujand city.1009 The security of the session was maintained by armed forces of Russia and 
Uzbekistan. The PFT received the Uzbek government’s support even before Rahmon’s rise to 
power. As a Tajik expert puts it, “Uzbekistan’s support was crucial regarding the military and 
organizational “survival” of the PFT during the most difficult period of the civil war (from May 
till October 1992), when Moscow officially declared its neutral stance toward the Tajik 
conflict.”1010 In December 1992, together with Russia, Uzbekistan helped PFT forces to free 
Dushanbe city from opposition.1011 In February 1993, Colonel Aleksandr Shishli͡annikov and 
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Major-General Aleksandr Chubarov of the Armed Forces of Uzbekistan, were appointed as the 
Minister and Deputy Minister of Defence of Tajikistan, respectively.1012  
Rahmon proved to not be as loyal to Uzbekistan as the latter expected. In August 1993, during 
a meeting in Moscow, Russia and Uzbekistan pressed Rahmon to negotiate with the opposition. 
However, the Tajik Head of State resisted. He was not only struggling against the Khujandi 
leaders, but also ignoring Russia and Uzbekistan when these countries requested that he talk to 
the opposition.1013 With the help of support from Russia, Rahmon successfully distanced pro-
Uzbekistan forces from his government, severely curbing Uzbekistan’s influence on the Tajik civil 
war.1014 Therefore, during the 1994 elections, the Uzbek government supported Abdullojonov’s 
candidacy.1015 When Abdullojonov lost the elections, Uzbekistan helped him to form the 
opposition. The most famous evidence of Uzbekistan’s attempts in this regard is the meeting 
that was held between Abdullojonov and Akbar Turajonzoda,1016 one of the leaders of UTO, in 
Tashkent in August 1995.1017 At the time that the meeting was held, the UTO was falling apart; 
Rastokhez had disappeared from the political arena due to lack of support; the DPT had split 
into two factions, with one part establishing direct contact with Rahmonov’s government. Most 
importantly, ongoing peace talks with the government revealed that the UTO was ready to 
create a secular state in Tajikistan. So, there were serious prospects for UTO and the Leninobod 
faction to form a coalition, which would improve the positions of both actors and create a 
serious opposition to Rahmonov’s government. “It should be noted that the leader of the UTO, 
Nuri, consented in principle to the participation of the NRM in the inter-Tajik negotiations of 
December 1996, upon the condition that the NRM abandoned its proposal to make the Uzbek 
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language one of Tajikistan’s national languages.”1018 However, the new opposition bloc was 
never realized. 
Due to the peace agreement that was reached with the UTO in 1997, Rahmon agreed to allow 
more than 5000 Islamic fighters to his government. He provided them with a 30% quota and 
appointed their leaders to top government positions. At the same time, he vigorously refused 
to cooperate with Khujandi groups.1019 Uzbekistan’s attempts to create a “third force” in 
Tajikistan failed. The following excerpt from Kniazev, a pro-Uzbekistan expert, summarizes the 
mood in Uzbekistan in the 1990s: 
The government in Dushanbe is making a big mistake by selecting the 
northerners to be the ultimate enemy. It would be in the best interests of all 
political forces in Tajikistan if “a third force” took part in peace talks between 
the United Tajik Opposition and the Kulob clan. The political elite of Khujand, 
who exclusively seek a secular path for Tajikistan’s development], could be an 
appropriate ally of Rahmonov in his struggle against plans [of the UTO] to 
make Tajikistan an Islamic state. 1020 
In general, the Uzbek players in the Tajik civil war have never provided unconditional support to 
the Kulobis in its struggle against the UTO. Depending on the situation the Uzbek forces have 
played either a supportive or unsupportive role. As will be demonstrated in the following part 
of the chapter, memories of the Civil War in Tajikistan increasingly single out the Uzbek “other” 
as the element that triggered the war. These same memories ignore the role played by intra-
Tajik differences and clashes during the conflict. In an attempt to substantiate the official 
position, scholarly discourses in Tajikistan overlook any positive role that Uzbek entities may 
have played during the Civil War.  
2. The issue of Roghun HPS in Tajik-Uzbek relations  
2.1. Roghun in the 1990s 
Since the early 1990s, Tajik officials have viewed the Roghun HPS as an important source of 
budget income. There are no known records regarding the Uzbek side’s opposition to the idea 
of Roghun’s construction in those years. However, since the mid-2000s, when Tajikistan made 
significant progress in negotiating with potential investors, Tashkent officials started 
questioning the ecological and agricultural consequences that the Roghun dam might have for 
countries that lay downstream from it. Due to the growing shortage of electricity in Tajikistan 
following the demise of the United Energy System of Central Asia in the mid-2000s, Roghun HPS 
became a “lifebuoy” for Tajik authorities. Thus, the building of Roghun HPS attained the status 
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of a national idea. When Uzbekistan opposed its construction, this triggered the “self/other” 
dichotomy. 
In February 1994, Rahmon condemned those who opposed the Roghun project in the late 1980s 
and called for an increased tempo to the construction work emphasizing that Tajikistan was 
buying 2 billion kw/h of electricity from its neighbors every year.1021 He also mentioned Rogun 
HPS in his September 1994 election campaign, claiming that by attracting a workforce to the 
construction works he could increase the “social protection of the people”.1022 Already, in April 
1995, Rahmon was arguing about using Tajikistan’s water resources to develop the economy 
and highlight the strategic importance of big and small HPSs.1023 He was determined to save the 
national economy from crisis by building Roghun, which was partially destroyed during the war, 
as well as other HPS.1024 He also started to talk about attracting foreign investors.1025 In his 
interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta in August 1996, Rahmon stated that so far Tajikistan had 
spent $860 million on the construction of Roghun and still needed to invest $500 million in order 
to construct two generators. The Tajik government was not only planning to supply electricity 
to the domestic population, but also to export it, and earn, as Rahmon mentioned in one of his 
speeches, $800 million every year.1026 According to him, “Afghanistan, Pakistan and China are 
waiting for the start of this HPS.”1027 Rahmon kept mentioning the importance of Roghun and 
the necessity of increasing the volume of construction throughout 1998,1028 19991029 and 
2000.1030 
2.2. The Tajik-Uzbek disagreement over Roghun (2002-2009) 
In February 2001, Rahmon stated that 48% of the most difficult aspects of the Roghun HPS were 
completed and within 4 years the HPS would be able to start operating.1031 The Tajik side 
expressed its interest in attracting Russian investors and specialists to Roghun and argued that 
70% of the income from the project would go to the Russian economy.1032 In October 2002, 
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Tajikistan reached an agreement with the Russian government over the construction of 
Roghun,1033 however it took Russia two more years to bring in RusAl, a Russian company, as a 
contractor to complete the construction. In the meanwhile, Rahmon unsuccessfully attempted 
to secure investment from the World Bank,1034 China,1035 and Pakistan.1036  
In February 2005 RusAl chose Lahmeyer International, a German-based engineering company, 
to conduct an assessment of the technical and economic viability of the project.1037 In September 
2005, Rahmon and the leaders of RusAl officially inaugurated the construction process.1038 
However, there were disagreements over who would own what percentage of shares; the Tajik 
side wanted the majority of shares as the project had been constructed in its territory and it had 
already invested a large amount of money.1039 The leadership of RusAl was confident that 
without their agreement on the height and the type of the dam, it was impossible to talk about 
of the extent of a party’s investment, and their subsequent ownership of shares.1040 In June 
2006, the Tajik ambassador in Russia warned that Tajikistan could go on with the construction 
of Roghun even without RusAl.1041  
An assessment by Lahmeyer found that the height of the dam should be 285-meters high, rather 
than the planned 335 meters.1042 In October 2006, the First Deputy Chairman of Barqi Tojik 
Aleksei Silant’iev complained that the agreement between the Tajik government and RusAl was 
not being implemented as a result of the two sides’ incongruent interests.1043 According to him, 
instead of the planned upon $50 million, the Russian company spent only $200 thousand on the 
construction of Roghun. Silanti’ev warned that if RusAl did not go on with the project, Tajikistan 
would return the amount RusAl had already spent and begin building Roghun using the state 
budget. In November 2006, Tajikistan decided to include $168.7 million in its next year’s budget 
for this purpose.1044  
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The Tajik government blamed Uzbekistan for their failure to cooperate with RusAl. According to 
the Tajik side, the idea for a 285 meter-high dam came to RusAl after the visit of Oleg Deripaska, 
President of RusAl, to Uzbekistan.1045 Some Tajik observers agree with such claims. As the late 
Sayfullo Safarov, head of the Centre for Strategic Studies under the President of Tajikistan, 
mentioned, RusAl “wanted to bring the effectiveness of Roghun down to minimum due to being 
influenced by Uzbekistan. The Tajik government, however, could not accede to this.”1046 Marat 
Mamadshoev, the Editor-in-Chief of Asia-Plus, a Tajik newspaper, was also sure that 
Uzbekistan’s was behind RusAl’s reluctance. He believed that "the Uzbeks were trying to play a 
leading role in the region, however, [the Tajik government] could not accept RusAl’s request to 
discuss its actions with Uzbekistan”. 1047 Furthermore, he contended that RusAl “behaved 
absolutely incorrectly” by trying to consult with Uzbekistan, and that Moscow should have 
understood this.1048 A Tajik scholar, Parviz Mullojanov, noted that “RusAl seems to have decided 
not to strain its relations with Uzbekistan. Thus, right after the agreement was signed, the issue 
of dam’s height and type emerged.”1049  
Following a failure to cooperate with the Russians, the Tajiks started searching for other 
investors and, in the interim, began to finance the project using the state budget.1050 The Uzbek 
side, which had kept a low profile until this point, began to express its concerns more publicly. 
During the next two years, even though the construction of Roghun did not progress 
significantly, the Tajik-Uzbek confrontation over this project escalated. To begin with, the Tajik 
government took two important steps; first, in May 2007, an International Consortium on the 
construction of Roghun was established, and the Tajik side invited any interested companies and 
countries to join it;1051 second, in August 2007, Rahmon issued a decree that reformed the 
Roghun HPS into an open, shareholder company. 1052 These moves revived the interest of old 
players and attracted the interest of new ones. Thus, Russia offered to fill RusAl’s place with 
RAO EES.1053 However, the Russian side demanded ownership of 75% of shares, and reportedly 
RAO EES planned to bring in RusAl as a partner.1054 Moreover, Russia also wanted to have its say 
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on the list of participants in the anticipated international consortium on Roghun, even though 
the Tajik President wanted it to be open to any party who wanted to attend.1055 Among the 
newly interested parties was Kazakhstan.1056  
Even though the Tajik side promised to consider the concerns of the downstream countries in 
building the Roghun dam,1057 the Uzbek government was not convinced. Shortly after the Tajik 
Prime Minister convened a government meeting to discuss the start the construction process in 
late July 2007,1058 the Uzbek President Karimov expressed his first ever public opposition to the 
project. According to him, before building any infrastructure on interstate rivers, all downstream 
states should have to be consulted.1059 The Uzbek ambassador in Tajikistan called a press 
conference to make a statement supporting Karimov’s words. 1060 The Uzbek Minister of Foreign 
Affairs expressed the same ideas during his UN General Assembly speech.1061  
Along with that, the idea of having the Roghun project internationally assessed emerged in the 
Uzbek media.1062 Some Uzbek experts questioned Tajikistan’s arguments about solving an 
electricity shortage by building Roghun. For instance, citing Sergei Zhigarev, Director of 
“HydroProject” Institute of Uzbekistan, the Uzbek newspaper Pravda Vostoka speculated that 
Tajikistan could instead avoid serious shortages by exploiting existing HPSs more efficiently and 
decreasing the supply of electricity to TALCO and Tadzhikts͡ement, companies which consumed 
approximately half of Tajikistan’s electricity. The newspaper further suggested that Tajikistan 
could refraining from exporting electricity to Afghanistan.1063  
In the meanwhile, Uzbekistan convinced Russia, which was Tajikistan’s long-term partner on 
Roghun, to consider the interests of lower-stream countries before building anything on Tajik 
rivers. According to one of the clauses in a joint statement signed by Karimov and Putin on 6 
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February 2008, “[t]he parties agree that it is necessary to consider the interests of all states 
located on the transborder waters of the Central Asia region when considering the 
establishment and maintenance of hydro-energetic infrastructure construction projects.”1064 
The Tajik mass-media reacted fiercely to this news. Tojikiston, a Tajik newspaper, went so far as 
to criticizing the statement for its resemblance to the NTD processes that took place in 1924 
when the Tajiks claim to have lost many of their territories:  
By doing so, the events of 1924 are being repeated, when similar actions 
resulted in Tajiks’ losing their historic centers. In this case, using the energy 
crisis, these states want to smother the Tajiks completely.1065  
Asia-Plus deemed this development to be a severe blow for Tajikistan considering that it 
followed China’s recent support of Uzbekistan’s position and withdrawal of its support for 
Tajikistan’s HPS.1066  
The Uzbek newspapers went on calling for the Tajik government to be open to their neighbour’s 
concerns. 1067 The Tajik side refused to do so. As the Tajik Deputy Minister for Energy and 
Industry put it “Tajikistan will not wait for the consent of its neighbours, especially Uzbekistan, 
before constructing of hydroelectric stations, particularly, Roghun, on its own territory.”1068 
Rahmon was sure that the first generators in Roghun HPS would start producing electricity in 
the coming 4 years.1069 The government was determined to build the HPS and called for 
construction workers from all over Tajikistan to come and work on it. 1070 Rahmon announced 
that the construction of HPSs was “a matter of life and death” for Tajikistan, and stated that he 
needed 3 more years to achieve energy independence for Tajikistan.1071 To accelerate the 
construction work, Tajikistan allocated $170 million from its 2009 state budget to Roghun.1072  
This was almost a 5-fold increase from the   $35 million that was invested in the project in 2008. 
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Rahmon issued orders for a plan to be devised to close the Vakhsh River and install the first two 
generators of Roghun that would start producing energy.1073  
The determination of the Tajik side apparently concerned the Uzbek government. Thus, on 21 
October 2008, the Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement:  
It should be guaranteed by authoritative international experts that the 
construction of hydro-technic objects in the region will not have irreversible 
ecological consequences and will not destroy the existing balance of water 
flow in the interstate rivers by all states located in the basin on this river. The 
technic-economic reasoning of new hydro-technic objects in the basin of 
trans-border rivers needs to go through compulsory objective expertise by 
neutral international auditory organizations.1074 
On 5 December 2008, the Uzbek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vladimir Norov, used his platform 
at the OSCE summit in Helsinki to condemn Roghun.1075 On 11 December 2008, Borii 
Alikhanov,1076 Head of the State Committee on the Environmental Protection of Uzbekistan, 
condemned Roghun HPS, urged for international assessment, and called for Tajikistan not to 
ignore the interests of other states.1077  
2.3. The escalation of the Roghun issue to diplomatic and economic “warfare” 
between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (2009) 
Some observers called Uzbekistan’s efforts against the Roghun project in 2009 an attempt to 
establish a “water front” 1078 or “water bloc” 1079 against Tajikistan. The reason for this is that, 
within the first two months of 2009, Uzbekistan gained the support of Russia and Turkmenistan 
on the Roghun issue. On 23 January 2006, the Russian President, Medvedev, announced his 
support for Uzbekistan’s vision of water problems in the region.1080 A month later, the Turkmen 
President, Gurbanguly Berdymuhammedov, made a similar announcement. 1081 The Tajik side 
was concerned about these developments, especially Russia’s support of Uzbekistan. The Tajik 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a protest letter to the Russian side.1082 Furthermore, Rahmon 
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boycotted the summits of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic 
Community in Moscow in late January 2009, during which he had a planned to meet with 
Medvedev.1083 Instead, he visited Belgium, Croatia, and the Baltic states in February 2009, a time 
during which the Tajik government, among other things, attempted to find investors for Roghun. 
As Pulod Muhiddinov, Deputy Minister of Energy and Industry of Tajikistan, explained, 
“Tajikistan will build Roghun HPS even though someone is against it.”1084  
In February 2009, Uzbekistan halved the amount of daily gas supplied to Tajikistan, with the 
warning that the supply might get reduced to nothing as a result of the Tajiks’ outstanding bill 
of $16 million. Simultaneously, the Uzbek government launched an information campaign 
against Roghun. On April 2009, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan issued a 
statement1085, and the Parliament of Uzbekistan held discussions condemning the Roghun 
project.1086 Following the reaction of the Uzbek parliament, President Rahmon gave a speech in 
the Tajik parliament stating that Tajikistan's energy projects were necessary to put an end to the 
sufferings that the Tajik people had been having in the last 15 years during winter.1087 On 
another occasion, he explained why the hydro-energetic projects of Tajikistan were viewed as 
“a national priority that   has no alternatives.” 1088  
On 24 April 2009, Pravda Vostoka, an official newspaper of the Uzbek government, published a 
letter of the World Bank’s head, Robert Zoellick, to President Karimov. In the letter, Zoellick 
assured the Uzbek side that its concerns would be considered in the forthcoming assessment of 
Roghun.1089 At the same time, referring to some European officials, the Uzbek Embassy in the 
UK announced that the EU was against the project.1090 The informational attack on Roghun 
became intense in the Uzbek media.1091 All of the articles published in Uzbekistan’s newspapers 
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contained evidence from experts with negative thoughts about the safety controls at the 
existing HPSs in Central Asia, 1092 or from experts that called the new project a “criminal levity.” 
1093 The Uzbek Minister of Foreign Affairs devoted a significant portion of his 2009 UN General 
Assembly speech to the issue of Roghun, calling for an international assessment of its 
environmental and economic viability. The Uzbek ambassador at the UN argued that, 
considering that half of Central Asia’s population lived in Uzbekistan, the Uzbek side had moral 
rights to raise the water issues in Central Asia. 1094 
Considering the difficulties presented by  attracting foreign investors to such a contested 
project, the Tajik government decided to cover the lack of funding by drawing money from 
Tajikistan’s population. The government issued shares for “OAO Roghun HPS” and the Speaker 
of the upper chamber of the Tajik parliament called upon the Tajik people to spend an amount 
equivalent to a monthly salary in order to buy these shares.1095 The same idea was later 
supported by President Rahmon, 1096 who proposed an exact amount that each family ought to 
spend on Roghun shares -- $690.1097 The idea of building the Roghun HPS at any cost began to 
sound more convincing to the Tajiks when Uzbekistan left the United Energy System of Central 
Asia (UES) in 2009.1098 Even though the Uzbek side explained this decision regarding economic 
and energy independence of Uzbekistan,1099 the Tajik government was sure that it was a political 
decision against Tajikistan.1100 The biggest implications this decision had were for electricity 
consumers in Tajikistan, mainly, the flagship of the Tajik economy – TALCO and Tajik Cement. In 
2009, in his speech during the opening ceremony of the “North-South” electricity line, to 
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compensate for Uzbekistan’s exit, Rahmon drew attention to the importance of completing 
Roghun: 
The noble people of Tajikistan can be sure that, using the financial resources 
and abilities of state, and importantly, relying on the will, decisiveness and 
support of the deserving Tajik nation, as well as attracting external 
investment, we will definitely build Roghun power station, because for the 
Tajik people it is the only rescue path from their current problems. Because it 
meets the energy demands, which define the further development of our 
national economy and the living standards of our nation, we have no other 
way. 1101 
To further increase pressure on the Tajik government, the Uzbek authorities started blocking 
the transit of Tajik trains through Uzbekistan’s territory. Thus, from November 2009 till February 
2010, Uzbekistan detained 400 train cargoes destined for Tajikistan. By June 2010 the number 
of blocked train cars had reached 2000.1102 According to the Tajik side, most of the products that 
had been blocked on Uzbekistan’s railways were fuel materials.1103 In explaining the behavior of 
Uzbekistan, the Tajik Prime Minister claimed that Tashkent planned to hurt the agricultural 
industry of Tajikistan, which employed 70% of the Tajik population. This was because the fuel 
materials were being imported for this industry’s usage.1104  
However, the Tajik side was aware that the ultimate purpose of the Uzbek side was to halt the 
Roghun project.1105 In 2010, after a meeting between the two nations’ presidents, Uzbekistan 
agreed to unblock all cargoes, except for the ones believed to be carrying materials intended for 
usage at the Roghun construction site.1106 As of February 2010, 2000 train cargoes remained 
trapped in Uzbekistan.1107 The Tajik railway company claimed a $5 million loss due to the 
blockade in 2010.1108 Apparently, the blockade worked so as to disrupt and delay Tajikistan’s 
plan to close to the Vaksh River by the end of January 2010. 1109 
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2.4. Paralysing the Tajik economy: issues concerning gas supply and the railroad 
blockade 
Tajik-Uzbek relations further deteriorated in 2010-2011 due to the uncompromising positions 
of both sides. Ignoring the demands of the Uzbek side, who wanted no activity to take place on 
the Roghun construction site until an international investigation was conducted, the Tajik side 
went on to self-finance the project by allocating $150 million to Roghun’s construction from the 
state budget in 2010, as well as selling $105 million worth of shares to the Tajik population.1110 
Apparently, these developments were not acceptable to the Uzbek government.1111 So, 
Uzbekistan once more halved the daily amount of gas supplied to Tajikistan, this time using the 
excuse of $2 million unpaid by Tajikistan for already-imported gas. Tadzhikts͡ement, a state-
owned cement producer in Tajikistan, which was known as the leading supplier of the cement 
for the construction of the Roghun HPS, was the party most affected by this decision.1112 
In a letter published in the Uzbek official media, the Uzbek Prime Minister called on his Tajik 
colleagues to halt the construction works pending an international assessment of the project. 
The Tajik government was warned that if construction did not stop, Uzbekistan would attract 
international attention to the issue.1113 The growing tension between the two nations over the 
project made it unattractive to international investors. Kazakhstan, which was the only Central 
Asian nation that had occasionally expressed interest in the Roghun project, decided that it 
would wait until the assessment was conducted. In March 2010, the Kazakh President, during a 
meeting with Karimov, announced Kazakhstan’s support for Uzbekistan’s position on the 
Roghun issue.1114 It should be noted that in February 2008, the Kazakh Ambassador in Tajikistan 
announced Kazakhstan’s interest in joining the international financial consortium on Roghun.1115  
In March 2011, Tajikistan signed an agreement with Coyne & Bellier, an international consulting 
and engineering company based in France, for technical and economic assessment and with 
Poyry , an engineering and company headquartered in Finland, for ecologic and social impact 
assessment. The World Bank agreed to finance both assessments. However, construction work 
continued during this period and there were also plans to close the stream of Vakhsh River, in 
order to install two generators for the Roghun HPS, in November 2011.1116 The government of 
Uzbekistan boycotted the first consultation on Roghun, organized by the World Bank with the 
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participation Coyne & Bellier and Poyry, in Almaty, on 17-19 May 2011. The following quote from 
an Uzbek newspaper article, published on 12 October 2011, expressed the mood in Tashkent: 
Despite the arguments that have been had and notwithstanding the final 
results of ongoing technical and economic assessment, [Tajikistan] still aims 
to follow the initial plan for this project, which involve an unprecedentedly 
gigantic dam. […]  Large-scale and aggressive propaganda for the project, the 
assessment of which has not yet concluded, remains ongoing [in Tajikistan]. 
[…] despite the categorical disagreement of international experts, the 
government of Tajikistan is taken with the idea of starting the construction of 
the first part of the Roghun HPS, with its preliminary 120 meter-high dam, 
without waiting for the completion of international assessment, thus putting 
the international community before the materialized, adventurist fact. 1117 
In a statement released on 26 October 2011, the Tajik government blamed the Uzbek media for 
spreading distorted information about the ongoing taking place on Roghun.1118 In response, a 
press release from the Uzbek government accused the Tajik side of hiding the actual scale of 
construction work taking place on Roghun:  
The assertions of the government of Tajikistan that currently only repair works 
are taking place on the territory of Roghun HPS are inaccurate. If this were the 
case, how would one explain why in 2010 these so-called “maintenance 
works” drained $150 million out of the state budget? This year, $191 million 
has been allocated for these works, and the proposed budget for 2012 
includes $223 million for these purposes. It is also known that up to 5000 
people are working in the Roghun HPS, which is clearly an excessive workforce 
for mere maintenance.1119 
As a following step, Uzbekistan took the harsh measures of cutting Tajikistan’s gas supply and 
blocking the railway transit. These measures almost crippled the Tajik economy. Hinting at the 
expiration of the contract, on 6 January 2012, Uzbekistan stopped the exportation of gas to 
Tajikistan. Murodali Alimardon, the Deputy Prime Minister, arrived in Tashkent the following 
day to negotiate a new contract.1120 He was only able to secure an agreement for 45 million 
cubic metres of gas. On 25 March 2012, Uzbekneftegaz, the state-owned gas company, 
announced that Uzbekistan would stop the exportation of gas on 1 April 2012, once the Uzbek 
side had finished supplying the agreed-upon 45 million cubic metres of gas. Referring to new 
obligations to China, the nation where all Uzbek gas needed to be exported, Uzbekistan refused 
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to negotiate with Tajikistan. Furthermore, Uzbekistan did not allow the transit of gas to 
Tajikistan from Turkmenistan.  
Alternative sources of energy proved insufficient to support Tajik industry.1121 So, Tajikgaz and 
Tadzhikts͡ement had to halt production and provide their entire staff with a leave of absence 
until further notice.1122 TALCO, which accounted for 75% of export revenue from Tajikistan, 
risked stopping aluminium production permanently. In a press release, the company stated that 
without stable energy supply the smelting pots would cool down and it would cost $200 
thousand to restart each of them. In total, the restart process could cost up to $500 million and 
take over 3 years.1123 During this period, 13 thousand people would find themselves unemployed 
and 40 factories in the supply chain would close. During the energy crisis, 130 factories in 
Tajikistan had to seek alternative energy sources and take the additional measure of replacing 
gas with coal.1124 Tadzhikt͡sement and TALCO began to install technologies that allow to operate 
on coal.1125 This led to an increase in coal mining in Tajikistan1126 and the establishment of a 
state-owned coal enterprise, Angishti Tojik, to boost the mining industry.1127  
Even though, on 11 April 2012, both sides agreed to renew the gas supply starting from 16 April 
2012, the Tajik economy suffered significantly during these fifteen days. These events revealed 
the overdependence of the Tajik economy on energy supplied by Uzbekistan. This, as well as the 
previous cuts, were a demonstration of power by Uzbekistan. . As a result, construction on the 
Roghun HPS sloweddown, mainly due to the shortfall in the amount of cement produced by 
Tadzhikts͡ement. Furthermore, these measures also affected households in Tajikistan in terms 
of gas supply and resulted in the temporary unemployment of tens of thousands of people. The 
Tajik authorities blamed Uzbekistan for seeking to provoke a humanitarian catastrophe, social 
unrest and disloyalty to the government.1128 
In March 2012, Uzbekistan started to demolish the Ghalaba-Amuzang railway, which was one of 
two routes linking the railway networks of Uzbekistan Tajikistan.1129 As a result, Tajikistan lost 
its main transit route to the world outside its borders. The other railroad link, Bekabad-Kudukly, 
which connects Tajikistan’s north to Uzbekistan’s railway network, still functions but, can only 
                                                          
1121 For the claims of the head of Tadzhiktransgaz, see "Tadzhikistan dogovorilsi͡a s Turkmenieǐ o postavkakh gaza - 
slovo za Uzbekistanom," Regnum, 28 March 2012. 
1122 "Uzbekistan vozobnovil postavki gaza v Tadzhikistan," Regnum, 16 April 2012. 
1123 "Uzbekistan perekryl postavki gaza v Tadzhikistan." 
1124 "Uzbekistan vozobnovil postavki gaza v Tadzhikistan." 
1125 "Kitai pomozhet "Tadzhiktsement"u pereiti na ugol'," Avesta.tj, 23 April 2012. 
1126 "Dobycha ugli͡a v Tadzhikistane uvelichena na 60 prot͡sentov - minėnergoprom," Trend New Agency, 7 November 
2013. 
1127 Z. Ergasheva, "Tadzhikistan do kontsa goda mozhet otkazatsia ot importa uglia," InoZpress, 4 June 2014. 
1128 Mirzaian, "Kak possorilis' Emomali Sharipovich s Islamom Abduganiievichem." 
1129 "Uzbekistan demontiruiet zheleznuiu dorogu po napravleniiu k iugu Tadzhikistana." 
171 
transport goods to the Sughd province of Tajikistan. Due to Tajikistan’s poor internal 
transportation system, moving of goods from Sughd to the southern parts of the nation such as 
Khatlon or Dushanbe is difficult. In fact, the transit of cargo through Ghalaba-Amuzang was 
stopped on 17 November 2011, when Uzbekistan reported that one of the railway bridges had 
been blown up in a suspected terrorist act.1130 Tajikistan’s offers to rebuild the bridge were 
rejected by Uzbekistan as a result of an ongoing investigation into the potential terrorist act.1131  
Hundreds of train cars bound for the Khatlon region of Tajikistan have been stuck in Uzbekistan 
since then.1132 In the meanwhile, the Uzbek railway company has been delivering cargo to the 
north of Tajikistan via the Bekabad-Kudukly link. However, the Tajik side was reluctant to accept 
cargo from this direction due to the difficulties presented by internal transportation from this 
region. The officials of the Khatlon region of Tajikistan claimed that the province suffered 
millions of dollars of loss in trade due to the damage done to the Ghalaba-Amuzang link.1133 The 
Uzbek side criticized Tajikistan’s reluctance to receive train freights through the Bekabad-
Kudukly link. According to Uzbek online media, “while blaming Uzbekistan for the blockade, 
Tajikistan is interested in the continuation of this ‘blockade’.”1134  
In general, through the implementation of energy and transportation blockades, Uzbekistan 
succeeded in slowing down the construction work taking place at Roghun. In July 2012 the Tajik 
government started to fire construction workers at Roghun en masse.1135 However, some 
workers remained on the construction site. According to official estimates, 3,000 of the 5,500 
workers who had been working on the project were dismissed.1136 According to other estimates, 
however, more than 5,500 construction workers out of 10,000 were dismissed.1137 Even though 
Uzbekistan achieved its short-term goal of freezing the construction work on Roghun, it was 
clear that the Tajik side was far from giving up the idea of Roghun completely.  
On 7 September 2012, the Uzbek president went as far as warning that trans-border water issues 
might result in a regional war.1138 The Tajik government, however, ignored this warning; on 20 
October 2012, following a decree from Rahmon, the Project Management Group for Energy 
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Projects, a government body regulating the construction of Roghun, was transferred from Prime 
Minister’s control to the President’s control.1139 The proposed budget for the following year 
included approximately $250 million for Roghun, which was more than what had been spent in 
2012.1140 On 7 November 2012, the Uzbek side boycotted the second meeting on Roghun, which 
was organized by World Bank as a part of ongoing international assessments of the project. 
3. Uzbekistan as an threat to the national unity and economic development of 
Tajikistan: the discursive construction of the Uzbek “other” and the heroic image of 
Emomali Rahmon 
3.1. The official discourses on Uzbek meddling in the Tajik Civil War 
The official discourses about Uzbekistan’s role in the Tajik Civil War were initially positive. 
However, in 1997 the Tajik government started openly accusing Tashkent of igniting the Tajik 
civil war. Until then, the official discourses rather pointed at the Islamic and national-democratic 
forces as the sources of the Tajik civil war. To begin with, in his first official statement as the 
Head of the Tajik Parliament Emomali Rahmon referred to “some [political] parties and socio-
political groupings” as the forces behind the war in Tajikistan.1141 In December 1992, he 
pinpointed Islamic fundamentalists, who were acting illegally in Tajikistan, as well as the DPT, 
who were followers of the Rastokhez movement.1142 In particular, he claimed that the DPT had 
“seeded hatred between Tajiks and Uzbeks.”1143 Repeating similar accusations, Rahmon stated, 
in March 1993, that “it is precisely this “demo-Islamic” [sic] opposition that has succeeded in 
splitting the people of Tajikistan into Khujandis, Gharmis, Hisaris, Badakhshanis, Kulobis, and 
Uzbeks.”1144 Rahmon used to talk positively about the role played by Tashkent the Tajik conflict.  
During our meeting with the President of Uzbekistan, comrade I.A.Karimov, 
we signed an Agreement on Friendship and Mutual Assistance between 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. By this agreement, the [Tajik] Republic is receiving 
humanitarian aid, clothes, medications, food, fuel, and combustive-lubricant 
materials.1145  
Furthermore, in December 1993, Rahmon stated that “I have to say that, for Tajiks, friendly, 
robust and long-term relations with Uzbekistan is a historical factor [sic] and our nation needs 
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this.”1146  All throughout 1994, President Rahmon kept expressing his gratitude to the Uzbeks 
for their contribution to improving the situation in Tajikistan. In January 1994, he gladly 
acknowledged that Uzbekistan had agreed to pay 15% of the expenditure that Tajikistan had 
earmarked for its newly-formed national army.1147 He was sure that Uzbekistan “would spare no 
efforts in rebuilding our ruined economy.”1148 In May 1994, Rahmon stated that “with the help 
and support of our brothers we have overcome difficulties ranging from the Spring-time sewings 
to problems in the economy. The President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, personally cares that 
we [Tajiks] solve our problems quickly.”1149 In his speech at the UN General Assembly in 
September 1994, Rahmon thanked Uzbekistan for its efforts in relation to the “peaceful 
resolution of inter-Tajik conflict, as well as the maintenance of security and stability in the 
Central Asian region.”1150 Even during his first presidential campaign in 1994 Rahmon did not say 
anything negative about Uzbekistan, which had supported Abdullajonov’s candidacy. He rather 
criticized “enemies of national unity” and condemned them for using propaganda in public 
places and in the media to split “us into true and fake Tajiks, into Gharmis and Khujandis, Kulabis 
and Mastchohis, Pamiris and Hissaris, Uzbeks and Russians, Muslims and infidels.”1151  
The positive tone of the official rhetoric surrounding Uzbekistan’s role in the Tajik conflict began 
to fade after 9-day-long demonstrations in Leninobod in May 1996, which resulted in the 
dismissal of 70 local government officials, mostly Kulobis.1152 Rahmon accused Uzbekistan of 
supporting the demonstration.1153 Shortly after his visit to Uzbekistan in 1997, Rahmon began 
to talk about equality and justice in the relations between the two nations, as well as the  internal 
and external forces that wanted to spoil the “millennium-long” friendship:  
our relations should be based on the principles of equality, brotherhood, 
social justice and good-neighbourliness. […] Unfortunately, there are internal 
and external forces that would like to complicate our relations. However, the 
neighborhood of these two nations is decided by God, not by some 
politician.1154  
In April 1997, Rahmon survived an assassination.1155 This happened two months before the Tajik 
government, and the United Tajik Opposition forces, signed a peace treaty putting an end to the 
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civil war. In August 1997, Rahmon’s government survived a coup. Following these events 
Rahmon started to make implicit statements about the destructive role that Uzbekistan and its 
clients had played in the Tajik Civil War: 
Remember the attempted coup [in August 1997] that began with an 
attempted assassination of the President [in April 1997]; after the dirty 
intentions and plans of the killers were not realized, these traitors of the 
nation and motherland attempted to organize a military coup overtly. 
Fortunately, our great armed forces, in a demonstration of true heroism, 
destroyed the military group of putschists and saved the motherland from 
collapse. […] The nation had a good chance to recognize the faces, aims and 
intentions of the traitors, who traded their own Motherland and nation, who 
attempted to destroy our state with the help of their bosses abroad. 1156 
In response to such accusations, President Karimov of Uzbekistan said that “Sometimes it is 
necessary to remember how, with whose support, with whose resources, the current 
government of Tajikistan came to power. It should be occasionally remembered in order to 
regain the memory, to realize what they are doing.”1157 Overall, the positive rhetoric about the 
role of Uzbekistan in the Tajik civil war, which had been abundant up until this point, almost 
disappeared from Tajikistan’s official discourses.1158 Uzbekistan replaced the “demo-Islamic” as 
the “other” in Rahmon’s rhetoric. Casting a shadow on Uzbekistan’s previously positive 
reputation, Rahmon claimed that their true face had now been revealed:  
The separatists, who got scared of [sic] peace, tranquillity and national unity, 
attempted to divide society the hostile groups and to sow seeds of discord and 
distrust between the brotherly people of our country. […] [An investigation] 
will tear the masks off the faces of those who committed these anti-
constitutional actions with the help of their patrons abroad and their internal 
cohorts. It will reveal the ill-wishers of our nation.1159  
Following the occupation of the Khujand region by the forces of Colonel Khudoyberdiyev, in 
November 1998, Rahmon became more explicit in his accusations addressed to Uzbekistan. He 
highlighted the fact that Uzbek warlords sought to disrupt the process of national reconciliation 
in Tajikistan:  
[The internal and external enemies of Tajikistan] are trying to use all means to 
stop the national reconciliation process and spread hatred and enmity among 
the people. The events of August last year are evidence of that. Back then, 
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government forces destroyed criminal groups and maintained peace in the 
country. However, the leaders of these forces, who aspired to rise to power 
[in Tajikistan], did not learn their lesson. Without giving up their dirty plans, 
and with the backing of the external ill-wishers, they attempted to bring 
calamity to their own people. As you all know, on the morning of 4 November 
[1998], enemies of the nation, backed by intelligence services abroad, [sic] 
intruded upon the holy territory of our Motherland. After many unsuccessful 
attempts that had been made in the southern regions of the country, this time 
they chose the territory of the peaceful Leninobod region for their evil 
activities. […] The predatory attack of the armed gang, headed by Abdumalik 
Abdullodzhonov, Mahmud Khudoyberdiyev and their supporters, among 
whom were the citizens of Uzbekistan, as well as the mercenaries of the 
Afghan General of Uzbek origin, Dostum, resulted in the death of a dozen of 
law enforcement officers [of Tajikistan], who took the first blows upon 
themselves, as well as the peaceful civilians.1160 
Besides singling out Uzbek warlords and Uzbek citizens as the enemies of the Tajik nation, 
Rahmon accused Uzbekistan of providing support to them:  
[T]his time they came from the territory of the Republic of Uzbekistan. They 
were hiding there after repeatedly committing their black deeds [in 
Tajikistan]. Most probably this coup d’état would not have taken place if these 
individuals, who attempted to take over [Tajikistan], did not hide in the 
territory of another state after their initial plans failed last year.1161  
Furthermore, according to Rahmon these events helped the Tajik nation to find out who its true 
enemies and friends had been for the last six years (1992-1998):  
During the last six years, I have highlighted several times that the ultimate aim 
of the enemy is to liquidate the statehood of the Tajik nation. This threat is 
still present. The tragic events in Leninobod have once more proved this. 
However, our enemies should not forget that the people of Tajikistan have 
already recognized who is their friend and who is their enemy.1162 
While making implications about the negative role played by the ethnic Uzbek generals or 
Uzbekistan as a nation in the civil war, Rahmon made sure not to alienate the Uzbek population 
of Tajikistan:  
There were and there will always be forces that try to hinder the 
neighbourliness and friendship between the Tajik and Uzbek people. These 
forces will try to implant discord and hatred between them. However, they 
are deeply mistaken. There is no force that could destroy the friendship of our 
two nations. Statesmen may come and go, however, the friendship of the Tajik 
and the Uzbek people has been and will always be eternal.1163 
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Rahmon was careful enough to note that the enemy was not the Uzbek people but rather their 
leadership who were attempting create a divide between the peoples of each nation:  
Anyone who tries to play games with the fate of the Tajik and Uzbek people is 
a despicable enemy of the nation. The friendship of these two nations, which 
has survived several challenges over the centuries, cannot be destroyed by the 
intrigues of various adventurists and politicians.1164  
Tajik scholars, who were quick enough in following President Rahmon’s lead in blaming 
Uzbekistan for causing and aggravating the Tajik civil war, were not as careful as the President 
was: “[t]here is a popular belief [in Tajikistan] that the main reason for the start of the civil war 
in Tajikistan was an Uzbek plot to crush Tajik nationalism”.1165 
3.2. Linking Uzbekistan’s participation in the Tajik Civil War to the NTD of the 1920s 
It is common in Tajik scholarly discourses to link the civil war to NTD. As one Tajik scholar put it, 
“the roots of the civil war in the Republic of Tajikistan can undoubtedly be traced to incorrect 
policies regarding central power [sic] in the 1920s-1930s.” 1166 As far as Uzbekistan’s 
participation in the Tajik civil war is concerned, Tajik scholars believe that the Uzbek side craftily 
planned to take advantage of the Tajik civil war. According to Mullojanov, supporting Rahmon 
in 1992 was part of Uzbekistan’s century-long plan to take control of Tajikistan: 
Naturally, Tashkent was seriously expecting the new Tajik government [of 
Rahmonov] to follow Uzbekistan’s geopolitical orientation and give key official 
positions to representatives of the political lobby [sic] loyal to Tashkent. […] 
This would result in the victory of the “Great Uzbekistan” project, which […] 
would include post-war Tajikistan.1167   
Mullojanov implies that the idea of the “Greater Uzbekistan”, which the Uzbeks failed to achieve 
the 1920s, may have been realized in the 1990s. He is sure that “the roots of the current 
geopolitical standoff between the two neighbouring states should be sought precisely in this 
historical period [i.e., the 1920s].”1168 Dagiev, a Tajik scholar, similarly believes that Uzbekistan’s 
involvement in the Tajik civil war was an attempt to establish control over Tajikistan, following 
the course the Uzbek side has been pursuing since the separation of Tajikistan from 
Uzbekistan.1169 However, after Rahmon effectively defeated the pro-Uzbekistan forces during 
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the Tajik civil war, Uzbekistan lost its influence in inter-ethnic relations in Tajikistan, which 
started the currently ongoing deterioration in the Tajik-Uzbek relations. 1170  
An official newspaper published a letter from an ordinary reader, who wrote that “Uzbekistan, 
of course, wanted to use the situation to its benefit and do its best to return Tajikistan [to 
Uzbekistan’s territory] as it was in 1924.”1171 According to Dagiev, it was not only the Tajik 
people, but “particularly the Tajik leadership, who viewed Uzbekistan’s involvement in the Tajik 
civil war as an aggressive and hostile manifestation of the neighbouring country’s attitude to 
Tajikistan and the Tajik people.”1172 Indeed, President Rahmon shared these beliefs: 
In the last decade of the 20th century, tragic and horrible events were 
imposed on our nation, which aimed at eliminating the Tajik nation. And, as it 
was during the upheavals of the times of Shirinsho Shotemur, these [events of 
the civil war] were, in a different guise, attempts to liquidate the national state 
and statehood of Tajiks. 1173 
The Tajik scholars mention the growing nationalism in Tajikistan among the reasons why 
Uzbekistan developed a strong interest in the Tajik civil war. Dagiev, for example, states that 
Uzbekistan was afraid of the nationalistic slogans of the Tajik “Islamic Democratic 
opposition”.1174 Likewise, Mehrali Toshmuhammadov believes that Uzbekistan foresaw the 
threat of Tajik nationalists and felt threatened by their claims about returning “the lost cities”, 
i.e., Bukhara and Samarkand. In his own words, “Arrival of national-patriotic and Islamic forces 
in [Tajikistan] was considered, by Tashkent, to be a threat to Uzbekistan’s integrity and security, 
since “the talk of the town” was the issue of the ownership of two ancient – Samarqand and 
Bukhara.”1175 Another Tajik scholar, Rustam Shukurov, went as far as arguing that the loss of 
these two cities in the 1920s was the ultimate factor, which, in the long run, led to the Tajik civil 
war in the 1990s: 
The Tajiks suffered significant inter-ethnic disintegration following the loss of 
these two cities. A fierce debate erupted among the Tajik ethnos regarding 
the civilizational priority of this or that dialectic group. Deprived of its “head”, 
the “body” of the ethnos got dissected, and the Tajiks had to re-enter the path 
of ethnogenesis, which they had already been on once before. This, precisely, 
was one of the driving forces behind the civil war in Tajikistan.1176 
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Bukhara and Samarkand resurfaced in the last years of the Soviet Union and became part of the 
slogans of nationalistic movements such as Rastokhez. According to Shukurov: 
[I]f the issue of disputed territories used to be discussed in secret within party 
structures, in the 80s the problem was picked up by humanitarian [sic] 
intelligentsia. The whole range of letters were sent in this regard to [the CC of 
the CP of the Soviet Union] and the government. As far as we know, the last 
such letters from 1990, addressed to M.S. Gorbachev and E.A. Shevardnadze, 
and signed by the top members of the humanitarian elite of Tajikistan, was a 
good example of the [still ongoing] territorial dispute. The photocopied texts 
[of the letters] were actively circulated among the Tajik people.1177  
One of these letters was sent to the Political Bureau of the CC of the CP of the USSR and the 
Chair of the CC, M. Gorbachev, on 2 March 1989.1178 It is noteworthy that one of the appendices 
of the letter contained Shirinsho Shotemur’s letter to Stalin about “the socio-economic 
condition of Tajiks in the territory of the Uzbek Republic” sent in May 1926.1179 The other 
appendices included a detailed analysis of cases of Uzbekification from the 1920s till the 
1980s.1180 Reportedly, a similar letter was sent to President Karimov in 1990.1181 Bukhara and 
Samarkand were a hot topic in the press from 1990-1992, and as a result of this NTD became a 
topic “where authors did not hold back from quite tough evaluations regarding the Uzbeks.” 1182 
The fact that the fate of Bukhara and Samarkand became a popular topic was “a sign of the final 
acquisition of European paradigms of nationalism.”1183  
National identity discourses in Tajikistan ignore the fact that the Tajik civil war started as a clash 
of regional factions over governance and ideology. It is believed that Samarkand and Bukhara 
“became the real issue of the war.”1184 As far as the inter-Tajik fights during the civil war is 
concerned, Tajik scholars tend to play down the differences that the conflicting sides had: 
With Rahmon’s choice of Tajik nationalism, based on nostalgia for Samarqand 
and Bukhara, the differences between his government and the warring 
opposition faded away. The Tajik and Uzbek governments rather inevitably 
had clashing on this issue.1185  
In general, Uzbekistan emerged as the single most important “other” in memories of the Tajik 
civil war. As former government official Usmon Davlat put it, Uzbekistan was not only a 
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contributor to “fratricidal war” in Tajikistan but also, “under the influence of the past”, still did 
not take Tajikistan’s independence seriously.1186 
3.3. The “Uzbek hurdle” for Tajikistan’s economic development 
In August 2014, the ecological and economic-technical assessments of Roghun, financed by the 
World Bank, were completed. With minor suggestions, the assessment reports approved the 
construction of the Roghun HPS. However, the Uzbek side rejected these conclusions. The Uzbek 
Prime Minister, Rustam Azimov, stated that the evaluations had not been independent and 
impartial enough, as the tender had been organized by Tajikistan, even if the assessments had 
been financed by the World Bank. According to him, the final reports “are anything – essay, pre-
project review, student coursework – but a professional, qualified and truly expert evaluation of 
the construction project of the Roghun HPS.”1187 Moreover, he noted that none of Uzbekistan’s 
concerns had been addressed in the reports.1188 In fact, three months before the announcement 
of the outcomes of the assessments, the Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement 
emphasising that, regardless of the results of international assessment, construction of the 
Roghun HPS was not acceptable to Uzbekistan.1189 
For the Tajik side, this meant that, in fact, Uzbekistan had requested international assessments 
solely to postpone construction works in Roghun. In the words of Gulomiddin Saydiddinov, a 
Tajik energy expert, “Uzbekistan is just afraid that by building this HPS Tajikistan will start to 
experience a sustainable development.”1190 A former head of Barqi Tojik, Bahrom Sirojev, 
believed that, after the completion of the Roghun HPS, Tajikistan had the potential to compete 
with Uzbekistan in terms of energy exportation. According to him, “the Uzbek side has never 
attended any technical [sic] meetings. They just came to the fifth session to express their 
disagreement. Their statements have been ignorant.”1191  
Georgii Koshlakov, a former Senior Advisor to the Tajik President, argued that Uzbekistan’s 
arguments were “at the least – lies, at the most – sheer provocations.” 1192 He had no doubt that 
the current government of Uzbekistan “would not approve any conclusions” about Roghun.” 
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According to him, “when technical and economic issues intersect with political interests, 
common sense will absent itself.”1193 Mullojanov states that Uzbekistan’s uncompromising 
position might change “if the Uzbek side is allowed to construct the project and take control of 
the distribution of the water resources of Tajikistan.” 1194 However, he implies that this is 
impossible considering that maintain control over the construction of Roghun is a matter of 
sovereignty for Tajikistan. 1195 Abdughani Mamadazimov, the Chairman of the National 
Association of Political Scientists of Tajikistan, made a proposal for Tajikistan to disengage from 
political debates with Uzbekistan and instead concentrate on raising funds to finish the 
construction.1196  
Even though it had its own reasoning for taking the measures that it did, Uzbekistan was 
worsening its already negative image in the eyes of Tajiks. Rahmon picked up on this and started 
to play the Bukhara-Samarkand “card”. As was later leaked, in a closed-door meeting with 
approximately 50 Tajik journalists in 2009, Rahmon pledged to return Bukhara and Samarkand 
to Tajikistan’s control.1197 Arkadii Dubnov, a Russian journalist who publicized this, argued that 
by making this pledge “Rahmon sought to win the support of Tajik journalists.”1198 As he claims, 
“it is achievable if only [he manages] to look like a hero-patriot and a leader who is 
wholeheartedly devoted to his country and who knows how to lead the country to a bright 
future.”1199 According to Dubnov, “Rahmon knows that his hatred towards Uzbekistan fits in with 
the mood of a significant portion of the Tajik population.”1200 During the same meeting, Rahmon 
reportedly told journalists about how he had engaged in two fistfights with the Uzbek president 
and how the Uzbek leader wished the Tajik nation ill.  
Roghun had already emerged as a national idea. Making a financial contribution to the 
construction of Roghun equalled to supporting a national idea. As Sukhrob Sharipov, the then 
Head of the Centre for Strategic Studies under the President of Tajikistan, argued, anyone who 
did not make a personal financial contribution to Roghun enterprise could easily be labeled as a 
traitor or the enemy of the nation.1201 He also stated that “Neither any politician, nor president 
can take a step back. Otherwise, he can be announced as a traitor to the Motherland.1202 Two 
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years later, when a Tajik professor, Alimkhon Burkhonov, attempted to argue that Roghun was 
not viable and was dangerous and thus must be abandoned,1203 he was criticised for being 
against the economic development of Tajikistan. As the press-service of Barqi Tojik commented 
on the issue, “Professor Burkhonov […] is repeating the already-known arguments of opponents 
of Roghun”, and “the aim of these people is but one – to create hurdles to the economic 
prosperity of our republic.”1204 
One Tajik media outlet stated that Roghun was Rahmon’s last chance to develop the economy 
of Tajikistan.1205 Rahmon himself has continually called Roghun a matter of “life and death” for 
Tajikistan: 
I said this in my address [to the Parliament] last year, and I would like to repeat 
it: building the hydroelectric infrastructure is a matter of life and death for us. 
[…] Thus, in order to meet energy demands we have no other way. This will be 
the basis for the development of all spheres of the national economy […].1206 
Despite the numerous hurdles to Roghun’s construction created by Uzbekistan, their readiness 
to go as far as launching a war against the Tajiks, Tajikistan has no plans to abandon this 
important project. Rahmon has promoted it as a matter of national pride and prosperity:  
I would like to refer to each proud citizen, to all the generous and patriotic 
people of our nation, and particularly, to the qualified constructors and 
specialists in  the fileds of energy and construction. I would like to call for 
active participation in the prompt construction and finalization of Roghun HPS  
and contribution to the achievement of energy independence for the 
nation.1207  
So far, according to Rahmon, Tajikistan has made significant progress when it comes to supplying 
electricity to the households; he compares 3-5 hours of energy supply per day in the early 2000s 
to 12 hours of supply in 2015.1208 However, the 24-hour uninterrupted energy supply might still 
be further away than official Tajik discourses claim. Since 2007, the Tajik government has spent 
around $820 million on the Roghun project.1209 At this rate, it might take Tajikistan another 
decade or two to complete the Roghun HPS. It is most likely that during this period, relations 
with Uzbekistan will keep deteriorating and that Uzbekistan’s image within Tajikistan will 
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become yet more negative. This means that the Roghun project will keep triggering the Uzbek-
Tajik “self/other” dichotomy. Rahmon in his turn, will need to continue being Tajikistan’s 
national hero. Throughout the last decade, hardly any Tajik officials have acknowledged that, 
due to this dam, Tajikistan has lost millions of dollars in trade with Uzbekistan (see Figure 1), 
deprived its producers of the potential Uzbek market, with its population of 32 million, and lost 
secure energy and transportation routes without working out alternatives. 
Figure 4. Tajikistan's trade turnover and Uzbekistan's share in it. Source: Adapted from data available at 
the website of the Statistics Agency under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan - 
http://www.stat.tj/ru/library/table_43.xls and http://www.stat.tj/ru/library/table_44.xls. 
 
As some observers have noted “the difficulties presented by reaching a compromise on the scale 
of Roghun led to the indefinite postponement of devising solutions for all other problems in 
Tajik-Uzbek relations.”1210 As one Tajik journalist mentioned, there is hardly any sign that 
Tajikistan has had any meaningful negotiations with the Uzbek side on the Roghun HPS. In her 
own words, “I will not judge our diplomats. How, and about what, they have talked to Uzbekistan 
all these years, I do not know. Most importantly, there is no result other than deteriorating 
relations with the neighbor.” 1211 Roghun has no final price tag or completion date at this stage. 
However, the burden of the crisis in Tajik-Uzbek relations has had real impacts upon the Tajik 
economy thus far. It has been argued that “the national strategy of development ignores the 
notion that the state has reached a critical point, beyond which local natural resources will not 
suffice to develop the economy […].”1212 Nevertheless, the Tajik government seems to find the 
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prospect of adjusting the height of Roghun, in order to meet Uzbek demands, unimaginable. 
Similarly, abandoning the project completely remains unthinkable. Knowing that it would be 
unacceptable for the Tajik government to give up on the Roghun project, a Tajik poet allowed 
himself to issue this ultimatum to Rahmon: 
The time you give up Roghun, you are not the Shah, 
You ought to make Tajikistan an illuminated heaven. 
 
[Soate forigh zi Roghonu zi Shoḣon nestī, 
Tojikistonro biḣishtoso charoghon mekunї.]1213 
While the economic benefits of Roghun are yet to be seen, its symbolic value for Tajik national 
identity has been immense. For the last decade, Roghun has been triggering pride amongst the 
population and has been inspiring visions of a potentially great future for the nation as well as 
hatred for Uzbekistan. According to Joshua Kucera, Rahmon has gone so far as to claim that with 
the help of the Roghun dam, “[w]e will bring Uzbekistan to its knees.”1214 
3.4. Rahmon’s heroism amid the crises in the Tajik-Uzbek relations 
Tajikistan’s foreign policy is entirely under the control of President Rahmon. “As per the 
Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan, the President of Tajikistan is the Head of State and the 
executive body – government, [and] leads and defines the direction of the nation’s foreign 
policy.”1215 The President also controls the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.1216 As a former Tajik 
Foreign Minister acknowledges, “if we look to the last twenty years of history, we can see that, 
in the beginning, Tajikistan had no experience in planning and conducting its internal and foreign 
policies […]”1217 Nevertheless, Rahmon is depicted as a master of using foreign policy-making in 
bringing about political and economic stability:  
From the early days, Emomali Rahmon started to employ a far-sighted and 
consistent foreign policy strategy, [and] despite the difficult situation in the 
Republic, he found ways to use opportunities available overseas [imkoniia͡tḣoi 
khorijī] to solve the most difficult issues. This young leader and politician, who 
had a genuinely pure soul and perpetual knowledge and wisdom of the Tajik 
people [sic], created and utilized all necessary conditions to stop the civil war 
and stabilize the ruined economy […].1218 
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Amid the “cold war” with Uzbekistan over the Roghun project, national identity discourses in 
Tajikistan have consistently portrayed Rahmon as heroic. As some Tajik poets have written in 
poems devoted to Rahmon, his heroism resembles that of Bobojon Ghafurov and Sadriddin 
Aini,1219 and the spirits of Aini and Gafurov are happy with what he has been doing.1220 Rahmon 
has been hailed as the first true leader since the times of Makhsum and Shotemur, and it is said 
that he has been leading the Tajik nation towards unity, stability, peace and prosperity.1221 
Rahmon himself believes that Makhsum and Shotemur dreamt of “sovereignty, territorial unity, 
obeisance to a national language, state emblems, respect for national culture and  for the high 
values of world civilization,” so there is reason to be proud that these dreams are coming 
true.1222 This continuity applies to his efforts to end the civil war as well as to bring economic 
prosperity to the nation. In doing so, like the previous Heroes of Tajikistan he has been struggling 
against Uzbekistan.  
As the authors of a government-sponsored book about Rahmon argue, “the greatest successes 
and achievements of our country have been the result of selfless work and heroic effort on the 
part of Emomali Rahmonov.”1223 The narratives about Rahmon’s heroism mainly focus on 
notions that he ended the civil war and has been building the Tajik economy ever since. To begin 
with, Rahmon is hailed for bringing an end to the Tajik civil war. As Asia-Plus recounts: 
In the summer of 1992, when Kulob was choking under siege, he, an ordinary 
director of sovkhoz, led this warring region, and shortly thereafter, the whole 
country. […] Right after being elected as a chairman of the parliament, he 
promised: “I will bring peace to you!” He kept that pledge. […] The country 
was on the brink of collapse into “independent khanates” and [was at risk of] 
a complete disappearance from the political map of the world. Gradually, bit 
by bit, Emomali Rahmonov succeeded in maintaining stability. He initiated the 
peace process and carried it through to its logical end. For this, he has been 
awarded the title of “Hero of Tajikistan.”1224 
These type of narratives surrounding the Tajik civil war are common not only in mass media but 
also in official and literary discourses. A former Tajik Foreign Minister, Hamrokhon Zarifi, for 
instance, believes that Rahmon’s tactfulness and wisdom have allowed him to lead the nation 
towards peace and unity.1225 Tajik writers and poets wax lyrical about Rahmon’s heroism during 
the civil war. Explaining Rahmons “historical service” Sharifzoda and Murodov note that “by 
taking the control of the state [into his hands] Rahmon prevented its collapse, extinguished the 
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flame of the civil war, […] laid the political and legal foundations for signing the General 
Agreement on Establishment of Peace and National Consensus on 27 June 1997 […].1226 
Abdumalik Bahori, a Tajik poet, in his poem Ba Bakhti Mo [For the Sake of Our Happiness], after 
depicting the horrors of the war, glorifies “the morning after the nightmares,” when Rahmon 
became a new leader of the nation and made peace talks his agenda, thus “breaking the neck of 
the hatred.”1227 “The seeds of our peaceful negotiations bore harvest, bravo to you, a steadfast 
leader!” concludes the poet.1228 Another Tajik poet, Mahmud Ziyo, thanks Rahmon’s mother for 
“creating” the “creator” of the Tajik nation: 
A Tajik mother again gave birth to one of the Somon dynasty, 
She created Emomali Rahmon for this nation. 
I kneel before such woman, 
For she created a cure for the issues of Tajiks, 
And helped the people to achieve their goals. 
It does not suffice to call him Shah,  
For what she created is the Shah of all Shahs, 
My Tajikistan was sliced into pieces, 
But Rahmon created Tajikistan anew. 
 
[Modari tojik boz i͡ak Oli Somon ofarid, 
Baḣri millat ў Ėmomalii Raḣmon ofarid. 
Sajda meoram ba peshi inchunin zan dar ḣaët, 
K–az baroi dardi tojik malḣami jon ofarid, 
Khalqro imrūz dar kūi murodash ū rasond, 
Shoḣ guftan in kam ast, ū Shoḣi Shoḣon ofarid! 
Pora–pora Tojikistoni maro kardand, lek 
Az sari nav ibni Raḣmon Tojikiston ofarid!]1229 
The following poems by Mirzo Faizali depict Rahmon as the only signatory of the peace treaty 
worthy of a golden statue: 
He went to Kabul, Tehran, and Moscow to say peace, 
He stood to defend his nation like Ismail Somoni. 
Supported by God in his great efforts, 
Look, he brought peace to the Motherland.   
 
[Kalomi sulḣ dar lab Kobulu Teḣronu Maskav raft, 
Chu Ismoili Somonӣ ba ḣifzi millatash barkhost. 
Dar in azmu talosh ūro Khudo, ki raḣnamoi͡ash shud, 
Bubined, in zamon sulḣu amonii Vatan barjost.]1230 
 
Let me put aside his all other good deeds, 
Just for the peace that he brought to the country, 
To this selfless great man of the nation, 
I would build a golden statue, if I could! 
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[Ḣama aʺmoli neki digarashro i͡ak taraf monam, 
Faqat bar khotiri sulḣe, ki barpo kard dar kishvar, 
Ba in mardi buzurgu jonfidoi millatu Meḣan, 
Agar az dasti man oi͡ad, guzoram ḣaǐkale az zar!]1231 
For some Tajik scholars, Rahmon not only ended the civil war and united the nation, but also set 
forth Tajik nationalism: 
[R]evival of Tajik nationalism was something for which Tajik nationalists had to 
wait until Rahmon came to power. Rahmon came to power as a result of the civil 
war, to aid the development of Tajik nationalism, which provided a stronger 
national identity for the Tajik people. Rahmon also maintained the unity of state 
and society, which gained him a sense of legitimacy and support internationally 
and domestically. This helped to preserve the state-ness of the post-Communist, 
post-civil war Tajikistan, which was exceptionally fragile. [In general,] Tajik 
nationalism enabled Rahmon to cement his image as a national hero.1232 
Discussing the peculiarities of the nationalism endorsed by Rahmon, Dagiev notes that he “tried 
to include and incorporate most of the UTO’s national projects in the process of recreating and 
re-forging Tajik national identity. This, once again, raised the issue of Samarqand and Bukhara 
and Tajik community in Uzbekistan.”1233  
As far as Roghun is concerned, official news sources depict Rahmon as taking a direct part in the 
construction works. Regarding one of many meetings held beween Rahmon and  the 
construction workers in Roghun, an official newspaper highlighted that “the quality of the repair 
works, continuation of the construction works, high mood and spirit of the workers of this site 
show that the instructions and advice of the President of the country, in relation to thethe 
accomplishment of every task with high durability and quality,  have been taken seriously.”1234 
Rahmon uses every possible opportunity to highlight that energy independence, which can only 
be achieved by building Roghun, is a priority for the Tajik government. Referring to such claims, 
Jumhuriyat, an official Tajik newspaper, stated that Tajikistan’s energy independence is close: 
These words, which evidence that ever bigger measures are being taken to 
achieve progress in the energy sphere, give hope to both the energy workers 
and the population of the country, who experience energy shortage in cold 
seasons. Light can be seen from a distance, and we are all convinced that due 
to the effective policies of the President of the nation, Emomali Rahmon, we 
are close to achieving energy independence. 1235 
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Along with mass media, Tajik writers and poets have expended some effort upon attempts to 
romanticize the Roghun project.1236 “In response to a request from the President of the Republic 
of Tajikistan about contributing to the construction of Roghun HPS, the Union of Writers of 
Tajikistan requested that all writers pay special attention to inscribing the heroism of workers 
of the greatest construction of the century.” 1237 In a meeting organized by the Union, a dozen 
of writers and poets reviewed what had been written on Roghun so far and pledged to write 
more about it. 1238 As part of the joint effort of Tajik writers, in 2010 a collection of literary works 
devoted to Roghun was published under the title of Navrūzi Roghun.1239 In his speech during the 
14th Meeting of the Writers of Tajikistan, Mehmon Bakhti, the Chair of the Union of the Writers 
of Tajikistan, listed several new books written on the topic of Roghun, noting that these were 
written to meet the demands of President Rahmon.1240 Another interesting work to mention is 
a trilogy by Jamoliddin Toshmatov, an ethnic Uzbek writer of Tajikistan, devoted to three HPSs, 
Nurek, Sangtuda, and Roghun.1241  
Tajik poets have written passionate poems about Rahmon’s heroic efforts to go on with 
constructing the Roghun dam contrary to barriers created by Uzbekistan. In a literary 
representation of such heroic deed, Abdusamad Jo’rayev, in his poem titled Ilhom az Roghun 
[An Inspiration from Roghun], says: 
The leader of my nation is Emomali the Connoisseur, 
 Roghun went on following his great steps. 
 He has been receiving a reprimand of the neighbor, 
The Vakhsh River is the sign [sic] of my Mawarannahr. 
  
[Peshvoi millatam Ėmomalii nuktadon, 
Bo qadamḣoi buzurgash sūi Roghun shud ravon. 
To ba in dam mekashad ū minnati ḣamsoi͡aro, 
Vakhsh khud nomu nishoni Movaronaḣri man ast.]1242 
 
Mirzo Faizali in one of his poems depicts Roghun as a site of battle, where national dignity will 
be  either lost or won: 
Roghun is a battlefield, 
The battlefield of honor. 
It is the frontline of national pride, 
The arena [of struggle] of disgrace and dignity.  
 
                                                          
1236 Jovid Muqim, a Tajik journalist and scholar, provides an interesting review of the journalistic and literary works 
devoted to Roghun. See Jovid Muqim, "Naqshi ocherk va publitsistika dar tashakkuli afkori jomea," Jovidmuqim's 
Blog, 15 May, 2013. 
1237 "Ishtiroki adibon dar sokhtmoni Nerūgoḣi barqi obii Roghun," Jumḣuriia͡t, n.d. 
1238 Ibid. 
1239 "Naqshi ocherk va publitsistika dar tashakkuli afkori jomea. 
1240 See "Sukhanronii Raisi Ittifoqi navisandagoni Tojikiston Meḣmon Bakhtī dar Anjumani 14-umi navisandagon," 
Ittifoqi navisandagoni Tojikiston, 2015. 
1241 U. Abdulloeva, "Anʺanai zullisonaǐnī dar nasri davrai navi tojik," Paëmi Donishgoḣi millii Tojikiston 97, no. 4/6 
(2012): 183. 
1242 See Sharifzoda and Murodov, E'zhosi Rahmon: Mazhmuai she'rho dar vasfi Prezidenti Zhumhuriiati Tozhikiston 
Emomali Rahmon, 31. 
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[Saḣni Roghun korzor ast, 
Korzori  iftikhor ast.  
Jabḣai nomusi millat, 
Arsai nang astu or ast.]1243 
4. Conclusion 
The dominant discourses on the Tajik civil war and the Roghun project represent Uzbekistan as 
the enemy of Tajik national unity and economic prosperity. Such a negative image of Uzbekistan 
fits perfectly into the historical narratives of “Uzbek atrocities” being perpetrated against the 
Tajiks. Tajik-Uzbek tensions have  always had their own hero; Shirinsho Shotemur and Nusratullo 
Makhsum struggled for Tajik nationhood and statehood against Uzbek leadership, whereas 
Sadriddin Aini successfully demonstrated that, contrary to the assertions of Uzbek nationalists, 
the Tajiks have always had a well-developed language and rich literature, which made them a 
fully-fledged nation. In his turn, Bobojon Ghafurov, by writing the history of the Tajik nation, 
proved that the Tajiks are the most ancient people of Central Asia. Thus, all other nations that 
came to Central Asia later reside on what were originally Tajik lands. In a similar manner, 
Rahmon, as the only living Hero of Tajikistan, is arguably continuing the deeds of the past 
national heroes.  
Considering Tajikistan’s interdependence with Uzbekistan in regards to transportation, energy 
and water, as well as in terms of history and culture, relations with the Uzbek republic can be 
viewed as a central factor in Tajikistan’s overall development. Therefore, Tajikistan’s sour 
relations with Uzbekistan have been a heavy burden for the political and economic 
development of the nation. However, given that memories of the civil war and ongoing disputes 
about the Roghun dam have created a negative image of Uzbekistan, a perpetual conflict with 
Uzbekistan might have positive implications for Tajik national identity. Because “[e]ven a 
harmful or self-defeating relationship can provide ontological security, which means states can 
become attached to conflict.”1244 In other words, crises in Tajik-Uzbek relations and the 
subsequent demonization of Uzbekistan by the Tajik side has been essential to the smooth 
discursive construction of Tajik national identity vis-à-vis the Uzbek “other.” This supports 
Campbell’’s statement that “[t]he constant articulation of danger through foreign policy is not 
a threat to a state’s identity or existence: it is a condition of its possibility.”1245  
                                                          
1243 Amriddin, "Vatandorī ba sidq astu ba imon." 
1244 Mitzen, "Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma," 342. 
1245 Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, 13. 
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Conclusion 
 
The lives of heroes become playgrounds of the imagination,  
richly inviting terrains for ideological projection and mythical speculation.1246 
 
1. Summary of the argument 
Using reflexivist methodology, post-structuralist theory, and discourse analysis methods, this 
thesis has demonstrated the direct links between “domestically” and “internationally” 
constructed sets of self/other dichotomy in Tajikistan. At the domestic level, historical narratives 
on Tajik national statehood, language (and literature), and historiography construct an image of 
Tajik “self” that has survived “atrocities” committed by the Uzbek “other”. At an inter-state level, 
covering bilateral issues with post-Soviet Uzbekistan, Tajik official, journalistic and literary 
discourse depict the image of a vulnerable “self” and a dangerous Uzbek “other”. The links 
between the two levels of “self” and “other” construction mean that the politics of identity is 
more than a matter of domestic policy; identity politics encompasses all aspects of the state’s 
function – “domestic” and “external” – aimed at ensuring the construction of “self” and “other”. 
In the words of David Campbell, “identity in the realm of global politics can be understood as 
the outcome of exclusionary practices in which resistant elements to a secure identity on the 
inside are linked through a discourse of danger with threats identified and located on the 
outside.”1247 
Consequently, three functions of identity politics ought to be highlighted. First, the politics of 
identity has an epistemic function. Through discourse, it outlines the moral space of identity, 
thus, informing the population about what is good and acceptable. In this regard, media, 
education systems, linguistic reforms, historiography, and national events as well as legitimate 
violence methods are relevant means of discourse production. Second, identity politics has a 
boundary-making performance. Relying on the moral space of identity, it locates the “self” and 
“other” and highlights the boundaries between them. The positive qualities and ideas associated 
with the moral space are deemed to be the core of national identity, whereas anything that 
opposes those ideas becomes associated with the “other” and, by default, remains forever 
excluded by the boundaries of “self”. Third, identity politics is aimed at maintaining ontological 
security. This makes identity/alterity construction a never-ending and ever-inchoate process. To 
                                                          
1246 Cubitt, "Introduction," 3. 
1247 David Campbell, "Global Inscription: How Foreign Policy Constitutes the United States," Alternatives: Global, 
Local, Political 15, no. 3 (1990): 266. 
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borrow Campbell’s words again, it is the state’s “evangelical” function to locate the dangerous 
“other”, because, otherwise, there will be no reason for the state to exist. 
This thesis revealed that one of the means of politics of identity – the commemoration of 
national heroes – can fulfil all mentioned functions. Heroes define the moral space by 
representing exemplary qualities around which national identity can be constructed. 
Simultaneously, discourses on heroes either implicitly or explicitly establish which qualities are 
unacceptable or threatening, which ideas that are necessarily associated with “other”. As Manzo 
puts it, “[n]ations are typically invented through allegorical stories about birth or awakening” 
where “godlike founding fathers” impersonate how the nation “stood up in opposition to some 
form of oppression and tyranny.”1248 Using Tajikistan’s politics of identity and its foreign policy 
issues with neighbouring Uzbekistan, this research made an original contribution that an 
analyses of discourses surrounding national heroes can be helpful in understanding interstate 
relations.  
The bulk of this thesis has dealt with explaining why the Tajik government chose six personalities 
from the recent history of Tajikistan to be national Heroes and why the government has 
expended significant effort to highlight the aspects of the Heroes’ personal and professional 
lives that feature struggle against Uzbek dominance. Specific chapters have been devoted to an 
analysis of discourses on the Heroes preceded by a review of the context of those discourses. 
For instance, the chapter on Shirinsho Shotemur and Nusratullo Makhsum revealed that in 
Tajikistan the heroism of these two statesmen is explained in terms of their methodical struggle 
against debilitating Uzbek dominance and their concerted efforts toward preserving Tajik 
statehood and nationhood from Uzbek threat in the 1920s. Other representatives of the Tajik 
elite are remembered as traitors to the Tajik nation for their cooperation with the Uzbek elite. 
Uzbeks are explicitly defined as the “other” in these discourses. Sadriddin Aini, in his turn, is 
remembered in Tajikistan as the founder of Tajik literature and linguistics, which proved 
instrumental in defending Tajik national identity from Uzbek threat in the period between the 
1920s-1940s. It was also shown that Tajik narratives on Aini ignore the aspects of his life where 
he struggled to choose his national identity, and overlook Aini’s contribution to the Uzbek prose 
of the 1920s. The chapter on Bobojon Gafurov showed that his heroism in Tajikistan is defined 
in terms of his contribution to the construction of the historiographic foundations of the 
superior Tajik “self” and the inferior Uzbek “other”.  
                                                          
1248 Kathryn Manzo, Creating boundaries: The politics of race and nation (London: Lynne Rienner Publisher Inc, 
1996), 40. 
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The dominant narratives in Tajikistan about the heroism of these personalities maintain the 
ontological security of the Tajik “self”. This explains why any archival discovery about Shotemur 
or Makhsum attracts nationwide news coverage;1249 why Aini’s “Turkestani” identity is absent in 
Tajik discourses;1250 and why any minor attempt to discredit Ghafurov’s image as a historian 
mobilizes Tajik officials, scholars and journalists to leap to his defence.1251 As Cubitt notes, 
“[w]hat resonates is not the life [of the founding fathers] as lived, but the life as made sense of, 
the life imaginatively reconstructed and rendered significant.”1252 So, what is sacrosanct is not 
only the images of the heroes, but also what is deemed as significant in their lives and deeds. In 
the case of the Heroes of Tajikistan, dominant discourses establish the defence of the Tajik “self” 
from the threat of the Uzbek “other” as the core element of heroism. As the last chapter of this 
thesis revealed, problematic relations with Uzbekistan are made sense of in Tajikistan by relying 
on these dominant narratives, i.e., the necessity of defending the Tajik “self” from the dangerous 
Uzbek “other”. In this regard, the discourses pre-define the courses of action that President 
Emomali Rahmon, who holds the title of Hero of Tajikistan, can and should take in relation to 
the Uzbek “other”. The historical discourses also pre-define any concession made upon the 
pressure of the Uzbek side in bilateral issues as a sign of anti-heroism.  
This does not necessarily mean that Rahmon has been acting under the pressure of his Hero 
title. It rather means that the deterioration of relations with Uzbekistan to an historically low 
and economically unviable level under his presidency have increased the image of his heroism, 
as he has stood against Uzbek pressure. Furthermore, no matter what reasoning is used on the 
Uzbek side of the conflict, it reaches the Tajik side (including the Tajik population) in the form of 
the moral settings that the dominant narratives pre-set. In other words, constructed public 
‘knowledge’ of the historical animosity of Uzbeks appears to be justifying an uncompromising 
position on foreign policy issues, whereas any issue that emerges in relations with Uzbekistan 
appear to be the continuation of historic “atrocities” towards Tajikistan, which in turn, boost 
national memories about “bad” Uzbeks. In this regard, unfriendly relations with Uzbekistan are 
not only the source of a threat but also a condition for the success of the politics of national 
                                                          
1249 The chapter 3 shows the process of steady consolidation of new knowledge on Shotemur and Makhsum such as 
videos, letters, oral memories, etc. 
1250 The chapter 4 reveals that Aini’s emergence as the defender of the Tajik language has not been straightforward, 
contrary to the assertions of the Tajik discourses. 
1251 For instance, in March 2009, when a Soviet archaeologist Boris Litvinskii claimed the authorship of Ghafurov’s 
Tadzhiki, Tajik media and forums reacted fiercely, which eventually forced Litvinkskii and his interviewer to change 
the original text of the interview. For the original text of Litvinskii's interview, see Yanovskaia, "Boris Litvinskii: My 
podarili tadzhikskomu narodu pervuiu polnotsennuiu istoriiu." For the reaction of the Tajik scholars to Litvinskii's 
claim, see K. Rustam, "Zachem Gospodin Litvinskii Lzhiot?," Iran-name, no. 1 (2009); A. Turson, ""Sbros' Obuzu 
Korysti, Tsheslaviie Gnet...": Po Povodu Odnogo Akademicheskogo Skandala Provintsial'noi Zakvaski," Iran-name, 
no. 1 (2009); Ikrami, "Kto na samom dele napisal "Tadzhiki"?." For a reaction by a Tajik official, see A. Dostiev, 
"Istoriia ne mozhet byt podarkom," TAJINFO, 3 May 2009. 
1252 Cubitt, "Introduction," 3. 
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cohesion in Tajikistan. Because “[t]he constant articulation of danger through foreign policy is 
not a threat to a state’s identity or existence: it is its condition of possibility.”1253 Last, but not 
least, “[t]he construction of the ‘outside’ as hostile and threatening, legitimises violence in 
international relations.”1254 
2. Dominant discourses as a burden on goodwill: reflections on emerging détente in 
Tajik-Uzbek relations 
Knowledge created by using the reflexive methodology is “instrumentally valuable, but only 
insofar as it provokes greater self-awareness and self-reflection on the part of the producers and 
consumers of such knowledge.”1255 This thesis, despite belonging to a narrow field of IR 
scholarship, can be helpful for the “producers” and “consumers” of the discourses on Tajik “self” 
and Uzbek “other” in better reflecting on their contributions to the bilateral relations between 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Furthermore, “[fo]r a reflexivist, knowing the world and changing the 
world are inseparable.”1256 Thus, this thesis suggests that the Tajik and Uzbeks states should 
invest in mutually complementing modes of national identity projects, which eventually should 
lead to a change of the current dominant discourses. This suggestion is based on the belief that 
Tajik and Uzbek people deserve better relations between their two nations. 
Since the death of the first President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, there have been signs of 
improvement in bilateral relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In October 2016, the 
Uzbek ambassador in Dushanbe, informed about the ongoing bilateral talks on improved visa 
processing for the national of Tajikistan.1257 In late December 2016, the Uzbek delegation visited 
Dushanbe to discuss economic and trade cooperation, as well as the establishment of direct 
flights and a railway link between the two states.1258 In January 2017, the two sides started 
negotiations on a new railway route that connects Tajikistan with Russia via Uzbek territory.1259 
The Uzbek side also announced plans to introduce direct flights to Dushanbe no later than April 
2017.1260 However, there are no official announcements regarding any agreements on the 
construction of the Roghun HPS, which has been one of the main issues in bilateral relations.  
                                                          
1253 Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, 13. 
1254 Jill Steans et al., An Introduction to International Relations Theory: Perspectives and Themes  (Harlow, Essex: 
Pearson, 2010), 150. 
1255 Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the 
Study of World Politics, 198. 
1256 Ibid., 160. 
1257 "Tadzhikistan i Uzbekistan rassmotri͡at vopros smi͡agchenii͡a vizovogo rezhima," Avesta, 25 October 2016. 
1258 "Tadzhikistan i Uzbekistan podtverdili vozobnovlenie aviasoobshchenii͡a," Regnum, 29 December 2016. 
1259 "Zheleznodorozhniki Tadzhikistana i Uzbekistana obsuzhdai͡ut novyǐ marshrut v Rossii͡u," Avesta, 24 January 
2017. 
1260 "NAK «Uzbekiston khavo ǐullari» v 2017 g. otkroet novye reǐsy," UzDaily, 27 January 2017. 
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All the goodwill about visa, transportation, and demarcation might get wiped out by unresolved 
disagreements over Roghun – the national idea in Tajikistan, as it happened in 2007-2011. Most 
importantly, there is no sign that in the near future the sides plan to discuss the issue of 
conflicting histories and mutually antagonistic national identities. A Tajik scholar rightly noted 
that without solving this issue, all other achievements in bilateral relations might remain tense: 
Neither momentous détente nor fundamental deterioration should be expected to 
happen in the Tajik-Uzbek relations. The status-quo is more likely to retain, even 
though certain improvements such as the introduction of new [transportation] 
communications, and improvements in visa processing are possible. However, a 
particular level of tension in the [bilateral] relations will prevail for a considerably long 
time; at least, until a mutually acceptable form of compromise is not achieved between 
the Tajik and Uzbek national projects.1261 
The first, unfriendly gesture from either of the sides regarding the Roghun project might easily 
bring relations back to their “cold war” state. A deterioration in bilateral relations might further 
be excacerbated by the long-pending demarcation of state borders. In November 2016, the 
Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the two sides had three-day negotiations 
devoted to border demarcations issues.1262 The last of such meetings failed in February 2009, 
when there was a major disagreement about the Farkhad HPS.1263 While the Farkhad HPS was a 
matter of negotiations, there was also the issue of Bukhara and Samarkand, which the Tajik side 
viewed as a legitimate part of demarcation talks. In the early 1990s, the Tajik side had already 
attempted to link Bukhara and Samarkand to demarcation issues: 
We stated that we would agree to solve the demarcation issue if only Uzbekistan 
accepted one condition. If Uzbekistan acknowledges that the cities of Samarkand and 
Bukhara are the historical and cultural cities of the Tajiks, then we can proceed with 
the demarcation. Otherwise, no. Uzbekistan did not accept this. We also said that we 
are not going to go ahead [with the demarcation], and that, today, we should still not 
proceed. […] These [un-demarcated] borders do not cost us anything [non 
namekhurad]. […] The tenth or further generation will come and solve the [the 
demarcation] issue, but until then we should keep silent. No one should attempt to 
raise the issue, because it is sin and crime.1264 
Viewing the issues of delimitation and demarcation through the prism of the already crystallized 
notion of “lost territories” has been inevitable for the Tajik side, given the dominant narratives 
of Tajik “self” and Uzbek “other” in Tajikistan. On the other hand, lingering demarcation 
                                                          
1261 Mullodzhanov, "Tadzhiksko-uzbekskiie otnosheniia - dinamika razvitiia i perspektivy." 
1262 "O vstreche rabochikh grupp pravitelʹstvennykh delegat͡siǐ Uzbekistana i Tadzhikistana po voprosam granit͡sy," 
Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Respubliki Uzbekistan, 20 November 2016 2016. 
1263 "Uzbeks, Tajiks Resume Border Talks After Three-Year Pause," Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, 20 February 
2012. The attempts to resume the talks in 2012 failed. See "Tadzhiksko-uzbekskiie peregovory po granitse. Kazhdyi 
ostalsia pri svoiom," Avesta.tj, 23 February 2012. There is a disagreement over the ownership of the Farkhad HPS; 
the Tajik side argues that the dam of the HPS was rented by Uzbekistan, whereas the Uzbek side believes that 
Tajikistan has received some lands equivalent to the territory of the dam, which should mean that the two lands 
were swapped forever.  
1264 Abduqaiumi Qaiumzod, "Rahim Masov: Tozhik qamvu qabila nadorad," Radioi Ozodi, 18 January 2011. 
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continues to trigger mutual accusations of territorial occupation. For instance, a Tajik official 
once called Uzbekistan’s behaviour in relation to the Farkhad HPS as “an attempt to annexe 
sovereign Tajikistan’s territory”,1265 which is a readily recognizable behaviour associated with 
the Uzbek side as per the dominant discourses in Tajikistan. As Doty notes, “[i]f the same kinds 
of subjects, objects, and relations are found to exist in different texts, this is indicative of a 
particular logic at work. We can think of texts that illustrate the same kind of logic as constituting 
a controlling or dominant discourse.”1266 So, every time the sides resorted to the blame-game, 
they were involved in further fortifying dominant discourses. As a result, relations between the 
two nations have become the captive of dominant discourses on “self” and “other” relations. 
Each side expects a change in the behaviour of the other side.1267 However, none of the sides 
have come to understand, so far, that the dominant discourses about the “self” and “other” on 
both sides will need to change prior to any behavioural change taking place. The language of 
these narratives, the discursively constructed images of the other are not merely matters of 
domestic “consumption”. They create the world that we live in. To use Jackson’s words, “our 
very experience of the world is inescapably mediated by the conceptual and linguistic apparatus 
that we bring to bear when producing knowledge of the world.”1268  
Overall, this thesis has established a direction that might lead to a better understanding of why 
nation-states easily get into military confrontations with each other even if conflicts are not 
economically or “logically” viable. Also, the findings of this thesis may be well supplemented 
with research on how the Tajik population perceives dominant discourses on the construction 
of the Tajik “self” vis-à-vis the Uzbek “other”. The popular perception of the “self” and “other” 
is beyond the methodological capabilities of the Campbelian post-structuralist, which should be 
deemed as one of its limitations. Furthermore, the complex nature of Tajik-Uzbek relations 
necessitates a separate scholarly inquiry into practices surrounding the discursive construction 
of the “other” in Uzbekistan. These studies would clarify the role, if any, of the Tajik “other” in 
the construction of Uzbek “self”.1269 Finally, the methodology and theoretical assumptions used 
                                                          
1265 See "Gazovyi ultimatum Tashkenta. Uzbekistan sprovotsiroval promyshlennyi kollaps v Tadzhikistane," Avesta.tj, 
9 April 2012. 
1266 Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of US Counterinsurgency Policy in the 
Philippines," 308. 
1267 For instance, according to a Tajik political scientist, Uzbekistan “has to revise certain parameters in relations 
with Tajikistan” and “find the courage to sit around the negotiation table”. See Daler Ikromov, "Sharipov nameknul 
Uzbekistanu, chto v sluchae destabilizat͡sii Tadzhikistana, prezhde vsego postradai͡ut uzbeki," TJKNews.com, 15 July 
2010. According to an Uzbek diplomat, rather than tying their patriotism to the construction of HPS, the Tajik 
consumers should learn paying for the used electricity. See Sanjar Hamidov, "Ėkskli͡uzivnoe intervʹi͡u: Shokasym 
Shoislamov, posol Uzbekistana v Tadzhikistane," Stan, 26 November 2009. 
1268 Jackson, "Foregrounding ontology: dualism, monism, and IR theory," 130. 
1269 An article by Suyarkulova is a good start in this regard, though a bit limited to the study of the metaphorical use 
of water in Uzbek discourses. See Suyarkulova, "Between national idea and international conflict: the Roghun HHP 
as an anti-colonial endeavor, body of the nation, and national wealth." 
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in this thesis might be a useful means of better understanding the complexities of our presently 
emerging “post-truth” world.  
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